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The study aims to design the optimal track access tariff to coordinate the relationship between 
an Infrastructure Manager (IM) and a Freight Operating Company (FOC) in a vertical separated 
railway system. In practice, the IM takes advantage of leader position in determining the prices 
to unilaterally maximise its profits without the collaboration with the FOC, which leads to a 
sub-optimal situation. 
  
The interaction between the IM and the FOC is modelled as a network-based Stackelberg game. 
First, a rigorous bilevel optimisation model is presented that determines the best prices for an 
IM to maximise its profits without any collaboration with the FOC. The lower level of the 
bilevel model contains binary integer variables representing the FOC’s choices on the itineraries, 
which is a challenging optimisation problem not resolved in the literature. The study proposes 
a uniquely designed solution method involving both gradient search and local search to 
successfully solve the problem.  Secondly, an inverse programming model is developed to 
determine the IM’s prices to maximise the system profit and achieve global optimality. A 
Fenchel cutting plane based algorithm is developed to solve the inverse optimisation model. 
Thirdly, a government subsidy based pricing mechanism is designed. To identify the optimal 
amount of subsidy, a double-layer gradient search and local search method is developed. The 
proposed mechanism can lead to the global optimality and ensure that the IM and the FOC are 
better off than the above two scenarios.  
 
Numerical cases based on the data from the UK rail freight industry are conducted to validate 
the models and algorithms. The results reveal that both the optimal prices obtained via inverse 
optimisation and the subsidy contract outperform the non-cooperation case in the current 
industrial practice; and that the cooperation between the IM and the FOC in determining track 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Rail plays an important role in the intermodal freight transportation network due to its 
economical and technological advantages (Islam, Ricci and Nelldal, 2016).  In the UK and some 
other western countries, vertical separation governance structure has been adopted as an 
innovative method to prevent infrastructure owners from being monopolists (Nash et al., 2014; 
Islam and O, 2016). After the separation of railway ownership from operation, a topical issue 
arising is how an Infrastructure Manager (IM) should charge Freight Operating Companies 
(FOC) for the use of rail infrastructure. This study will make contribution to designing a better 
pricing mechanism for a vertical separated railway system. 
 
In this chapter, the context of the research will be explained. Four aspects of the research context 
will be considered: 1) the role of rail in the multimodal freight transportation system; 2) the 
technological and economical advantages of rail freight; 3) the governance structures in the rail 
freight industry; 4) the development of UK rail freight industry. Following on from this research 
context, the research questions, objectives and novelty will be presented at the end of the 
chapter.   
 
1.1 The Role of Rail in the Multimodal Freight Transportation System 
Freight transportation is essential for the development of a modern society. It enables the 
movement of raw materials, semi-finished, as well as finished products from one point to 
another. It acts as the lifeblood system of human society in association with the passenger 
transportation system (Engström, 2016). The transportation modes by which freight can achieve 
mobility come in four forms: land (that includes road, rail and multimodal), water (that includes 
maritime, coastal and inland waterways), pipeline and air (Figure 1). As shown in Figure 2 the 
cargoes can be delivered from an origin point to a destination point carried by a single transport 
mode only or multimodal transport mode. Multimodal transport provides a door-to-door service 
where road transport is normally used for the pickup and “last mile” delivery service and the 
other transportation modes, e.g., rail, water, and air, are used for long-haul transportation.  
 
Freight transport has brought undoubted benefits such as improved mobility of goods and 
services to society, however it also generates some negative impacts such as greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission, congestion resulting in unreliable transport or journeys and accidents 
resulting in damage to goods/materials, injuries and fatalities. Compared to road transport, rail 
transport is more friendly to the environment as it produces less GHG and causes less 




The European Commission’s Transport White Paper 2011 has set a target of modal shift, by 
2030, 30% of road freight over 300km should shift to other modes such as rail or waterborne 
transport, and more than 50% by 2050. This indicates there are efficiency and capacity 
requirements for rail freight transportation over long distances (European Commission, 2011). 
The policy target for rail freight transport also suggests that rail will play a more important role 
than it is playing currently. This signals a valuable opportunity for the rail freight industry. In 
the meantime, all the stakeholders involved in the rail freight industry, including but not limited 
to infrastructure managers and freight service operators have been facing the increasing 
pressure of competition from other transportation modes, in particular roads, which forces the 
stakeholders to review and optimise their business management process, as well as their pricing 




Figure 1 The Main Freight Modal Options  












Figure 2 An example of a Multimodal Rail Freight Service Operation 
Source: (Islam, 2014)  
 
1.2 Technological and Economical Features of Rail Freight  
In spite of the competition from the other transportation modes, rail freight has unique 
competitive advantages. With its pros and cons, rail plays a vital role in the economy. It is the 
engine of real economic activity and moves goods along supply chains. It brings benefits to the 
economy through productivity and environmental benefits such as reduced road congestion and 
emissions. The most obvious properties of rail freight transportation include: 
 
Cost-Efficiency    
Consistent with the common purchase principle, freight customers select an appropriate 
transportation mode which has the highest cost-efficiency. Comparing road transport with rail 
freight transport, shippers can determine that, in many cases, rail freight transport is a better 
choice resulting from economies of scale, particularly reflected in low value bulk cargo 
transportation such as coal and container transportation. In recent years there are signs of 
increasing volume of containerised cargo transport by rail (Department for Transport (DfT), 
2016b).  
 
Longer distance is an important factor for rail (and waterways) transportation option in terms 
of a break-even point. Researchers (Bontekoning, Macharis and Trip, 2004;(Mortimer and 
Islam, 2017) found  that rail freight transport is cheaper than road transport for  transportation 
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of goods 246 miles on rail but only 88 miles by road (Network Rail, 2017a), therefore, 
multimodal transport including rail, i.e. motor-rail multimodal transport can provide a cheaper 
inland freight service compared with truck only transport. 
  
Reliability   
Nowadays competition exists in every corner of the economic field. In order to improve 
competitiveness, companies need to make use of all key elements. When considering 
competitiveness, people may naturally think about cost. It is true that cost-efficiency is a key 
indicator influencing customers’ choices on a products or service; however, reliability is 
another important element of competitiveness that needs special attention. These two elements 
of competitiveness are not independent. In many cases, the reliability can reduce the cost and 
therefore improve the competitiveness. The reason for this is that, in many industries such as 
manufacturing and retailing, high availability needs to be guaranteed. To satisfy this 
requirement, there are two different strategies: one is to keep a high level inventory and the 
other is to gain access to reliable transportation management. For the first plan, it is obvious 
that the company will incur inventory costs including additional warehouse cost and financial 
cost etc. on top of the normal transportation cost. For the second plan, the ideal situation is to 
achieve zero or near to zero inventory which requires a reliable transportation plan. It is 
doubtless that the second plan will lead to lower total costs and results in a competitive position 
for the product in the market. From this point of view, it is vital for the company to choose a 
reliable transportation method which can fulfil their customer demand in a timely manner, 
minimise total costs and achieve maximum competitiveness.  
 
For most companies, especially those which supply businesses related to some seasonal 
products or short shelf life products, a very important criterion to select a carrier is the reliability 
of its transportation service system. In order to compete with other transportation modes and 
satisfy customers, rail freight stakeholders aim to increase unctuality rates through more 
efficient operations, including timetabling arrangements, blocking (wagons fulfilment 
management) and wagon routing plans, locomotive assignment and empty car management to 
reduce the possible delays in cargoes transport process. Related research can be found from the 
literature (Morvant, 2015; Khaled et al., 2015; Murali, Ordóñez and Dessouky, 2016). 
The report ‘Value of Rail Freight’ – UK Network Rail, 2010 shows that the UK rail freight 
performance is improving year on year. Between 2005/06 and 2008/09 the percentage of freight 
trains arriving on time rose by six points. More than 80 percent of freight trains completed their 
journey on time. As shown in Figure 3,  train delay measured by minutes per 100 km show a 
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declining trend . In recent years, the indicator fluctuates in a range of 9 -15 minutes per 100 km.  
For road transportation, there are more uncertainties, such as congestion, vehicle problems, 
traffic accidents etc., resulting in truck transport having an inherent lower reliability.   
 
 
Figure 3  Normalised Freight delay per 100 train kilometres 
Source: http://orr.gov.uk  
 
Environment Effect 
Worldwide the utmost priority is to urgently reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In order to 
contribute to this target, many countries have set up their carbon budget which places a 
restriction on the total amount of greenhouse gases the whole country can emit over a 5-year 
period. Many researchers have applied quantitative and qualitative methods to prove that rail 
freight is an environment friendly service, as it can help to mitigate noise, congestion and 
emissions compared to other modes in particular road transport (Kirschstein & Meisel, 2015; 
Pritchard et al., 2014; Alessandrini et al., 2012 ; Anderson et al., 2005 ; Dinwoodie, 2006). 
 
The UK is one of the first countries to set legally binding carbon budgets (Priestley, 2019). Data 
from the EU statistical pocketbook suggests that transportation is the only sector where 
emissions are on the rise.  Statistics show that in 2014 in the UK, domestic transportation 
emissions contributed 25% of total greenhouse gases emissions, where road freight makes up 
17% of total transportation emissions. In contrast, rail, including passenger and freight are 
responsible for only 2% of total transportation emissions. The latest data released on 24th  
October 2017 by the UK Office of Rail and Road shows that in 2016-17 the CO2 emissions in 
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the rail freight industry per freight tonne kilometre were 33.2g which is just 33% of the 
greenhouse gas of an equivalent journey by road (Goddard, 2018).  It is universally accepted 
that rail transportation is greener and more environmentally friendly than road. There is no 




Data from Network Rail as shown in Table 1 indicates that a freight train can deliver many 
more commodities than a lorry, i.e. a full loaded train transporting construction materials can 
take 77 HGV (Heavy Goods Vehicles) from the road. By reducing the number of lorries, 
congestion on the national road will be improved. 
 
Rail freight is also proven to be a cost-effective method that can apply economies of scale, in 
particular to low value cargo such as ore.  
  Commodity  Fully Loaded  Train Potential Equivalent  Number of   Heavy 
Goods Vehicles 
Coal   
Metals and ore 
Construction materials 
Oil and petroleum 
Consumer goods   
Other traffic  
1,500 tonnes 
1,000 to 2,500 tonnes 
1,500 to 3,000 tonnes 
2,000 tonnes 
600 to 1,100 tonnes 







Table 1  Potential for A Fully Loaded Freight Train to Remove Lorries 
Source:  (Network Rail, 2017b) 
 
1.3 Governance Structure in the Railway Industry 
Governance structure has significant impact on the cost-effectiveness of the railway industry. 
There are three typical governance structures in the railway industry: Vertically Separated 
System, Vertically Integrated System, and Holding Company. The main difference between 
these governance structures is whether and to what extent infrastructure ownership is separated 
from operation. Based on the existing research in this field, the countries adopting each 
governance structures are summarised in Table 2 (Nash, 2008; Nash, 2014; Nash et al., 2013; 




Vertically Separated System Vertically Integrated System Holding Company  
Sweden China German 
Britain Ireland Austria 
Finland Northern Ireland Belgium 
Denmark U.S. Italy 
Netherlands Japan Latvia 
Norway  Poland 
Spain  Greece 
Portugal  France 
Slovakia   
Lithuania   
Table 2 Railway Operation Modes with Examples 
Source: Nash (2008) 
 
The first governance structure is termed ‘Vertically Separated System’. The essence of this 
mode is the complete separation of infrastructure ownership from operation institutionally, 
functionally and financially (Nikitinas and Dailydka, 2016). Two separate legal persons without 
interrelation were established to govern the railway freight system: one is the Infrastructure 
Manager (IM); and the other is Freight Operating Company (FOC).  In the vertically separated 
mode, the IM is responsible for developing and maintaining railway network and providing 
capacity for freight service; and the FOC generates revenue from selling rail freight service to 
end customers (shippers/consignees) by utilising the capacity acquired from the IM.  One of the 
key decisions for vertical separation governance is how the IM should charge the FOC. From 
the perspective of governments, the pricing process needs to be regulated as the social benefit 
of the railway system needs to be considered. It is believed that the rail freight industry in the 
UK is a good example of this vertical separation governance structure.  
 
‘Vertically Integrated System’ is another type of governance structure, which is totally different 
from vertical separation governance structure discussed above. Under this arrangement, a single 
company owns and operates the whole railway system. The pricing problem in the 
aforementioned vertically separated system does not exist as there is only a single company that 
has all the functions that the IM and the FOC provide. The IM and the FOC are two different 
departments in the same company in a Vertically Integrated System. China and the USA are 
two typical examples for this type of governance structure. In China, railway is fully state 
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owned and operated, and there is no formal fee or separate accounting system between railway 
owner and operator (http://www.nra.gov.cn/). For the USA rail sector, it is primarily developed 
and maintained by private companies on a commercial basis. The relationship between the 
department representing the ownership and the department operating the railway are not typical 
service providers and customers since the two departments belong to a single company. Under 
the vertical integration governance structure, the rail company that owns and operates the 
railway system is very likely to be in a monopoly position in an intra-rail market which can 
lead to the absence of market-pricing.  
 
The third type of governance structure is a Holding Company where the IM and the FOCs are 
separated companies but under the same ownership. The German rail sector is known as a 
typical example for this governance structure (Nikitinas and Dailydka, 2016) . The features of 
this governance structure include: (1) The IM and the FOCs have separate accounts; (2) 
independent institutions are established to determine infrastructure charges and distribute 
infrastructure capacities; (3) The IM and the FOCs remain business segments of a single 
company (Nikitinas & Dailydka, 2016; Zunder et al., 2013; Islam, 2014). The French railway 
sector adopts a holding company governance structure as well. The IM of French railway, 
Réseau ferré de France (RFF, French: French Rail Network) became SNCF Réseau from 1st  
January 2015 according to European Union Directive 91/440, it defines the guiding principles 
and procedures and sells train paths. SNCF Mobilités is the train operator in France. They all 
belong to SNCF, the historic state-owned railway company (Morvant, 2015). 
 
Review of the worldwide railway governance structure can be found in the literature (Laurino 
et al., 2015; Nash, 2008; Nash et al., 2013). Debates on the advantages and disadvantages of 
the separation between the IM and the FOCs also exist in literature. Emmanuel & Crozet (2014), 
Cui & Besanko (2016) thought that vertical separation is better than vertical integration in terms 
of cost reduction while others expressed the opposite opinion. Similarly, Nash et al. (2013) 
compared the railway transport models in Britain, Sweden, and Germany. They concluded that 
the governance structure in the UK, which adopts a vertical separation system is the best, with 
Sweden next and Germany least successful. Manuel & Andrade (2013) compared the difference 
between U.S. and European freight railways.  Jensen & Stelling (2007) discussed the effect of 
vertical seperation based on the Swedish example where a longitudinal econometric approach 
for railway deregulation process was applied. They concluded that vertical separation leads to 
increased costs, whilst the introduction of competition may lower costs. The combined impact 
on cost efficiency is an improvement. Conversely, Mizutani & Shoji (2004) found  that 
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vertically separated systems do not have significant advantages over vertically integrated ones 
in terms of infrastructure maintenance costs.  
 
This research will focus on the pricing process for vertical separation governance structures 
adopted in the UK and some other countries as highlighted above.  The following will provide 
an overview of the rail freight industry and its development and governance structure in the UK. 
 
1.4 Rail Freight Industry in the UK 
 
In the UK, rail freight started its renaissance after rail liberalisation (Woodburn, 2001). After 
several decades’ development, Britain’s rail freight network connects almost all major freight 
origins and destinations of the island-country. Figure 4 Map showing the Strategic Freight Sites 




Figure 4 Map showing the Strategic Freight Sites of the UK 




More and more companies such as Jaguar Cars, Tesco and Sainsbury’s make rail freight their 
first transportation choice. Information from Network Rail shows that in the past eight years, 
the amount of consumer goods delivered by rail has increased by 75%. The consumer goods 
market has become the greatest growth freight market (Network Rail, 2017b). Moreover, data 
collected for Felixstowe shown in Figure 5, from Network Rail shown in Table 3 National Railway 
Freight Moved By Commodityand from ORR shown in Figure 6, suggests that rail freight maintained 
a fast growth trend for a very long period in the UK.  
 
As shown in Figure 7, the rail freight traffic forecast for the near future published by Network 
Rail in their Strategic Business Plan on 9th Feb 2018 suggests that rail freight traffic will have 
a very significant increase in the period from 2019 to 2024. This information indicates that in 
the future, the rail freight industry in the UK will continue to play an important role in the 
development of economy and will be crucial to the prosperity of the country. 
 
Figure 5 Growth in Rail Freight at Felixstowe 






















1996/97 3.9 .. .. .. .. .. 11.2 15.1 
1997/98 4.4 .. .. .. .. .. 12.5 16.9 
1998/99 4.5 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.1 3.5 2.5 17.3 
1999/00 4.8 2.2 2 1.5 1 3.9 2.7 18.2 
2000/01 4.8 2.1 2.4 1.4 1 3.8 2.6 18.1 
2001/02 6.2 2.4 2.8 1.2 0.6 3.5 2.6 19.4 
2002/03 5.7 2.6 2.5 1.2 0.5 3.4 2.7 18.5 
2003/04 5.8 2.4 2.7 1.2 0.5 3.5 2.8 18.9 
2004/05 6.7 2.6 2.9 1.2 0.5 4 2.5 20.3 
2005/06 8.3 2.2 2.9 1.2 0.5 4.3 2.3 21.7 
2006/07 8.6 2 2.7 1.5 0.4 4.7 1.9 21.9 
2007/08 7.7 1.8 2.8 1.6 0.4 5.1 1.7 21.2 
2008/09 7.9 1.5 2.7 1.5 0.4 5.2 1.4 20.6 
2009/10 6.2 1.6 2.8 1.4 0.4 5.5 1 19.1 
2010/11 5.5 2.2 3.2 1.3 0.4 5.7 0.9 19.2 
2011/12 6.4 2.2 3.5 1.2 0.4 6.3 1 21.1 
2012/13 7.5 1.8 3.1 1.2 0.4 6.3 1.2 21.5 
2013/14 8.1 1.8 3.6 1.3 0.5 6.2 1.4 22.7 
2014/15 6.5 1.8 3.9 1.2 0.6 6.5 1.7 22.2 
 
Table 3 National Railway Freight Moved By Commodity 














Figure 6 The volume of rail freight moved (billion net tonne km) 


















Figure 7   Strategic Business Plan 2019 – 2024: Freight 
Source: (Network Rail, 2017b) 
 
In recent years, to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, the UK has been encouraging the 
shift of traffic volumes from road to rail. One of the important measures is to move cargoes 
through intermodal transport, involving rail in two or more modes of transport in the conveying 
process. As shown in Figure 8 below, there are a total of 63 intermodal rail terminals in the UK, 
which provide freight services to the customers. The terminals are run by different operators 
(including freight operating companies such as DB Cargo) shown in Table 4 Intermodal 












Figure 8 Intermodal Rail Terminals in Great Britain 








http://www.abports.co.uk/    
ABP Connect http://www.abports.co.uk/custinfo/other_op/abp_connect.htm   
AV Dawson http://www.av-dawson.com/    
Bristol Port 
Company 
http://www.bristolport.co.uk/    
CdMR http://www.cobelfret.com/terminals_purfleet.html   
DB Schenker http://www.dbschenker.com/site/logistics/dbschenker/com/en/start.html 
Table 4 Intermodal Terminal Operators in GB 
Source: (Network Rail, 2017b) 
 
The British rail freight industry is a distinctive example of vertical separation governance. There 
are many companies and organisations involved in the operation of the rail freight industry in 
the UK including infrastructure manager (IM, refer to Network Rail); freight operating 
companies (FOCs), e.g. Colas Rail, DB Cargo UK, Devon and Cornwall Railways, Direct Rail 
Services, GB Rail Freight, Freightliner Group; regulating organisations, the Office of Rail and 
Road (ORR); Rail Safety and Standards Board - RSSB; terminal operators and industry 
suppliers. Network Rail is the only IM (although after the establishment of High Speed 2, there 
will be another IM - High Speed Two (HS2) Limited) in the UK. It is responsible for 
establishing, maintaining and providing safe and reliable railway paths for the FOCs.  The FOCs 
are licenced to operate the freight service as per, among others, the path allocation and will have 
to pay for using the path. All the potential operators need to satisfy a series of requirement 
before being licensed by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR).  Office of Rail and Road is an 
independent regulator on behalf of government (Nash et al., 2014).  
 
The separation of infrastructure ownership from operation in the UK mainly aims to establish 
the competition mechanism between the FOCs. So far it is operationally working well and to 
some extent, it offers efficiency (from an asset utilisation point of view) to the British railway 
system (Nash, 2014). But it is only part of the story. The separation also leads to a suboptimal 
operating system due to the fact that the separation results in the infrastructure managers and 
freight operators making their operational decisions independently and in some cases selfishly, 
which is not rare in the commercial world.  This feature is very distinct in their pricing process. 
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1.5 Research Motivation 
One of the major decision making issues for a vertically separated railway system is how to set 
up an appropriate pricing mechanism between the IM and the FOC for the use of rail 
infrastructure. In what follows, the UK rail freight industry will be used as an example to 
explain the issue. 
 
At present, the UK Department for Transport (DfT) is responsible for the planning and 
investment in the transportation infrastructure. It is a Ministerial Department supported by 19 
agencies and public bodies in which the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) takes charge of the 
railway industry. To set up the price, Network Rail firstly proposes an initial industry plan that 
contains the information on construction, maintenance, improvement and price. This document 
is then submitted to ORR for approval. The updated price information will be released by ORR 
after a proper consultation process with direct and indirect stakeholders. The consultation 
process involves safety bodies, expert advisors, related government departments, rail freight 
customers, industrial companies and freight operating companies. Britain’s current 
transportation system regulation structure is summarised in Figure 9 and the pricing process for 
rail freight itinerary is shown in Figure 10. The principle followed by Network Rail in 
determining the price is to recover their costs generated by using the railway infrastructure. 
This principle complies with the rule of DIRECTIVE 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council  and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/909 (The European 
Parliament, 2012) (The European Commission, 2015). 
 
Figure 9 Regulation Structure of Transportation System in the UK 
Office of Rail and Road 
(ORR) 












































Figure 10 Current Pricing Procedure 
 
There are a few drawbacks relating to the current pricing process. First, as an important stage 
prior to the ORR’s approval, the consultation process on how the IM should charge the FOCs 
is very complex. The heated debates and conflicting interests between different stakeholders 
also make the review procedure very slow. For example, the consultation of Control Period 6 
started on 18th May 2016, but the final determination was published in December, 2018. This 
decision-making process is very long, but the freight market changes very quickly. It is very 
likely that the outcomes of the consultation may be out of date by the time they are released. 
Second, in the pricing process, Network Rail acts as the leader to set up the price tariff for using 
the rail infrastructure; and then the freight operating companies make the decision on the 
purchase of the train itineraries as the followers. It is common practice that an IM may take 
advantage of its leader position in designing the tariff to unilaterally maximise its profits 
without caring about the FOCs’ profits. According to the industrial visits to the UK rail freight 
industry, to prevent an IM from doing this, the UK government applies a certain cap on the 
IM’s profit. As a countermeasure, the IM often chooses to exaggerate its cost, and attempts to 
gain additional profits. In such a battle between the government and the IM, the government is 
often not in a good position as it has great difficulty ascertaining the IM’s genuine costs due to 
Network Rail (IM) 
Submit: Initial Industry Plan 
(including price information) 
Office of Rail and Road (ORR) 
Consultation process with 
related stakeholders 
New Price  
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the complexity of railway system operations.  Hence, the current pricing mechanism is not 
really as effective as expected. There is a need to design a better strategy to improve the pricing 
process of the rail freight transport system adopting the vertical separation governance structure. 
Third, in practice, an IM’s tariff significantly affects not only the IM and FOCs’ profitability 
but also the utilisation rate of the railway system, which should be maximised from the 
perspective of government and society. However, as an independent safety and economic 
regulator of Britain’s railways, ORR’s main responsibility is to ensure that the railway operators 
comply with health and safety law. Its function includes regulating Network Rail’s activities to 
satisfy its funding requirements, regulating access to the railway network, licensing the 
operators of railway assets and publishing rail statistics (Office of Rail and Road, 2019b).  ORR 
has no concern for the IM’s profit, the FOCs’ profit, and the profit of the entire freight system.  
There is no institution and mechanism to maximise the social benefits.  
 
1.6 Research Questions 
In recognition of this issue, this study aims to propose novel mathematical models to capture 
the complicated relationships between the IM and the FOC and design a better coordinated 
pricing mechanism for the vertically separated railway system. Firstly, the optimal prices that 
an IM can charge to maximise its own profits unilaterally without cooperation with FOCs are 
determined. This is also what an IM is trying to do in practice, but currently they do not have a 
rigorous mathematical tool to determine the prices of their train itineraries. They largely rely 
on their intuitive experience or manually change their prices repeatedly and choose the one that 
leads to the maximum profits, which is a “trial and error” approach. Secondly, alternative better 
pricing mechanisms are explored. More specifically, efforts are made for the identification of 
the pricing strategy that is able to lead to global optimality. It is then evaluated whether it is 
worthwhile for an IM to achieve global optimality initially, and share the corresponding profits 
with FOCs afterwards. 
 
When developing the models to investigate the above issues, a stylised railway system that 
adopts the vertical separation governance structure is considered as a three-echelon service 
network based supply chain comprising an IM, a FOC, and end customers.  The whole pricing 
process between the IM and the FOC is considered as a dynamic Stackelberg (leader-follower) 
game (Stackelberg, 2011).  As the leader, the IM’s decision is the price tariff for their network 
consisting of all the itineraries. The follower, the FOC needs to design a service network based 
on the IM’s tariff and shippers’ orders, which is a typical network design problem. Based on 
these, a mechanism (contract) will also be introduced for the IM and FOCs to collaborate. The 
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target of the mechanism is to maximise the total profit of both the IM and FOCs. It will also 
guarantee that the IM’s and the FOCs’ profit under the mechanism is no less than their profit 
achieved without the contract.  
 
In summary, the following research questions will be answered in this thesis: 
1) What are the optimal prices of the IM-FOC game at the Stackelberg equilibrium? The 
solution at Stackelberg equilibrium specifies the prices that the IM can charge to 
maximise its profits unilaterally without any cooperation with the FOC.  
2) What are the optimal prices that can maximise the overall profit of the whole rail freight 
system (supply chain) and lead to system optimality under the vertical separation 
operation structure?  
3) What is the best contract that should be adopted to coordinate the whole rail freight 
system? 
 
The aim of the research is to develop a pricing mechanism that can achieve global optimality 
and also make IM and FOCs better off than the pricing mechanism being used in the practice. 
Based on the aim, the following objectives are designed: 
 Identify the equilibrium of the current pricing mechanism where there is no cooperation 
between IM and FOCs. This involves solving the Stackelberg game.   
 Identify the solutions that lead to global optimality of the pricing process.  
 Develop a mechanism to maximise the total profit of the freight system and allow each 
individual stakeholder to obtain profits no less than the existing mechanism. In designing 
the mechanism, the different results that the relevant stakeholders can obtain under 
cooperation or non-cooperation context will be compared.   
 
The Novelty of the research is summarised as follows: 
1) A vertically separated railway freight system is considered as a three-tier service supply 
chain consisting of an IM, a FOC and end customers. The conflicting interests of the 
IM, the FOC and the end customers are considered in designing the optimal pricing 
strategy for the IM and the optimal freight service network for the FOC; 
2) The proposed game theoretic model contains integer or binary variables that model the 
FOC’s purchasing choice on itineraries. This can better model the FOC’s route/ itinerary 
purchasing choice, but leads to a big challenge to solve the model; 




4) The uncertainty of customer demands is considered and a stochastic programming 
model is developed to accommodate the issue; 
5) A proposed government subsidy based mechanism that can lead to global optimality is 
designed in the mechanism, the system optimality is achieved, and the government 




1.7 Structure of This Thesis 
This thesis is divided into 8 chapters including the introduction as the first chapter. 
 
In chapter 2, related research topics and publications are reviewed according to the identified 
research questions and objectives.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology to be applied in this research. Linear programming, 
stochastic linear programming, game theory, bi-level linear programming, inverse mixed 
integer linear programming and gradient search method are discussed in detail in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 explains the industry practice on pricing procedure and provides the basis for model 
development. Two data sets in line with the industry practice will be prepared to validate the 
models and algorithms to be developed in this thesis. 
 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the scenario where the IM makes decision on price selfishly without 
collaboration with the FOC. The scenario reflects the current pricing practice, and is also a 
Stackelberg game on networks. A bilevel optimisation model and a gradient search method is 
developed for obtaining the solution at Stackelberg equilibrium.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the ideal scenario where the IM and the FOC have full cooperation, which 
will lead to global optimality of the game. Inverse mixed integer linear programming model 
and a Fenchel cut based solution method is developed to find out the optimal prices leading to 
the global optimality.  
 
Chapter 7 aims to identify the best mechanism for the government to regulate the collaboration 
between the IM and the FOC. The aim of the mechanism is to ensure the IM sets up a price 
tariff that can lead to global optimality and also make the IM’s profits the same as that at 
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Stackelberg equilibrium. After comparing a number of contracts, a government subsidy based 
mechanism is choosen to achieve the target, and a double-layer gradient search based algorithm 
is developed to obtain the optimal subsidy rate. 
 
In Chapter 8, conclusions are made based on the developed models, algorithms and numerical 
case studies. Recommendations for future work are given. 
 
1.8 Summary of the Chapter 
In this chapter, the role of rail in the broader context of intermodal transportation is discussed 
firstly; then the features of rail freight are introduced from the aspects of cost efficiency, 
reliability, environment and high capacity. Following on from this, the operation practice of the 
freight industry in the UK is reviewed. By analysing the current freight pricing process, the 
weaknesses that motivates this research is identified, and subsequently the research questions, 
objectives and novelty of this research are presented. The structure of the thesis is given at the 




Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides the knowledge base and a thorough literature review on all aspects of the 
proposed research questions in Chapter 1. It will inform the research gaps and justify the 
potential contributions of the study to the literature. 
 
2.1 The Approach to Organising the Literature Review 
The research questions identified in the first chapter aim to design a pricing mechanism for a 
vertically separated railway system. The research questions have the following four features, 
which will be used as criteria to scope the literature that need to be reviewed.  
 
1) The research questions are revenue management issues 
The key decision to be made in the research is how an IM should charge a FOC. The proposed 
research question has the typical feature that a revenue management problem should have. 
Therefore, in the literature review, revenue management literature will be covered.  
 
2) The research questions involve the conflicting interests of the different stakeholders in 
the rail freight industry. 
To decide the pricing mechanism, both the IM’s and the FOC’s decision making processes need 
to be considered. There are conflicting interests between the IM and the FOC. The IM’s 
decision determines the best price tariff for train itineraries to make the maximum profits from 
the FOC; whereas the FOC’s decision making target is also to maximise its own profits while 
having to pay the IM’s charge.  To consider the conflicting interest, game theory needs to be 
applied to model their interactions. Further, as the decisions involve the freight service network 
consisting of correlated train itineraries, the research can be categorised as network revenue 
management game. Therefore, one stream of literature to be reviewed will be network revenue 
management and the related game theory. 
  
3) The research questions also involve network design 
Network design is a traditional issue in the field of operations research. A FOC’s decision in a 
vertically separated railway system is in the nature of a network design problem. The FOC’s 
decision-making is to design a freight service network based on shippers’ demands and the IM’s 
price tariff. Hence, the literature related to network design particularly in the rail freight industry 




4) The research questions involve a supply chain consisting of an IM, a FOC and end 
customers 
The network revenue management game is carried out on a supply chain involving the IM, the 
FOC, and shippers. Therefore, the literature on supply chain management, in particular, pricing 
and revenue management for supply chains will be reviewed.  
 
To sum up, the research questions to be considered is a revenue management problem that 
involves a network, as well as multiple stakeholders with conflicting interests, thus it can be 
categorised as network revenue management game. Network revenue management game is 
characterised by dependent demands and multiple stakeholders. To conduct a thorough 
literature review, the other types of revenue management related to network revenue 
management game will be considered in the study. More specifically, the literature to be 
reviewed will include: 
1) traditional revenue management that involves a single stakeholder and independent 
demands (homogenous products) 
2) revenue management in a supply chain that involves multiple stakeholders and 
independent demands  
3) network revenue management that involves a single stakeholder but dependent demands 
(heterogenous products), e.g., seat control in airline industry 
4) network revenue management game that involves multiple stakeholders and dependant 
demands 
 
An overview of the streams of literature to be reviewed is shown in the following Table 5 
 Independent Demands Dependent Demands 





(Game theoretical model) 
Revenue Management on 
Supply Chain  
Network Revenue 
Management Game 
Table 5 An Overview of the Streams of Literature 
 
In additional to the above four streams of literature relating to the different aspects of revenue 
management, the literature on rail freight service network design will also be reviewed as it is 




In what follows, the context in the railway industry that motivates the research will be briefly 
discussed; then the five streams of literature discussed above will be reviewed.  
 
2.2 Background 
Freight transportation is a vital part in the development of an economy. To a large extent, the 
efficiency of freight transportation affects the operational efficiency of many direct and indirect 
stakeholders in the other industries across the chains of productivity and circulation. Also, 
freight transportation costs form a significant part of the prices of the products required by raw 
material providers, manufacturers, and end customers on supply chains. 
 
It is believed that, apart from the costs of material, labour and finance, economic development 
is also at the cost of degradation of the environment (Azomahou, Laisney, & Nguyen Van, 
2006); however there are choices which can reduce these negative effects (Saboori, Sulaiman, 
& Mohd, 2012; Azomahou et al., 2006; Bickford et al., 2014). Certainly, the rail freight industry 
also has to comply with the economic rules. As an essential part of economic development, 
transportation does inevitably generate some adverse consequences, greenhouse gas emission 
is one of these negative aspects. Statistics data in Table 6 shows that in 2015 domestic 
transportation was responsible for 24% of greenhouse gas emission and negatively affected the 
air quality especially at the roadside. The UK set a target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
by at least 80% by 2050 (from 1990 baseline). To minimise the negativities, in 2008, the 
Climate Change Act 2008  was implemented (Legislation.gov.uk, 2008). This is the first legal 
document established to binding climate change targets. In order to achieve the emission targets, 
the UK government has put in a lot of efforts, including providing grants to the related research 
investigating and finding mechanisms to reduce emissions generated from the burning of fossil 
fuel; encouraging people to use non-motorised transportation modes such as cycling, walking 
or the use of electric-powered vehicles, etc. Among these, there is an important policy relating 
to the freight industry termed ‘modal shift’. This policy encourages freight volume shifting 
from road to rail (and waterways transport).  The reason for this is that lorries are responsible 
for more than 33% of the UK’s transport related CO2 emission (Department for Transport (DfT), 
2018). This policy aims at using cleaner transport modes instead of lorries. Due to its unique 
environment-friendly advantage, rail freight is a preferable substitution mode to road freight 
transport. It is a more efficient way to move the same amount of cargoes at a lower 
environmental cost to society.  
From the commercial point of view, especially in an open market environment, the freight rate 
is a key element that will affect the shippers’ decision making on modal selection and result in 
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(positive or negative) modal shift among the different transportation modes. Therefore, to 
realise the shift from road to rail, a reasonable and competitive freight rate is crucial. According 
to a quotation from a representative truck company and a rail freight operator, to deliver a 40 
feet standard container weighing 250,000kg from Felixstowe to Southampton in June 2019, the 
average cost using truck transport is £526 while the cost is £446 using the rail freight service. 
This clearly shows that the rail transport is cheaper than a truck by 15.2%. This research will 
contribute to this aspect by investigating the pricing problem of the rail freight service in the 
UK where a vertical separation governance structure is being adopted.  
 
                                        Million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent/percentage 
By source 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 








Cars and taxis 77.0 77.4 77.4 76.8 77.1 74.8 72.5 70.2 69.5 69.2 68.0 68.3 69.1 14 
Heavy goods vehicles 20.2 20.6 20.8 20.8 21.0 19.5 18.0 18.6 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.8 19.6 4 
Light vans 15.0 15.4 15.8 16.3 16.8 16.0 15.8 16.1 16.2 16.4 16.6 17.3 18.0 4 
Buses and coaches 4.9 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 1 
Motorcycles and mopeds 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 - 
Other road transport 
emissions 
0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 - 
Total 118.2 119.2 119.9 119.9 121.0 115.8 111.6 110.3 108.8 108.6 107.8 109.3 111.5 22 
Other 
transport 
Rail 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 - 
Domestic aviation 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.5 - 
Domestic shipping 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.5 1 
Other 3.6 3.6 3.4 4.0 4.3 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.6 1 
Total 10.2 10.4 10.5 11.0 11.3 10.8 10.0 9.8 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.5 2 
Total domestic transport 128.5 129.6 130.4 130.9 132.3 126.6 121.6 120.1 118.3 117.7 116.5 117.8 120.0 24 
Net domestic emissions all sources 698.3 694.3 685.8 679.9 667.7 647.2 590.1 605.9 557.6 575.2 558.3 515.1 495.7 100 
Table 6 Greenhouse Gas emissions by transport mode, United Kingdom: 2003 to 2015 









2.3 Traditional Pricing and Revenue Management  
Revenue is the total income generated by a business or an organisation over a period of time 
from selling goods or providing services to its customers without deducting any cost or 
expenses.  The commercial objective of any business or company is to make profits or at least 
cover the costs incurred in the operation process. Profits can be calculated by taking costs away 
from revenue, which may be profitable, break even or negative depending on the operation in 
the particular time period (Talluri, 2008). It can be used as a parameter to assess the operational 
result of an enterprise. Revenue Management (RM) is the strategy or technique aiming to 
improve the profit by adjusting product availability, pricing strategy and distribution based on 
the prediction of customer behaviour, forecast and analysis of the key market parameters 
(Rodríguez-Algeciras and Talón-Ballestero, 2017). It originated in the airline industry in the 
1970s. Pricing strategy is one of the most important elements in revenue management of any 
business especially when substitutable products are available in the market or competitors exist, 
as the price can affect the choice of the customer.  
 
In the section, the focus will be on the traditional pricing and revenue management where a 
single stakeholder considers how to maximise its revenue for homogeneous products 
(independent demands) associated with a single price. In the domain of traditional pricing and 
revenue management, the mathematical function depicting the relationship between historical 
price and the corresponding demand needs to be collected first.  Generally, demand will fall 
with increasing price. By analysing the historical data, the parameter of the demand function 
can be determined. For example, the collected historical price and demand data for product 
XYZ is listed in  
Table 7.  The price-demand function can be demonstrated  by : 𝑑 = 20000 − 2000𝑝, shown 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Demand  18000 16000 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 
 








Figure 11 The Price-Demand Function  
 
For the above demand function, the revenue S can be calculated by multiplying the price with 
the demand, i.e., 𝑆 = (20000 − 2000𝑝) ∗ 𝑝. In the example, the revenue can be visualised in 
Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12 The Price-Revenue Function 
 
It is easy to identify the optimal price that can maximise the revenue by computing the first 
order derivative of the price-revenue function (Chopra and Meindl, 2016). 
 
The above example is a very simple and traditional pricing problem which has been discussed 





























McMahonBeattie, 2010); (Talluri, 2008). However, the problem may become very complex 
when demands are stochastic and decisions are made over multiple stages, which will lead to 
stochastic dynamic programming (Birge and Louveaux, 2011)(Dimitri P. Bertsekas, 2018). 
Further, the pricing problem may be coupled with other management issues, e.g. inventory 
control and product innovation. A large number of studies have been carried out for this type 
of revenue management that may involve stochastic dynamic programming or stochastic linear 
programming and the research results have been summarised in many textbooks (Talluri, 2008); 
(McMahon-Beattie, 2004)(Ian Yeoman; Una McMahonBeattie, 2010).  
 
2.4 Revenue Management in Supply Chains  
Traditional revenue management only considers a single stakeholder and independent demands 
(homogenous products). Over past decades, research has been carried out to extend traditional 
revenue management to multiple stakeholders (Cao, Wan and Lai, 2013). This generally leads 
to pricing and revenue management on supply chains, e.g., between a retailer, a wholesaler, a 
supplier, and end customers. This type of research requires the application of game theory to 
model the conflicting interest of different stakeholders (Vafa Arani, Rabbani and Rafiei, 2016a). 
 
In what follows, the nexus between a vertically separated rail freight system and supply chain 
will be analysed. It will be shown that a vertically separated rail freight system can be 
considered as a three-tier service supply chain. Following this idea, the literature in relation to 
supply chain pricing, revenue management and coordination will be examined.  
 
2.4.1 The nexus between supply chain management and vertically separated rail system 
In a vertically separated rail freight system, there exists three different stakeholders: the IM, the 
FOC and end customers (shippers or consignees). An IM provides all the rail freight 
infrastructure and offers itineraries to the FOC. A FOC pays the IM for accessing the freight 
transport capacity/itineraries, operates freight service on the purchased itineraries and provides 
a cargo transport service following the requirement from the shippers. The relationship between 
the IM, the FOC and shippers can be treated as a three-echelon service supply chain. The IM 
can be treated as a supplier who provides train itineraries to the FOC; and the FOC as a retailer 
who uses purchased itineraries to provide freight service to the shippers. The ‘products’ sold 
across the three-echelon service supply chain are a freight service network that comprise 




Supply Chain Management (SCM) concept was first introduced when the managers realised 
that optimising the way of operating supply chain activities can not only reduce the costs but 
also increase their competitiveness by providing customised service (Lawrence v. Snyder, 
2011a). Because of  its significant impact on the profit of each stakeholder on supply chain 
(Vafa Arani, Rabbani and Rafiei, 2016b), SCM is an active research area and attracting more 
and more scholars to work on it. 
 
As shown in Figure 13, a supply chain starts from suppliers and ends with customers. The figure 
demonstrates all the possible processes to fulfil customer demand. The performance of each 
stakeholder involved in the supply chain can influence the operation of the entire system. By 
analysing the figure, it can be found that there are four different types of connection/relationship 
between the supplier and the customers (Chopra and Meindl, 2016):  
(1) Supplier-Manufacturer- Distributor-Retailer-Customer; 
(2) Supplier- Distributor-Retailer- Customer; 
(3) Supplier-Retailer- Customer; 
(4) Supplier- Customer.  
 
A vertically separated railway system is type (3) supply chain. It is worth mentioning that a 













Figure 13 Supply Chain Stages 
Source: (Chopra and Meindl, 2016) 
 
 
 Intensive research fruits have emerged in the literature relating to supply chain management in 
recent decades. Research has been carried out for different aspects of supply chain management, 
i.e., supply chain design (Goetschalckx, Huang and Mital, 2013), inventory management 
problem (Dillon, Oliveira and Abbasi, 2017), environment impact or green supply chain 
management (Vanalle et al., 2017), risk management (Song and Zhuang, 2017), supply chain 
efficiency (JIA and JIA, 2017); (Biswal, Jenamani and Kumar, 2018), and supply chain contract 
design (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005); (Seifert, Zequeira and Liao, 2012)(Zhao et al., 2014)(Xu, 
Cheng and Sun, 2015). 
 
 In the following, research on revenue management and pricing for supply chain will be 
reviewed. 
 
2.4.2  Pricing and revenue management in the supply chain 
 
In recent decades, supply chain coordination via pricing has attracted more attention. 
Researchers tried to improve the supply chain performance by designing a more efficient 
Supplier Manufacturer Distributor Retailer Customer 
Supplier Manufacturer Distributor Retailer Customer 
Supplier Manufacturer Distributor Retailer Customer 
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pricing strategy. Moon, Yao and Park (2011) investigated the pricing negotiation in contract 
design between a seller and a buyer under uncertain demand. Zheng and Negenborn (2015) 
extended (Moon, Yao and Park, 2011)’s study by considering the buyer’s fixed and elastic 
demand. (Kuo and Huang, 2012)  used finite dynamic programming to investigate pricing 
negotiation issues for one retailer selling two generations of products with limited inventories 
in a supply chain. (Chen, Federgruen and Zheng, 2000) considered joint pricing and 
replenishment for a two-echelon supply chain with deterministic demands. Chung, Talluri and 
Narasimhan (2011) studied the price markdown issue for a supply chain that included a supplier, 
a manufacturer, and a retailer.  Matsui (2017) investigated the timing for applying wholesale 
and retail prices. Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) provided an overview of current practices 
in dynamic pricing with the presence of inventory considerations. 
 
More and more industrial practitioners and academic researchers have realised that a 
coordinated supply chain is ideal for the relevant supply chain stakeholders,  although conflict 
between them always exists as the primary concern ( Ellegaard & Andersen 2015 ). The view 
relating to supply chain coordination significantly affects inter-organizational cooperation in 
the buyer-supplier relationships (Kyu et al. 2010).  Xiao and Qi (2008) studied the coordination 
of a supply chain with one manufacturer and two retailers where the production cost of the 
manufacturer was disrupted. Two pricing strategies were investigated as coordination 
mechanisms: an all-unit quantity discount and an incremental quantity discount. Vafa Arani, 
Rabbani, & Rafiei (2016) presented a coordination mechanism for a two-echelon supply chain 
using dynamic game theory. The mechanism was evaluated against two scenarios depending 
on the player who dominates the market and makes the first decision: retailer-led and 
manufacturer-led supply chain. In the retailer-led model, the retailer was deemed to be the 
leader of the supply chain and made decisions on the order quantity and the price they can 
afford, and then passed the information to the manufacturer. The manufacturer then decided his 
own production quantity based on the information specified in the contract with the retailer. 
While in the supplier-led scenario, the decision sequence was reversed. The authors modelled 
the quantitative relationship such as the order quantity of the retailer, production quantity of the 
manufacturer and the realised demand for different scenarios. Similarly, Yao, Leung, & Lai 
(2008) presented a Stackelberg (leader–follower) game which involves one manufacturer and 
two retailers who were competitors to each other. Similar research on supply chain cooperation 
can also be found in the studies conducted by He & Zhao (2012) , Venegas & Ventura (2018), 
Seo, Dinwoodie, & Roe (2016), Hou et al. (2017), Venegas and Ventura (2018). Qiu and Lee 
(2019) studied the revenue management problem for rail which involves intermodal transport. 
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To maximise the profit of all stakeholders, the pricing problem in a dry port system was 
modelled as a Stackelburg game. The dry port was the leader of the game and the shippers were 
the followers. The demands considered by Qiu and Lee (2019) were independent. 
 
Although a vertically separated railway freight system can be treated as a three-echelon supply 
chain, the research findings in the literature related to supply chain pricing and revenue 
management, such as (Heydari, Govindan and Aslani, 2018); (Huang, Yang and Zhang, 2012); 
(Seifert, Zequeira and Liao, 2012), cannot be applied to this thesis due to the network effect of 
the rail freight service. Importantly, the existing supply chain pricing literature focuses on 
homogenous products that do not have correlations between each other. In other words, only a 
single price needs to be optimised for homogeneous products in the existing study.  This is a 
research gap as the itineraries that make up a freight service network are heterogeneous since 
each itinerary has different train arrival and departure time, origin and destination stations, and 
operational costs. Therefore, in this study, the price for each itinerary needs to be optimised. To 
address the pricing for heterogeneous products with correlation, another stream of literature – 
network revenue management needs to be examined to attempt to close this research gap. 
 
2.5 Network Revenue Management 
In recent years, network revenue management has become an active research field which is 
drawing increasing attention from academia because it can deal with correlated (dependant) 
demands. Before network revenue management was introduced, the studies in revenue 
management were based on the assumption that the demand for one product does not affect the 
availability of the other products (Strauss, Klein and Steinhardt, 2018).  Network revenue 
management is the technique dealing with dependent demands. The research questions in this 
dissertation in fact involve dependent demands as the itineraries on railway network are subject 
to capacities associated with sections and at stations. 
 
The research on network revenue management started in the airline industry. The airline 
industry is also a successful example where revenue management research is being actively 
implemented. Belobaba (1989) studied the seat inventory control in airlines by applying a 
probabilistic decision model to maximise total flight revenue. Curry (1990) combined two 
network revenue management approaches: marginal seat revenue and mathematical 
programming, and promisingly the new method has the merits of the two approaches.  Brumelle 
and McGill (1993) proposed to use fix-limit booking control for nested fair class. Ryzin and 
McGill (2000) proposed an adaptive algorithm to control seat booking without the need of 
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forecasting and optimisation. An early review of network revenue management in the airline 
industry was conducted by Barnhart, Belobaba and Odoni (2003) as part of an extensive review 
on the application of operation research in the field. The authors reviewed airline revenue 
management from two aspects: overbooking and leg-based and network-based seat inventory 
management. In order to reduce the revenue losses associated with no-shows, the airlines 
allowed the seat reservations to exceed the aircraft capacity. This is termed overbooking. It has 
been proven that effective overbooking can generate positive impact on airline revenue 
management. Leg-based and network-based seat inventory management are two techniques of 
airline revenue management.  Leg-based management method focuses on maximising revenue 
by adjusting seats in different booking (fare) class on each future flight-leg departure. As this 
method can only optimise the revenue on one leg and cannot guarantee the optimisation on the 
network, the network-based seat inventory control was introduced and applied particularly in 
the largest and advanced airlines. It aims at maximising the revenue of the entire network. This 
method is proven to be especially useful when a large proportion of passenger itineraries 
involve multiple flight legs and connections at the connecting hubs. After the review, further 
studies have been carried out.  Bertsimas and de Boer (2005) investigated the booking limits in 
airline revenue management using a simulation method. A stochastic gradient algorithm 
combined with approximate dynamic programming algorithm is proposed in this research to 
improve the airline revenue. A case study based on the proposed approach showed that applying 
the booking limit had a positive impact on revenue improvement. Huang and Lin (2014) 
adopted a simulation method to improve the computation of bid price control. (Birbil et al. 
(2014)  proposed a decomposition method for calculating the large-scale revenue management 
problem. Chatwin (2014) proved the optimal condition for fix-limit booking control. 
Hosseinalifam, Marcotte and Savard (2016) improved the estimation of time-dependant bid 
prices while considering customers’ choices. Comprehensive literature reviews on the 
application of network revenue management in the transport industry was conducted by Ryzin 
and Mcgill (2000). Ryzin and Mcgill (2000) reviewed the research on transportation revenue 
management since 1959, specifically, focusing on the forecasting, overbooking, seat inventory 
control, and pricing problems. 
 
In the limited studies relating to rail network revenue management, the majority focus on rail 
passenger transportation where seat control is a focus, e.g.,(Ben-khedher et al., 1998; 
Ciancimino et al., 1999; Kraft, Srikar and Phillips, 2000; Xiaoqiang, Lang and Jin, 2017). In 
the studies relating to the pricing problem in rail freight, it is common that only a single 
stakeholder is considered. For instance, Kraft (2002) adopted a bid price approach to schedule 
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railway shipment delivery times for a railway operation company.  Li and Tayur (2005) 
developed a medium-term pricing model for an inter-model transportation operator. Gorman 
(2001) and Gorman (2005) investigated the pricing problems for a railway company, Burlington 
Northern and Santa Fe Railway (BNSF), in the USA.  Bharill and Rangaraj (2008), Hetrakul 
and Cirillo (2014) investigated the application of revenue management principles in railway 
passenger transportation. Kapetanović, Bojović and Milenković (2018) applied the booking 
limits and bid price policies in rail freight transportation aiming to maximise the revenue. 
(Bilegan and Brotcorne (2015) focused on the maximisation of revenue for a rail freight 
transportation company or intermodal freight company. The authors developed a load 
acceptance system to decide whether or not to accept the transportation request aiming to 
maximise final profit. 
 
2.6 Network Revenue Management Game 
The studies discussed in the above section were carried out for a single stakeholder who is 
normally a transport operator. However, in practice, there is normally more than one 
stakeholder who gets involved in the transport system. To model the conflicting interests of 
multiple stakeholders, game theory needs to be applied to extend the research of network 
revenue management. Based on the game theory application, the existing literature in network 
revenue management game can be classified into two groups: Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg 
equilibrium. 
 
2.6.1 Nash Equilibrium 
The competition between airlines has been considered in network revenue management game 
which normally leads to the Nash equilibrium. In these games, the decisions are made by the 
relevant competitors simultaneously. Netessine & Shumsky (2005) examined the seat inventory 
control problem for two airlines competing for passengers on the same flight leg which was 
defined as the horizontal competition scenario. Li et al. (2016) extended  Netessine & Shumsky 
(2005)’s work, and considered callable products that grant airlines the rights to cancel 
passengers’ bookings. The concept of callable products is first introduced by Guillermo Gallego, 
S. G. Kou (2008). It refers to units of capacity sold to self-selected low-fare customers who 
agree that the airline can “call” the capacity at a pre-specified recall price. The method is always 
being used together with other mechanisms. Grauberger & Kimms (2014) proposed a heuristic 
method to solve Nash equilibrium in non-zero-sum games for airline alliance. The developed 
model improved the model presented by Jiang & Pang (2011) by overcoming the shortcomings 
in modelling the capacities of aircraft, the random demand and the decision variables. Jiang & 
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Pang (2011) set these parameters to be continuous non-negative numbers which is not the case 
when using this mechanism to optimise the booking problem for the airline companies. Both 
Grauberger & Kimms (2014)  and Jiang & Pang (2011)  analysed the competition game between 
the players. In their studies, each player made decisions on the basis of the predicted reaction 
of the other competitor. W. Grauberger and Kimms (2016)  investigated joint price and quantity 
competitions between airlines and developed a heuristics method to solve the game. Waldemar 
Grauberger and Kimms (2016) has investigated the solution to Nash equilibrium considering 
horizontal and vertical competitions. Grauberger and Kimms (2018) proposed a mixed-integer 
model to compute a pure Nash equilibrium. 
 
Apart from obtaining the solution to the Nash equilibrium, collaboration mechanisms have also 
been developed for competition. For example, the cooperation in the airport-airline was 
analysed by Saraswati & Hanaoka (2014). Asgari et al. (2013) investigated the competition and 
cooperation strategies amongst ports and shipping companies. Saeed (2013) explored the 
cooperation between freight players in different transportation modes. 
 
2.6.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium 
Stackelberg Equilibrium has not been found in air transportation, but it has been applied in a 
few studies in road transport. Labbé, Marcotte and Savard (1998) developed a bilevel model to 
optimise highway tolls on a multi-commodity transportation network. Brotcorne et al. (2000) 
developed bilevel programs for a freight tariff-setting problem. There were two main 
assumptions in their research: the first one was that the customer demands were known and 
fixed; and the second assumption was that the leader was not a dominant player in the market.   
Brotcorne et al. (2008) simultaneously considered the network design and pricing problem. 
Mixed-integer bi-level program method was applied to develop mathematical models for a 
carrier (leader) and a shipper (follower). The leader’s model aimed to determine a network as 
well as a tariff to charge the follower; and the follower decided how to meet customer 
transportation demands using the network based on the tariff decided by the leader. The authors 
proposed an iterative algorithm based on a Lagrangian relaxation framework (Lawrence v. 
Snyder, 2011a).  
 
Stackelberg Equilibrium has also been applied in the railway freight industry. However, the 
conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders and the application of game theory in rail network 
revenue has not received much attention although it has been suggested that cooperation 
between multiple stakeholders can improve the profits (T. Li et al., 2016). An early study 
47 
 
involving both multiple stakeholder and track pricing was carried out by Harker and Hong 
(1994).  They used pricing as a lever to coordinate the train scheduling between different 
divisions in a railway company. Variational inequalities were used to model the game. Crevier 
et al. (2012) considered the joint optimisation of pricing and capacity for rail freight using a bi-
level model.  Both  Harker and Hong (1994) and Crevier et al. (2012)  made pricing decisions 
with regard to capacities which can be modelled as continuous variables, and the calculation of 
duals in their models have been used. This research is different from the previous studies in the 
following aspects: 1) the bi-level model in the study has binary integer variables in the lower 
level problem, this makes the existing duals based solution method invalid for this problem; 2) 
this research conducts a further study on the solution for system optimisation for the network 
revenue game.  
The IM-FOC game considered in the study can be applied to oligopoly market structure where 
markets are only dominated by a small number of firms. The common gaming models used in 
investigating oligopoly market in the existing literature are Cournot and Bertrard game 
(Naimzada, Tramontana and Milano-bicocca, 2012). Cournot game is used to determine the 
Nash Equilibrium in a duopoly market where the companies produce homogeneous goods and 
compete in output. Bertrand derives a Nash equilibrium where the companies compete in price 
(Tremblay and Tremblay, 2011). Both Cournot and Bertrard games assume that the players in 
the games make a decision simultaneously whereas the IMs and the FOCs make decisions 
sequentially. Further, the two games cannot be applied in this study, as the products in this study 
are the train itineraries. They are heterogeneous products which have different properties 
including original station, destination station, departure time, arrival time, etc. 
 
2.7 Network Design 
As discussed earlier, the FOC’s decision is to design a freight service network. Therefore, the 
relevant literature in relation to rail network design is also covered.  
 
Rail network design is a traditional research topic in operations research and transportation 
science. Similar to the literature in network revenue management, rail network design in the 
published studies was mainly conducted for a single stakeholder, e.g. Infrastructure Manager. 
Crainic & Rousseau (1986) developed a modelling framework to optimise the network design 
process for a multimode, multi-commodity freight transportation problem and also provided an 
algorithm to solve the model. Crainic (2000) provided an overview of the models relating to 
service network design. Pazour et al. (2010) presented models from a policy maker’s point of 
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view for high-speed rail freight distribution network design in the US. Lulli et al. (2011) 
proposed a customised mathematical model to design the Italian rail service network. Lin et al. 
(2012) formulated models to optimise the freight train connection problem in a large-scale 
railway network in China. A simulated annealing algorithm was applied in the optimisation 
process. Murali et al. (2016) developed a decision tool for train planners to select the best route 
in terms of travel time. Capacity limits for the train movement was considered. This tool used 
integer programming to model the capacity of the network and a genetic algorithm was used to 
solve the model. It can be observed that there are very limited studies considering the 
conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders in network design. 
 
2.8 Research Gaps  
Based on the current state of the art and the above comprehensive literature review in this 
research field, research gaps were identified. 
 
Armstrong & Meissner (2010)  observed a lack of studies in rail network revenue management 
after reviewing 18 relevant papers on both passenger and freight rail revenue management. 
They found that the existing research covers the issues including capacity allocation, service 
differentiation, and booking horizon, but importantly network revenue management in rail 
freight industry has been overlooked, this is a clear research gap. To further clarify the 
contributions that this research will make to the existing body of literature, a summary of the 
most relevant research is given in Table 8. When analysing the literature, the following aspects 
were considered: 1) if the proposed model was deterministic or stochastic; 2) if the number of 
stakeholders was one or more than one where game theory was applied; 3) if the model involved 
integer variables; 4) if the topological structure of network was considered.  
 
 











Crainic and Rousseau, 1986 D 1 I √ 
Pazour, Meller and Pohl, 2010 D 1 I √ 
Crevier, Cordeau and Gilles 
Savard, 2012 
D Multiple C √ 
Crainic, 2000 D 1 I √ 
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Lin et al., 2012 D 1 I √ 
Lulli, Pietropaoli and Ricciardi, 
2011 
D 1 I √ 
Marcotte, Savard and Zhu, 2009 D Multiple C √ 
 Murali et al. 2016) D 1 I √ 
Harker and Hong, 1994 D 2 C X 
This study S Multiple I √ 
Table 8 A summary of the relevant literature 
 
Based on Table 8 and the above literature review, the following research gaps are identified. 
 
GAP 1: There are very limited studies on the network revenue management game in the rail 
freight industry. Only two studies have been found in the extensive literature search: Harker 
and Hong (1994) and Crevier et al. (2012). However, both studies only model the capacities 
that a FOC should purchase as a continuous decision variable, which does not capture the 
network design issue faced by the FOC. 
 
More specifically, Harker and Hong (1994) and Crevier et al. (2012) considered how many 
wagons a FOC should purchase between OD pairs. This arrangement made it possible to model 
the IM-FOC game using continuous models such as variational equations or continuous bilevel 
linear programming. The deficiencies of their approaches was that their models are not in line 
with industrial practice. In the real-world system, the IM normally sells the freight service to 
FOCs on the basis of itinerary rather than individual wagons; the wagons associated with a 
particular train itinerary have different prices, and thus are heterogeneous products. In the study, 
bilevel integer linear programming will be used to overcome the deficiencies of the two earlier 
models. 
 
GAP 2: To obtain a solution to the Stackelberg Equilibrium for the network revenue 
management game in the railway freight industry, a bilevel linear programming model with the 
lower level being a network design problem needs to be solved; however, the existing literature 




A similar study was carried out by (Brotcorne et al., 2008). In their bilevel model, pricing and 
network design that involves binary decision variables that are all on the upper level, and all 
the decision variables in the lower level are continuous. This arrangement enabled them to 
convert low level problems to constraints for the upper level by using the duals of the lower 
level model. However, the model developed in this thesis has binary integer decision variables 
in the lower level that does not have a dual problem. Therefore, we cannot use a Brotcorne et 
al. (2008) solution method. Another similar study was conducted by Crevier et al. (2012). 
However, the Crevier et al. (2012) study also has no integer decision variables in the lower level 
problem, and thus provided no solution to the problem to be discussed in this dissertation. 
 
GAP 3: There is the need to develop a solution method to identify the global optimal solution 
for the Stackelberg game for network revenue management in the rail freight industry. The 
literature reviews mainly focused on how to obtain the solution to the Stackelberg Equilibrium, 
but there are no studies conducted to obtain the solution leading to the global optimisation of 
the Stackelberg game. 
 
In the existing literature, the Stackelberg model aims to identify the best strategy for the leader 
to optimise their profits, i.e., the optimal solution to Stackelberg equilibrium. These studies 
always assume that the leader is a selfish decision-maker. However, in the IM-FOC game 
considered in the study, the IM is a representative of government, therefore, there is the chance 
that the IM’s decision target may be to optimise the social benefit, i.e., the total profits of the 
system. However, the existing literature does not consider how to design the best strategy for 
the leader who aims to maximise the profits of all the stakeholders in the game. There is a 
research vacuum for this aspect.  
 
GAP 4: Contract or mechanism design for the network revenue management game in the rail 
freight industry is required in both practice and theory. There are studies on mechanism design 
in the context of supply chain revenue management where demands are independent and the 
leader-follower game is applied; and there are also studies on mechanism design for the Nash 
game for the competitions in network revenue game. However, no studies have been found for 




The existing studies in the supply chain contract design mainly focus on homogeneous products 
with a single price. Therefore, the designed contract only involves a single price. As a contrast, 
there are many itineraries, each associated with a single price, in the study. Since the FOC’s 
decisions are to choose which of these heterogeneous products to purchase, binary decisions 
variables have to been used to model the behaviours. Therefore, the previous approach used for 
contract design, particularly the first order and the second order optimality used in news vendor 
game, is not applicable to the thesis. There is another body of literature focusing on the 
mechanism design for Nash game, which is also not applicable to this study.  
 
GAP 5: Practitioners lack the knowledge on how to manage a vertically separated rail freight 
system. The interviews with relevant stakeholders in the rail freight industry have indicated that 
the current pricing mechanism is not ideal， and that they have no clue on how to manage their 
revenue effectively. Further information with regard to the interviews will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
Since the vertical separation governance structure was introduced to the rail freight industry, 
how an IM should charge FOCs became a major decision making problem. In practice, an IM 
lacks the knowledge and tools to identify the best price/strategy for the new system. More 
specifically, an IM does not know what prices should be set to maximise their own profits; and 
what prices should be set to maximise the profits for the whole freight system.  For example, 
up to now, the UK rail freight system, which is one of the earliest countries adopting the vertical 
separation governance structure, has only experienced price changes six times. The limited 
number of pricing processes has not provided enough experience for the UK to manage the 
prices of using rail infrastructure. 
Further, it may take several years for an IM and FOCs to set a new price tariff in the UK freight 
industry as there are a large number of consultations to be conducted. From the perspective of 
practitioners, it would be more desirable if the price agreement between an IM and FOCs can 







2.9 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter analysed the features of the research questions and scoped the literature review 
accordingly. Research gaps were identified based on five streams of literature reviewed 
including: traditional pricing and revenue management, revenue management in supply chains, 
network revenue management, network revenue management game and network design.  
To solve the research questions and fill in the gaps, research framework and methodology to be 






Chapter 3 Research Framework and Research Methodology 
 
This chapter will provide an overview of the research framework adopted in the study, it will 
also introduce the main research methods selected and applied.  
 
3.1 Research Framework 
To address the three research questions introduced in Chapter 1, the following research 




























Step 1: Formulation of Network Revenue Management Game 
Methods Applied: Quantitative (Linear Programming, Stochastic Linear Programming) 
Step 2: Stackelberg Equilibrium Scenario 
Methods Applied: Quantitative (Game Theory, 
Bilevel Linear Programming, Gradient Search and 
Local Search Method) 
Step 3: Global Optimality Scenario 
Methods Applied: Quantitative (Inverse 
Linear Programming, Fenchel Cutting 
Plane Algorithm) 
Step 4: Optimal Mechanism (Contract) Design 
Methods applied: Quantitative (Bilevel Linear Programming, Double Layer Gradient Search Algorithm) 
Step 5: Software Development 
 Computer Languages Applied: C++ and CPLEX 
Solution for Stackelberg 
Equilibrium 
Solution for Global Optimality 
Solution for the Optimal subsidies under 




Step 1:  Formulation of Network Revenue Management Game 
The proposed question will be mathematically formulated, which is the basis of the research. 
Stackelberg (Leader/Follower) game theory (to be discussed in detail in section 3.2.6) will be 
employed to model the relationship between an IM and a FOC. They are deemed as two players 
in a Leader-Follower game. Figure 15 shows the interaction between the IM and the FOC. In 
the UK, Network Rail, the IM, represents the Leader in the game who is responsible for 
determining the price tariff for train itineraries in the rail freight service network. A freight 
operating company (FOC), e.g. DB Cargo, acting as the Follower, will make its decisions on 
the purchase of train itineraries based on the prices decided by the Leader and end customer’s 
(shipper’s) demands. Based on the FOC’s itinerary purchasing plan, the IM can calculate its 
costs and profits. It should be pointed out that the activities in the two phases are conducted 
repetitively. In other words, the IM will repetitively adjust the prices based on the decision 




Figure 15 Gaming Process of the IM’s and the FOC’s Decision Making 
 
In contrast to the traditional Stackelberg game which normally does not involve networks and 
assumes homogeneous product associated with a single price, the problem to be investigated in 
this research is based on the rail freight service network consisting of multiple itineraries with 
Infrastructure Manager 
(Leader)’s Model 
Freight Operating Company (Follower)’s 
Model 
Two-Stage Stochastic Programming Model 
Phase 1: pricing and 
supply capacity 
Phase 2: Service 
Network Design  
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multiple prices. Therefore, the question to be investigated is consequently more challenging. 
Due to the network effect, integer decision variables must be used in the models, which make 
it very difficult to solve the game.  
 
Mixed integer linear programming is employed to develop the IM’s model and two-stage 
stochastic linear programming is adopted to model the operation of the freight service operator. 
The FOC’s model is a two stage stochastic programming model where the uncertainty of the 
shipper’s demands will be considered. In the first stage of the FOC’s model, the decision centres 
on the rail freight route selection/ network design. It will model the relationship between 
capacity acquisition cost and freight service network design. In the second stage, the operational 
performance of the corresponding network design plan will be evaluated.  This stage will 
involve the modelling of operational issues such as fulfilment of customer demands and 
compute the revenue and the costs corresponding to the selected operation plan and the designed 
service network. 
 
Customer demand is one of the main parameters in the FOC’s model. Because of the dynamics 
of the economic environment, this parameter has a high level of uncertainty which cannot be 
neglected when making decisions on itineraries purchasing plan. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider customer demand as a stochastic variable to reflect its uncertain characteristics. 
Sample Average Approximation (SAA) method will be employed to accommodate the 
stochastic factor (Dantzig and Thapa, 2003).  
 
Step 2:  Solution of the Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Game 
To address the first research question in the study, i.e., identifying the prices at Stackelberg 
Equilibrium, a bilevel linear programming model with binary decision variables in the lower 
level is developed. This is different from the existing studies related to Stackelberg game model 
where the first-order or second-order derivatives of a nonlinear continuous functions are the 
main solution approaches. The adoption of bilevel linear programming in the thesis is due to 
the heterogeneous train itineraries.  
 
Bilevel programming is an optimisation technique, it is a branch of hierarchical mathematical 
optimisation. In a bilevel programming problem, the upper level decision making process 
integrates the reaction of the lower level to its decisions. Once the upper level decision variables 
are determined, the follower solves an optimisation problem at the lower level, taking as 
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exogenous the leader’s variables. Such an interaction between the upper level model and lower 
level model in a bilevel model can exactly reflect the relationship between the IM’s and FOC’s 
decision making. It is an appropriate method to be applied for finding the Stackelberg 
Equilibrium solution of the game. Detailed introduction to this method is in section 3.2.6. 
 
The existing solution methods for the bilevel programming model requires conversion of the 
lower level problem into a dual problem (Dantzig and Thapa, 2003), which cannot be used for 
the bi-level model developed in the dissertation due to these binary variables. Therefore, a 
specialised solution method based on gradient search will be developed for the proposed bilevel 
programming model.  
 
Step 3: Solution of the Global Optimality of the Game 
The second research question is to identify the solutions leading to global optimality of the 
Stackelberg game. In this step, a solution for the IM-FOC game when the two stakeholders have 
perfect cooperation is first identified. In order to make this solution optimal to the scenario 
when the IM and the FOC make decisions independently, an inverse linear programming 
method is applied. Detailed information for this method will be provided in section 3.2.5. Due 
to the integer variables involved, a Fenchel cutting plane method (Boyd, 1994) is used to solve 
the inverse integer programming model. Stochastic programming is applied to handle the 
uncertain demand.  
 
Step 4: Optimal Mechanism (Contract) Design 
The various contracts/mechanisms that may coordinate the freight service network supply chain 
will be explored. The ‘coordinate’ means that the contracts/mechanism can lead to global 
optimality and ensure the IM and the FOC are better off than the current industrial practice, i.e., 
the IM’s unilaterally designing the prices without collaboration with the FOC. A government 
subsidy based mechanism is designed to coordinate the rail freight system. A double-layer 
gradient search enhanced by local search method is developed to find out the optimal value of 
the subsidy rate. 
 




Finally, in this research, the algorithms and mathematical models will be implemented in a 
software package tool. The software tools will be developed using C++ and CPLEX. The 
following will explain the main reasons for choosing the computer language and tool. 
 
There are many choices of computer languages for developing the software package. To choose 
a suitable language is a crucial step for the particular task. In the field of computer science, 
there are some studies that have been conducted to compare the computational performance of 
different languages. In these studies, the same algorithm will be coded using all tested languages. 
The key criterion for the comparison is the computational speed and time required for a 
particular task. (Aruoba and Fernández-Villaverde, 2015) summarised the speed of several 
languages in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 Table showing the speed of several languages for the same algorithm 
 
As the software to be developed will mainly be used to do scientific calculation in this study. 
A large amount of calculations will be needed in the case study and data analysis process. 
Therefore, run time will be an important criterion for selecting language. If the computer 
language is not efficient enough, the computational time required will be significant. From 
Table 9, it can be found, compared with other computer languages, C++ has very good 
performance in terms of computational time.  
 
Meanwhile, in the software, it is necessary to call IBM CPLEX library function to calculate the 
model. CPLEX will provide basic functions to compute Mixed Integer Linear Programming.  
CPLEX library functions has the best compatibility with C/C++ although it also supports JAVA, 
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PYTHON, MATLAB and C. This is because CPLEX was designed for C/C++ originally and 
developed later to connect with other languages.  
 
In light of the above discussions, C++ and CPLEX were chosen as the computer language and 
tool to develop the software package tool to implement the algorithms and models in this 
research. 
 
3.2 Research Methods to be Applied  
To address the research questions, the following methods will be employed at different stages 
of this research: 
 Game theory 
 Linear programming 
 Stochastic linear programming 
 Sample Average Approximation 
 Inverse Mixed Integer Linear Programming 
 Bilevel linear programming 
 Gradient search method 
 
In what follows, an introduction to these methods will be presented. 
 
3.2.1 Game theory 
Game theory studies the decision strategies of multiple players. Mathematical models including 
the objectives and constraints of different parties involved in the decision making environment 
are normally developed to capture the relationship between the multiple decision-makers that 
may have both conflicts and cooperation (Drew Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) . Game theory has 
now been applied in economics, political science, psychology, logistics, computer science, as 
well as biology, to study the conflict and cooperation between two or several decision-makers. 
The earliest researchers who studied game theory in economics were Cournot (1838), Bertrand 
(1883) and Edgeworth (1925). The book Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour written by 
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) is known as the first book which introduced 
the idea of a general theory of games in the economic field. The authors applied game theory 
to analyse most economic problems in the book. They introduced the definition of the min-max 
solution as well as the zero-sum games. In these games, the players have conflicting interests 
and have no commonality. They also proved that the min-max solution always exists in the 
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zero-sum games which involve two players. In two-player zero-sum games, the sum of the total 
utilities is a fixed number (constant) and the amount one player wins is exactly the same as the 
others lose. The political election problem is a typical example of zero-sum game. The total 
number of votes is constant and if one candidate has more votes, it means the others will have 
to lose by the same number of votes. 
 
John Forbes Nash Jr. also made a significant contribution to game theory by introducing the 
concept of “Nash Equilibrium” in 1950 to study the equilibria. It was then developed for 
specific models by (Cournot, 1838), (Bertrand, 1883) and Drew Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
In the Nash Equilibrium, there are two assumptions: the first one is that each player has full 
knowledge of the strategy of his opponents, this means each player can correctly predict the 
competitor’s response to their strategy. The second one is that each player tries to maximise 
their payoff based on their estimation of their competitor’s reaction. Nash Equilibrium is a 
strategic combination in which each player’s strategy is the best response to the other’s. In other 
words, under such a situation, each player achieves the maximum payoff he/she could have in 
the game. This is a different type of game and also a non-zero-sum game.  
 
To understand the insight of game theory, a simple example in practice will be given. Suppose 
that a manufacturer needs to determine a price between a range (between a high and a low price) 
for its products. When making this decision, the manufacturer needs to consider production cost 
that includes the raw material costs, labour cost etc. as well as the prices of other manufacturers’ 
same or substitutable products. A simple approach to design the pricing strategy is to choose a 
price similar to the competitors’ prices for the same or substitutable products.  An improved 
method is to apply game theory to consider the other competitions’ behaviours, i.e., how they 
may change their prices in response to the manufacture’s price. To apply game theory, the 
manufacturer needs to mathematically capture: 1) how customer demand will respond to the 
change of prices based on their knowledge of the market environment; and 2) how each 
individual competitor will adjust their price in response to the prices designed by the 
manufacture and the other competitors. Based on these mathematical models, a Nash 
Equilibrium status may be identified and the prices at Nash Equilibrium can be obtained.  
 
In this research, the IM and the FOC are two stakeholders involved in rail freight system. They 
are independent decision makers with each having their own operational objectives. They have 
a conflict of interest in setting the freight rate because, in general, the higher rate can increase 
the IM’s profit but inevitably increase the FOC’s costs. Also, the IM’s decision on price can 
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influence the FOC’s decision on purchasing train itineraries. The FOC’s decision on itinerary 
purchase will affect the IM’s profits, and how the FOC will fulfil the customer orders. For each 
individual itinerary, the IM may set a tariff which is the highest price that the FOC can afford. 
If the prices are higher than this, the FOC will stop buying any itineraries.  There exists a price 
that can lead to an Equilibrium status where the IM and the FOC can achieve their own best 
possible benefits when they make decisions independently. The above process between the IM 
and the FOC can be categorised as a Stackelberg game, and the equilibrium for the game will 
be the Stackelberg Equilibrium. As the total profits of the system will change with the IM’s 
price tariff, the IM-FOC game is a non-zero-sum Stackelberg game.  
 
When applying game theory to identify the prices at equilibrium, two independent optimisation 
models will be developed: the IM’s model and the FOC’s model. The IM’s model aims to firstly 
determine a track access price tariff; the FOC’s model aims to determine an itinerary purchasing 
plan based on the prices determined by the IM and end customers’ orders. In the game, the two 
models will be applied repetitively.  At the beginning of the game, e.g., time period 0, the IM’s 
model will be applied to generate a price tariff for using train itineraries; based on this price 
tariff and the end customers’ orders, the FOC’s model will be applied afterwards to decide the 
optimal purchasing plan for train itineraries. Then the IM will make adjustment to its price tariff 
in the hope that a more profitalbe response from the FOC can be received to increase its profits.   
The above process may repeat many times until an equilibrium status can be achieved. 
 
3.2.2 Linear programming  
Linear programming will be used to develop the IM’s and the FOC’s models. Linear 
programming was first introduced by George B. Dantzigg and his colleges in 1947 as a method 
to obtain the best solution for a particular goal (Dantzig, George B., 1997a). George B. Dantzig 
is believed to be the pioneer in linear programming research and he has made significant 
contribution to this field. He published more than four hundred papers, books and reports in the 
research of this field (Dantzig, George B., 1997).  Dantzig, George B. (1997) defined linear 
programming as the problems which aim to determine the maximum or minimum of a linear 
objective function. The variables in the problem are subject to linear equality and inequality 
constraints. The general Linear Programming Problem can be formulated as 
max 𝑐𝑇𝑥 = 𝑍 
                                                                 s.t.  
𝐴𝑥 ≤ 𝑏 




Where the linear objective function of the model is to find out the maximal value of Z. A is a 
𝑚 × 𝑛 matrix; c is a 1 × 𝑛 vector, b is a  𝑚 × 1 vector. All the elements in matrix A, b, c are 
rational.  𝑅+   is nonnegative n-dimentional real vector. xis 𝑛 × 1 continuous non-negtive 
decision varialbes and all x are constrained by :𝐴𝑥 ≤ 𝑏. 
 
After several decades’ development, linear programming theory has been applied widely and 
extended to the other mathematical programming fields including integer programming, 
stochastic programming and nonlinear programming.  One of the major extensions that has 
close connection to this study is Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP). Like a LP problem, a 
MILP problem has a linear objective function, has bounds and linear constraints, but no 
nonlinear constraints; particularly, some components of decision variable set are integer values. 
A standard formulation of a Mixed Integer Linear Programme problem (MILP) is: 
Z = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑐𝑇𝑥 + 𝑑𝑇𝑦) 
                                                     s.t.  
𝐴𝑥 + ℎ𝑦 ≤ 𝑏 
                                                           𝑥 ∈ 𝑍+




Where the linear objective function of the model is to find out the maximal value of Z. x is 𝑛 ×
1 non-negtive integer decision variables, and thus belongs to 𝑍+
𝑛  ; y 𝑝 × 1  non-negative 
continuous decision variables, y ∈ 𝑅+
𝑝
; h  𝑚 × 𝑝 matrix; d 1 × 𝑝 matrix.  
 
Many researchers extended linear programming to mathematical optimisation theory (Lenstra, 
Shmoys, & Tardos, 1990; Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer, & Nemirovski, 2004;  X. Chen, Sun, 
& Xu, 2018). Now linear programming has become a cornerstone for operations research 
(Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1978; Crowder, Johnson, & Padberg, 1983; Desrochers Martin, 
Jacques Desroseris 1991; Mathur & Puri, 1995), management science (Fisher & Fisher, 1981; 
Elmaghraby & Keskinocak, 2003), economics (Ghodsypour & O’Brien, 1998; Ghodsypour & 
O’Brien, 2001)and computer science(Yannakakis, 1991). Linear Programming is also used in 
combinatorial optimisation problems and network flow maximisation problems. Linear 
programming has been used widely in industrial practices, e.g., petroleum industry throughout 
the whole process, from oil extraction, refining, blending to distribution, transportation, supply 
chain management, food processing industry, iron and steel industry, metalworking industry 
etc. (Dantzig, George B., 1997). Linear programming provides a way to model the problems in 
practice mathematically. Linear programming models can be solved through some algorithms 
more efficiently than non-linear programming. The output of a linear programming model can 
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inform what is the best decision to be taken and what are the best results corresponding to the 
decision. 
 
3.2.3 Two-Stage stochastic programming 
Stochastic programming is a mathematic optimisation method dealing with the probability and 
stochastic factors. A stochastic programming problem normally contains a set of variables that 
include one or more random variables. The earliest research on stochastic programming 
appeared in the papers by George Dantzig, Martin Beale and Ferguson in 1955 and 1956. The 
research at this early stage in this field was in isolation and its importance was not fully 
recognised, which resulted in the very slow development of stochastic programming and things 
did not improve until late 1980s when computer science technology became mature. 
 
One of the most common stochastic programming is termed two-stage program with fixed 
recourse by Dantzig (1955). It can be formulated as 
 
 
min 𝑧 = 𝑓𝑇𝑋 + 𝐸𝜔∈Ω[𝑞(𝜔)
𝑇𝑌(𝜔)] 
                                        s.t.             𝐴𝑋 = 𝑏 
𝐶(𝜔)𝑋 + 𝐷𝑦(𝜔) = 𝑘(𝜔) 
𝑋 ≥ 0, 𝑌(𝜔) ≥ 0 
 
In the first stage, the decision variable is X, and the coefficient is a vector f.  X is the first stage 
decision that needs to be made first before the realisation of any decision variables. Hence, X is 
independent of the random events.  In the second stage, a set of random events, denoted by Ω, 
may happen, and 𝜔 is one of the random events. 𝐶(𝜔), 𝐷, 𝑘(𝜔) are the coefficients; y(𝜔) is 
the decision variable, which are all dependent on a realisation of stochastic variable. The target 
of the second stage is to minimise the expected costs relating to 𝑌(𝜔) for a given X. 
 
If the number of random events is finite, i.e., {𝜔1, … , 𝜔𝑘, … 𝜔|Ω|} , the corresponding 
probabilities for the random events are {𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑘, … 𝑝|Ω|}, the above two-stage program can be 
re-written as, 




                                        s.t.             𝐴𝑋 = 𝑏 
𝐶(𝜔)𝑋 + 𝐷𝑦(𝜔) = 𝑘(𝜔) 
𝑋 ≥ 0, 𝑦(𝜔) ≥ 0 
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Where, 𝑄(𝑋, Δ(𝜔𝑘)) = min
𝑦
{𝑞(𝜔𝑘)
𝑇𝑦|𝐷𝑦 ≥ 𝑘(𝜔) − 𝐶(𝜔𝑘)𝑋}; 
              Δ(𝜔𝑘) = {𝑞(𝜔𝑘), 𝐶(𝜔𝑘), 𝑘(𝜔𝑘)}. 
 
The majority of published research in stochastic linear programming involves two-stage 
problems as solving the two-stage stochastic programming is relatively easy.  This technique 
has been widely applied in optimisation problems(Fangruo CHen, 1999). For example, Chen et 
al. (2015) applied this method to design the supply chain for Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs) considering the uncertainty of the value of remanufacturing.  Restrepo, Gendron and 
Rousseau (2017) formulated a multi-activity scheduling problem considering the uncertain 
demand as a discontinuous two-stage stochastic linear model. In their study, a multi-cut L-
shaped method was developed to solve the model, and the computional results showed that the 
developed models and solution method can help to reduce staff costs. 
 
3.2.4 Sample average approximation (SAA) 
It is a big challenge to solve the aforementioned stochastic programming problem, due to the 
inherent complexity and large computational requirement (Emelogu et al., 2016).  For example, 
consider a road network with 200 links, and each link may have five states with each 
representing a certain level of traffic congestion. Each state may happen with a certain 
probability. Therefore, the total scenarios to be considered will be 5200, i.e., |Ω| = 5200. This 
will lead to a large number of constraints and scenario-dependent variables, which may be 
easily beyond the capacity of an advanced modern computer.  
 
Sample Average Approximation (SAA) approach was proposed to calculate the near-optimal 
solutions for these large-scale stochastic optimisation problems with uncertain parameter(s). 
SAA is a sample-based approach. The idea of SAA is that a number of sample scenarios, e.g., 
(𝜉1, 𝜉2, … , 𝜉𝑛) are generated according to the distribution functions of random variables. The 
expected value of the objective function such as 𝐸𝜔∈Ω[𝑞(𝜔)
𝑇𝑦(𝜔)] and ∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑄(𝑋, Δ(𝜔𝑘))
|Ω|
𝑘=1   
is approximated by the sample average function 
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑄(𝑋, Δ(𝜉𝑛)) 
𝑛
𝑖=1 . An additional merit of 
SAA is that it can even approximate the expected value of a function that does not have a closed 
form.   
 
Many studies with regard to SAA have been carried out. Some scholars studied this approach 
theoretically, e.g., Ermoliev and Norkin (2013), Kleywegt, Shapiro and Homem-de-Mello 
(2002). Some other scholars applied SAA into different industry practice. Dong, Lee and Song 
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(2015)  studied the service capacity planning and dynamic container routing problem in the 
shipping network in which customer demand is an uncertain parameter. The researchers applied 
the SAA method to deal with the uncertainty of customer demand. Wang and Meng (2017)  
explored the intermodal freight transportation network design problem in their research and 
proposed a sampling-based heuristic policy in which they applied SAA approach. Wu and 
Sioshansi (2017) employed the SAA method to solve a two-stage stochastic model to manage 
the electric vehicle charging problem. This method was also used in the location-allocation 
problem (Amiri-Aref, Klibi and Babai, 2018). The demand in the study was a stochastic 
parameter in a multi-period location-inventory optimisation problem in a multi-echelon supply 
chain network. 
 
In literature, the SAA method can be categorized into two groups: (1) SAA with fixed sample 
size; (2) SAA with variable sample size. In this research, the freight demand of the FOCs from 
the shippers, measured by the number of orders and wagons required in each order, are all 
random.  Further, the number of orders that need to be served by a FOC is large. Due to these 
features, SAA with fixed sample size is an appropriate approach for this study. 
 
 
The FOC’s model will be formulated as a two-stage stochastic programming model with 
recourse. The input data for the FOC’s model is the IM’s price and the random customer 
demands. SAA method will be adopted to handle the random customer demands, i.e., customer 
demands will be sampled, and then fed into the FOC’s model. 
 
3.2.5 Inverse mixed integer linear programming (InvMILP) 
In this study, the global optimality of the above Stackelberg game will be also investigated. To 
determine the optimal prices that can lead to the global optimality of the game, Inverse Mixed 
Integer Linear Programming will be applied in this research. This method has been widely 
applied in the optimisation field (Chow and Recker, 2012; You, S.I.a , Chow, J.Y.J.b, Ritchie, 
2016; Tayyebi and Aman, 2016) 
 
Similar to the other optimisation problems, an MILP also includes a set of parameters and a set 
of variables; and can generate different optimal solutions (output) when a different parameter 
set (input) is given. The Inverse Linear Programming Problem (InvMILP) aims to identify a set 
of cost coefficients in objective function that can convert a known feasible solution to an 








                                                     s.t.  
𝐴𝑋 = 𝑏 
                                                           𝑋 ∈ ℤ𝑟 × ℝ𝑛−𝑟, c ∈ ℝ𝑛 
 
Mathematically, InvMILP aims to identify a vector of cost coefficients, d, in the objective 
function, which can make a known feasible solution 𝑥0 optimal. d is normally obtained by 
minimally adjusting a known cost coefficient c. As d might be not unique, i.e., there might be 
many possible sets of vectors that can make 𝑥0 be the optimal solution, some criterion will be 
needed to choose a vector d. The commonly adopted criterion is some selected 𝐿𝑝 norm, i.e., 
||c − 𝒹||
p




𝑝, where 𝑝 is an integer ranging from 1 to +∞. In this research, 
𝐿1 norm will be used for the sake of simplification. Hence, the Inverse Mixed Integer Linear 
Programme (InvMILP) can be formulated as the following: 
min
𝑑
|𝑐 − 𝑑| 
Subject to:   
𝑑𝑇𝑥0 ≤ 𝑑𝑇𝑥 
𝐴𝑥 = 𝑏  
𝑥 ∈ ℤ𝑟 × ℝ𝑛−𝑟 
where, 𝑥0  is a feasible solution for the original problem, but is the optimal solution 
corresponding to the new cost coefficient vector d. 
 
There are some applications of the Inverse Linear Programme in the existing literature. For 
example, Bitran et al. (1981) proposed to use Langragain techniques to solve an inverse 
optimisation problem, and applied the proposed method in a plant location problem. (Albert 
Tarantola (2005) applied the inverse linear programming method in geophysical research. In 
recent years, this method attracted more researchers, e.g.,Yang & Zhang (1999);Wang (2009); 
Zhang et al. (2011); Bulut & Ralphs (2013);Ralphs & Bulut (2014) and its application is not 
just limited to mathematics  and geophysical sciences, it has also been applied in many other 
different fields (Mostafaee, Hladík and Černý, 2016). (Burton and Toint (1994) and Toint (2013) 
explored inverse shortest paths problem which aimed to recover the arc costs based on the given 
information about the shortest paths in a graph. Some other researchers expanded this theory 
and developed different algorithms. Ahuja and Orlin (2001) studied the algorithm for inverse 
optimization problem and proved that the inverse problem of a linear programming problem is 
also a linear programming problem under L1 and L∞ norm. They claimed that the inverse 
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problem of the optimisation problem can be simplified when a particular condition was satisfied. 
Wang (2009) developed a cutting plane algorithm for the inverse MILP problem. Zhang and 
Xu (2010) investigated the inverse optimization for linearly constrained convex separable 
programming problems and explored the application practically, such as using this method to 
control quality in production systems and to manage the production capacity planning problem. 
Bulut and Ralphs (2013) systemically discussed the mathematical property and complexity of 
inverse mixed integer linear programme and proposed an algorithm to identify the optimal 
solution of InvMILP. Tayyebi & Aman (2016) proposed a binary search technique based 
algorithm to solve inverse linear programming problem.  The authors also did a case study for 
an algorithm for the inverse minimum cost flow problem which showed a positive result. Most 
recently, You, S.I.a , Chow, J.Y.J.b, Ritchie (2016) applied this method in vehicle route 
problems to find the optimal route solution. The above successful examples of the application 
of inverse linear programming indicate that InvMILP is an appropriate research method and 
can be employed to solve the problem proposed in the thesis. 
 
In this thesis, when the IM and the FOC are deemed as a single organisation under perfect 
collaboration, there will be no charges between each other, and the freight system can achieve 
system optimality, i.e., the sum of the IM’s and the FOC’s profits is maximised.  By solving 
the model under prefect collaboration, the best itinerary purchasing plan and order fulfilment 
plan can be obtained. By setting an appropriate price tariff, the optimal solution for the case 
under prefect collaboration can also be the optimal solution leading to system optimality for the 
aforementioned Stackelberg game in a vertically separated railway system. From the 
mathematical point of view, there might be more than one price vector which can satisfy the 
aforementioned requirement. In this study,  𝐿1 norm will be followed, thus the price vector that 
is closest to a known price vector will be selected. Using 𝐿1 norm can minimise the disturbance 
to the freight market and keep the market stable.  
 
3.2.6 Bilevel linear programming 
In game theory, it is common to consider two different decision-making approaches: centralised 
and decentralised. In the centralised decision-making system, a central but sometimes virtual 
planner who can access the global information and makes decisions for all the stakeholders. 
The centralised decision-making mechanism represents an ideal situation as there is no central 
planner in reality for the majority of games.  As a contrast, in a decentralised decision-making 





In this study, the bilevel linear programming method will be adopted to identify the prices at 
equilibrium when the IM and the FOC make decisions independently in a decentralised 
decision-making system. The bilevel linear programming method is an approach to model a 
two-players non-cooperative game.   
 
Bilevel linear programming problem (BLPP) is a type of hierarchical mathematical 
optimisation. In BLPP, there exists two decision-makers known as “the leader” and “the 
follower” who make upper level and lower level decisions, respectively.  In game theory, BLPP 
is introduced as a method to solve Stackelberg game (Amirtaheri et al., 2017). In such a game, 
one player acts as the leader in the problem and makes decisions first, while the other, as the 
follower, will determine its decision strategy according to the decision made by the leader. The 
leader and follower have their own decision variable sets and the corresponding constraints sets 
and aim to optimise their own objective functions independently.  It should be noted that, 
although the leader makes a decision first, the leader’s performance, e.g., costs or profits, are 
often affected by the lower level decision.  
 
A standard formulation of BLPP can be written as: 
min 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦)  
                                                 s.t.            𝐵(𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ 0 
                                                                     𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 
min 𝑔(𝑥, 𝑦) 
                                                   s.t.            𝐾(𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ 0 
𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 
 
Note: one or both “min” operators may be replaced by “max” operator. 
 
In the above formulation, 𝑥 is the set of decision variables of the leader (upper level), 𝑓(⋅) is 
the leader’s objective function,  𝐵(𝑥, 𝑦) denotes the leader’s constraints. For the follower 
(lower level), 𝑦 is the set of decision variables, 𝑔(⋅) is its objective function and 𝐾(𝑥, 𝑦) are the 
constraints. 
 
Bilevel programming has many applications. For example, it was applied in strategic planning 
and pursuit-evasion games in which the two player’s objectives are opposed (Dempe et al., 
2015). These models are in the form of max-min formulations. Many other applications of 
bilevel programming in literature deal with policies/regulations for governments and industries 
(Li, Ukkusuri and Fan, 2018; Feng et al., 2018). In recent years, bilevel programming approach 
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was applied in many other fields to facilitate decision making. Amirtaheri et al. (2017)  used 
this method to investigate a production-distribution supply chain problem. Calvete et al. (2014) 
studied the planning process of a decentralised distribution network using a bilevel optimization 
approach. In the study, the effect between decisions made at the distribution stage and the 
manufacturing stage were considered. Labbé (2011) modelled the pricing optimisation 
problems using bilevel programming. In the study, linear prices and network effects have been 
considered.  
 
3.2.7 Gradient search approach 
In this study, a special bilevel programming model will be developed. In the bilevel model, 
there will be binary integer variables in the lower level. Solving this type of bilevel model is 
not reported in the existing literature. A special solution algorithm for this unique bilevel 
programming model will be developed in the study. In developing the solution algorithm, 
gradient search will be employed.  
 
Gradient search is an optimisation method using a first-order iterative approach to find the 
minimum or maximum value of a function. Gradient descent or gradient ascent may be used 
depending on whether the optimisation problem is to find the minimum or maximum value of 
a function. At the beginning of the algorithm, a start searching point (initial value) needs to be 
selected and the step length needs to be defined.  The gradient descent will be used to search 
the minimum value of a function along the negative direction of gradient. As a contrast, gradient 
ascent will be used for searching the maximum value of a function along the positive direction 
of gradient (Alzaman, Zhang and Diabat, 2018). 
 
Suppose that a function F(x) with multiple variables is differentiable at an arbitrary point x, 
then the gradient of F(x) at x is F(𝑥) .  Let 𝑘 denote the length of search step, which is a 
positive scalar. To calculate the minimum value of F(x), the negative of the gradient, i.e., 
gradient descent, should be used to determine searching step.  The searching point should be 
updated as  
𝑥𝑛+1 = 𝑥𝑛 − 𝑘 ∗ F(𝑥𝑛) 
To calculate the maximum value of F(x), the negative of the gradient, gradient ascent, should 
be used. Hence, the searching point should be updated as  




A gradient search based algorithm normally follows the following procedure: at the beginning, 
an initial point of F(x), 𝑥0, is chosen as a start point of the search. Then, following the above 
two equations to update the searching point depending on whether it is a maximisation or 
minimisation problem.  For a minimisation problem, the search stops when 𝐹(𝑥𝑛+1) ≥ F(𝑥𝑛); 
and for a maximisation problem, the search stops when 𝐹(𝑥𝑛+1) ≤ F(𝑥𝑛) 
 
In recent years, this gradient search method was applied widely, especially, in the research of 
machine learning. In this dissertation, gradient ascent will be applied to find out the maximum 
profits for the relevant stakeholders in the aforementioned Stackelberg game. 
 
3.3 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter provided an overview of the research framework. Also, the research methods to 
be applied in the thesis to answer the identified research questions were provided which are the 








Chapter 4 Rail Freight Charging Regime in the UK and Data Collection 
In this chapter, the governance structure of the UK rail freight system will be explained in detail. 
The information will provide the basis to develop mathematical models in the subsequent 
chapters.  Data collected from industry will be presented, which will then be used to test the 
mathematical models and the corresponding solution algorithms. 
 
4.1 Governance Structure of the UK Rail Freight  
The rail freight industry in the UK originated in the early 19th century after the first steam 
locomotive was built, long before the railway network was used for providing regular 
passenger services. Similar to many other countries, the UK railway has experienced reforms, 
e.g. nationalisation, privatisation, and innovations such as electrification, over the centuries. 
One of the major reforms that happened in the UK was that the UK government changed the 
governance structure of their railway system from vertical integration to vertical separation in 
the 1990s in the hope that the railway system could become more efficient and competitive. 
 
In the current UK rail freight industry, a vertically separated governance system characterised 
by the separation of railway ownership from the operations is adopted. Under this governance 
system, the owner of the railway system does not provide transport services to shippers 
directly. Instead, it provides itineraries to some licensed freight operating companies (FOCs) 
who provide freight transport services to shippers. Shippers need to pay the railway owner for 
using the railway infrastructure including tracks, signals, electricity, bridges, tunnels, etc. 
Currently, the rail freight service is provided by competing FOCs, and the infrastructure is 
managed by a single Infrastructure Manager (IM), Network Rail. The three stakeholders in the 
rail freight industry form a three echelon supply chain where the IM is the supplier of the rail 
freight service supply chain, the FOC is the retailer and provides freight service to the end 
customer. In contrast to a traditional supply chain, the products in the chain are the itineraries 
where each itinerary has different properties including original station, destination station, 
departure time, arriving time, passing stations etc. The most important property of the 
itineraries is the network effect.  
 
Compared to the vertically separated railway governance structure in other countries, the UK 
railway industry has a unique feature. In the UK, both the FOCs and the IM are all regulated 
by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) who is responsible for the development of the railway 
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industry by setting strategy and overseeing its delivery. It operates within the framework set 
by UK and EU legislation, e.g. DIRECTIVE 2012/34/EU,  Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2015/909 , and is accountable through Parliament and the courts.  
 
Under such a governance structure, after many years of development, the railway industry has 
become an important economic sector in the UK. Figure 16 presents the contribution of the 
rail industry to the UK economy (Office of Rail and Road, 2019a) and the income of the rail 
industry in 2016 is shown in Table 10. 
 
 
Figure 16 Industry Income in 2017-2018 
Source: (Office of Rail and Road, 2019a)  
 
 
Table 10 Overview of the UK Rail Related industries’ economic footprint 
Source: (Oxford Economics, 2003) 
 
4.2 The Current Charging Regime in the UK Rail Freight Industry 
Under the governance of vertical separation, Network Rail needs to charge the FOCs to collect 
revenue and recover its costs (although sometimes not-fully) incurred in providing the freight 
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infrastructure to the freight operating companies. This arrangement is reasonable as it follows 
the principle that “users pay for the costs”. Network Rail and Office of Rail and Road have put 
a lot of effort into setting up the cost-reflective tariff (Office of Rail and Road (ORR), 2015). 
 
The tariff that the IM adopts to charge FOCs is generally reviewed every 5 years; this is termed 
a Control Period (CP). The only exception is CP2, which was 3 years long due to historical 
reasons related to the predecessor of Network Rail - Railtrack. To match with the start and end 
date of a financial year, each Control Period begins on 1st April and ends on 31st March. The 
current control period is CP 6 which started on 1st April 2019 and will end in 2024. This 
reviewing mechanism has been implemented in the UK rail freight industry since 1996.  Since 
1996, there were 5 CPs, which are: Control Period 1 (CP1): 1996-2001; Control Period 2 (CP2): 
2001-2004; Control Period 3 (CP3): 2004–2009; Control Period 4 (CP4): 2009–2014; Control 
Period 5 (CP5): 2014–2019. The planned control periods are: Control Period 7 (CP7): 2024-
2029; Control Period 8 (CP8): 2029-2034 (Network Rail, 2017b) 
 
The most recent track access charges for Control Period 6 (CP6) were published on 3 December 
2018 and the price tariff was in line with ORR’s Final Determination valid from 1 April 2019 
to 31 March 2024.  
The new price tariff for freight operations in CP6 includes the following elements:  
• Variable Usage Charge (VUC); 
• Freight Specific Charge (FSC); 
• Open Access Infrastructure Cost Charge (ICC); 
• Electrification Asset Usage Charge (EAUC); 
• Fixed Track Access Charges (FTAC) 
 
The approach Network Rail used to recalibrating each charge for CP6 is explained in  (Network 
Rail, 2017) in details. The official document produced by Network Rail in 2017 is very lengthy. 
The calculations methods to determine each charge element are very similar to the previous 
ones that Network Rail have developed during the time period from CP1 to CP5. However, 
these calculation methods have been updated to reflect the changing industry condition in recent 
years. The key points for recalibrating charges in CP6 will be summarised as follows. It should 
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be noted that the updated principles and methods for each charge element have been audited by 
third party companies.  
 
 The current structure of the UVC remain unchanged for CP6. However,  the charge rates 
have been updated to reflect the new industrial changes, e.g., Network Rail’s costs and 
patterns of traffic flows on the network (Office of Rail and Road, 2019). The calculation 
method is audited by ARUP.  
 
 The CP6 EAUC rates follows the same methodology in CP5 but based on the latest 
forecasts of traffic volumes. Steer independently audited the EAUC recalibration. 
 
 In calculating EAUC, comparing to that in CP5, ORR approved the removal of the meter 
tolerance factor from the Traction Electricity Rules.  
 
 The FTAC is determined based on the methodology revised by Network Rail in May 
2018.  
 
The following is the key milestones for setting up the charges for CP6 (Network Rail, 2017b): 
Autumn 2016 –  Network Rail published its initial industry plans. 
Spring 2017 – ORR published advice to ministers and set out requirements for Network Rail’s 
Strategic Business Plan. 
Summer 2017 – Department for Transport (DfT) and Transport Scotland published their high 
level output specifications (HLOS) and statements of funds available (SOFA). 
Winter 2018 – Network Rail published its strategic business plan (Network Rail, 2018a). 
Summer 2018 – ORR published its draft determination. 
Autumn 2018 – ORR published its final determination. 




It is clear that the consultation for CP 6 started in 2016 and lasts for at least 2 years before a 
new control period starts. The 2-year timespan might result in the collected information being 
outdated when they are used to determine the track access tariff. If the IM’s tariff is not designed 
appropriately due to the outdated information, the freight rate that the FOCs charge the shippers 
will be also unreasonable.  
The review in each CP includes track usage tariff, which is very important information for 
Network Rail, the owner of most of the rail infrastructure in the UK, to plan their financial 
flows for the coming years. The review result provides the detailed charging rate for different 
categories, for example, rail freight related charges including capacity charge, track usage 
charge and traction electricity consumption charge. More specifically, for freight train, the track 
usage tariff obtained from the review includes the following elements:  
1) Variable Usage Charge (£/kgtm)   
 - Freight Variable Usage Charge rates  
 - Freight Variable Usage Charge default rates  
2) Electrification Asset Usage Charge (£ per electrified kgtm)  
3) Freight Specific Charge (£/kgtm)   
 - Freight Coal ESI and Iron Ore Freight Specific Charge rates 
            - Freight Biomass Freight Specific Charge rates  
 - Freight Spent Nuclear Fuel Freight Specific Charge rates  
Note:  kgtm means kilogram per train mile. 
 
Currently only Variable Usage Charge and Electrification Asset Usage Charge are applied to 
freight trains transporting general cargos (Network Rail, 2018c). There are no fixed charges 
applied to freight trains, and fixed charges are only applied to the franchised passenger 
operators (Network Rail, 2018b). In fact, as occurs in railway industries in other countries, the 
fixed costs do not change with traffic volume and account for a significant proportion of the 
cost of the railway network. In practice, the total fixed costs incurred by Network Rail are huge. 
For example, in 2013, in England & Wales and Scotland, the amounts were £2,379,350,841, 
£1,759,663,413 and £619,687,428 respectively (Swattridge, 2013). 
 
It has been noticed that “There is currently a relatively low level of understanding around the 
drivers of Network Rail’s fixed costs” (Office of Rail and Road (ORR), 2016). To ensure a 
healthy and sustainable development of the rail sector, the freight operators need to at least pay 
for the cost generated for using the network. As ORR's Director of Markets and Economics, 
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Cathryn Ross, said “Under the current regime, freight companies only pay a small proportion 
of the costs they create using the network for freight industry” (Office of Rail and Road (ORR), 
2016). Network Rail employed an independent costing expert, Brockley Consulting, to review 
the cost allocation approach and suggest improvements. In contrast to the existing charging 
regime, the report prepared by Brockley Consulting proposed to also apply a fixed cost to 
freight operators (Mantzos, 2017). On 22nd September 2017, Network Rail had a consultation 
with regard to the allocation of fixed costs to freight operators in Control Period 6 
(CP6)(Network Rail, 2018a). The consultation was to check the stakeholders’ views on the new 
cost allocation approach. There are a lot of arguments and disagreements among the 
stakeholders, for and against the cost spread method. All of these actions indicate that 
authorities are trying to improve the charging regime in the hope that the principle “charges to 
better reflect costs” can be followed.  
 
In contrast to road transport that is normally operated in an open market with few regulations, 
rail freight services are operated within a fully regulated market environment. Notably, Network 
Rail still relies on government grant (subsidiary) to sustain their company. In the current freight 
charging regime, there are three main sources for Network Rail to recover their total costs for 
operating the network, and the government grant is one of them: - 
(1) charges to the freight service operating companies; 
(2) the government network grant; 
(3) other sources of income (Network Rail, 2017b). 
 
As the public funds are used to subsidise the activities of Network Rail, it is very important for 
the UK government and the public to understand the cost structure of Network Rail and reduce 
the contribution of public fund as much as possible. However, in practice, both the track access 
charging and Network Rail’s cost structures are very complex, and it is very difficult for the 
UK government and the public to ascertain Network Rail’s real costs. Further, as the 
government aims to use public funds to cover Network Rail’s loss, Network Rail may have the 
incentive to exaggerate their costs. Therefore, increasing transparency of Network Rail’s costs 
and simplification of the charging scheme is of interest to the UK government and the general 
public. 
 
In the UK rail freight industry practice, there is no adequate collaboration between Network 
Rail and the FOCs.  Network Rail is the only infrastructure manager, and is in a leading position 
to set up the track access prices. As the monopolist in the market, the IM makes decisions on 
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the track access tariff independently without collaboration with FOCs. Although the charges 
suggested by the IM need to be approved by the ORR, and the ORR may apply some caps on 
the profit the IM can make, the IM can still generate any profit by exaggerating the costs. The 
FOCs need to make a decision based on the track access tariff as well as historical customer 
demands to purchase train itinerates. Hence, the FOCs’ profits are subject to the IM’s track 
access tariff. There is the possibility that the IM makes the decision to maximise its own profits 
without caring about FOCs’ profits. Modern game theory indicates that, in many fields, 
collaboration between stakeholders often leads to better outcome than non-collaboration 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). It remains unclear whether or not both the FOCs and the IM can 
be better off when some sort of collaboration mechanism is introduced. 
 
 
To sum up, the current charging regime has a few drawbacks:  
1) The review on the track access tariff normally takes 2 years. Therefore, it is very likely 
that a tariff may not catch up with a swift change in the freight market. 
2) The FOCs do not pay fixed charges for accessing railway infrastructure whereas the 
fixed cost is a large portion of costs incurred by the IM. 
3) Since the IM receives the subsidy from the UK government, it is important to ascertain 
its costs and revenue generated from charging the FOCs as the information is useful for 
the UK government to determine the amount of public funds to be released to the IM.  
A way forward might be to increase the transparency of the IM’s spending (costs) as 
well as simplify the track access charging regime. 
4) There is lack of cooperation between the IM and FOCs in designing the track access 
tariff. 
 
These drawbacks in a vertically separated governance system have been recognised by the UK 
government. The UK government has recognised that it is necessary to renovate the charging 
regime that the IM adopts to charge the FOCs. As stated in “The Rail Freight Strategy” designed 
by the Government, the new pricing mechanism/strategy is required to meet the current and 
future requirements of rail freight and generate the positive impact of track access charge on 
the freight industry (Department for Transport (DfT), 2016b). 
 
This research is one of the efforts to improve understanding of the charging regime. The focus 
of this study is to introduce a collaboration mechanism to coordinate the decision making 
between an IM and a FOC using Stackelberg game theory. This new mechanism will enable 
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both of the two parties to be better off than making the decision independently. In designing the 
mechanism, the fixed charge will be considered, which is consistent with the new methodology 
proposed by Network Rail published on May 2018 (Network Rail, 2018a) . The models and the 
solution algorithms will be implemented in a software tool, which can facilitate fast decision-
making.  
 
4.3 Data Collection  
In the following chapters, mathematical models and algorithms will be developed. The best way 
to validate the developed models and algorithms is to apply them using real data collected from 
the freight industry in the UK. In order to collect data from Network Rail and the freight 
operating companies, various approaches were adopted on numerous occasions. 
 
There are two mathematical models developed in this study including the IM’s model and the 
FOC’s model. In order to validate the two models, relevant data from the industry is required. 
Data collection was conducted as an important part of this research. To collect data, two 
methods, questionnaire and interview, were applied. The two methods are used simultaneously 
in data collection process rather than being applied independently. 
 
 At the beginning of the study, based on the literature review and documents published on the 
websites of Office of Rail and Road, Department of Transport, Network Rail and operating 
companies, the primary mathematical models were developed for the IM and the FOC 
respectively.  The cost structures of the models included fixed costs, variable costs. 
Questionnaires were designed based on the data requirements of the two models. To validate 
the model structures and collection of the data set required by the model, interviews with 
industry practitioners were also conducted. Several interviews involved the experts from 
Network Rail, Rail Freight Group, Consultants, Chartered Institute of Logistics and 
Transportation (CILT). The detailed information about each interview will be provided in the 
following section. By analysing the information collected from the interviews, it was found that 
collecting detailed cost elements from Network Rail and freight operators were unrealistic. 
Therefore, the structure of fixed cost and variable costs were adjusted to an aggregated value 
rather than different categories, the models for the IM and the FOC were changed according to 
this adjustment. The questionnaire was designed for collecting the data set based on the 
structure of the models accordingly.  
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To collect data from Network Rail and operating companies to validate the IM’s model and the 
FOC’s model respectively, two different questionnaires were developed. Background of the 
study was provided in the first part of each questionnaire so that the participants can have a 
good understanding of the data collection requirement. Each questionnaire was designed 
according to the model structure respectively. For the IM’s questionnaire, apart from 
investigating the current pricing methodology and principle, the related data required in the 
model were listed and explained including the cost, price, freight capacity information.  For the 
FOC’s questionnaire, the interviewees are required to provide the price they currently offered 
to the shipper, typical customer demands over 3 days, average cost per wagon per train mile, 
estimated profits for meeting the provided customer demand for each itinerary. Open questions 
were also designed in the questionnaires which contains personal information about the 
interviewees.   
The questionnaires were distributed on various occasions directly or indirectly to the rail freight 
practitioners. Interviews with the practitioners based on the designed questionnaires were also 
implemented. The total number of interviewees was 24. The total number of questionnaires 
distributed was 45. The returned questionnaires with completed answers excluded open 
questions were treated as valid returned questionnaires. Valid questionnaires returned were 
from 2 companies. In the valid returned questionnaires, the participants took a case from their 
business as an example and provided the required data information including costs and price.  
Due to the commercial confidentiality, the profit information was unable to be collected. To 
estimate the profit that a freight operating company may earn, the FOCs’ average profits 
information, which is open to the public, is used. This method makes it reasonable to estimate 
the profit information of the freight operators.  
By going through this data collection process, the key data information required to validate the 
developed models was thus obtained. 
 
Data collection process also includes: 
Firstly, attempts were made to obtain data from my industry supervisor based in Network Rail. 
 The data collection issue was initially raised at the first External Supervisory Team 
Meeting held on 16th November 2015 to Dr. Meena Dasigi, my external supervisor from 
Network Rail. She introduced the state of art of the current rail freight practice, but no 
data information was provided after the meeting and this issue was raised again in the 
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iCASE meeting on 1st Sep 2016 held at Imperial College, London, organized by Dr 
Dasigi’s supervision, but still no data was provided. 
 Ms. Nadia Hoodbhoy, the current Principal Engineer (Acting) has replaced Dr. Meena 
Dasigi as the industrial supervisor following Dr Dasigi’s retirement in February 2017. 
The data collection questionnaire was presented to her in the first External Supervisory 
Team Meeting held in March 2017 in Network Rail Office, London, and with her help, 
an interview with Mr. Guy Bates, Head of Freight Development at Network Rail on 8th 
June 2017 was carried out. At this very informative meeting, a broader understanding 
of the rail freight industry in the UK as well as the operational process of rail freight 
transportation was introduced. He suggested abandoning the very detailed cost  structure 
in the models, “as the costs are composed of thousands of pieces from here and there, 
and it will cost you the rest of your life to get it!”  
 
Secondly, the supervisory team helped to approach their industry network for help. 
 Since January 2017, Mr. Phil Mortimer, from freight logistics consultancy helped to 
collect data for this research. He arranged a meeting with Mrs. Maggie Simpson from 
the Rail Freight Group (RFG) on 13th March 2017. Maggie kindly provided details of 
her contact in Office of Rail and Road (ORR); 
 In February 2017, the supervisory team organised a meeting with Mr. Paul Davison, a 
Principal Consultant at AECOM to see if they had any data available from previous 
projects. They kindly gave some suggestions in relation to the data collection 
questionnaire; 
 Effort had also been put into participating in the CILT Rail Freight Forum held on 14th 
March 2017 at Newcastle University. During the meeting, the data questionnaire was 
discussed with Mr. Julian Worth, Chair of CILT Rail Freight Forum and he invited the 
meeting participants, particularly those from rail freight industry to help with the data 
requirement. 
 Freight Operating Companies were contacted. 
 I participated in the CILT Forum held on 26th November 2018. With kind help from 
Mr. Julian Worth Chair of the Forum, some shippers agreed to provide the price 
information they paid to the FOC with the signing of a confidentiality agreement. 
 
Thirdly, published documents on the Network Rail website as well as the ORR website were 
investigated. Some pricing information relating to freight train operation is open to the public 
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and provide a good level of details. Especially, the profit percentage of the FOC, percentage of 
each type of cost in the IM’s total cost are published. 
 
After analysing and integrating the collected information, the IM’s and FOC’s models were 
developed. The structures of the two mathematical models have been validated through 
interviews with freight industry practitioners. Information collected indicate that, in practice, 
the fixed costs and variable costs for the IM to provide itineraries to the FOC may include 
thousands of cost elements which make it impossible to collect each of them individually. This 
is the same for the cost elements for FOC. Therefore, it is advised by the industry experts that 
it is reasonable to use aggregated values to denote the fixed costs and variable costs in the 
models. The advice given by the experts in the UK rail freight industry has been followed in 
designing both the IM’s and FOC’s models. 
 
The datasets used for validating the models were designed based on the freight service prices 
that the FOC charge shippers. According to the price information provided to shippers and the 
average profit percentage of the FOC obtained from the published financial document, the fees 
that the FOCs pay to access the IM’s itineraries can be determined. As currently Network Rail 
is supposed to be non-profitable for operating the freight system, the fee they received from the 
FOC will be close to the cost for providing the itinerary. Moreover, the published statics data 
indicates that the IM’s fixed cost accounts for 70 percent of the total cost. This was applied as 
the principle for seperating the IM’s cost into fixed cost and operational variable cost.   
 
Following the above steps, two hypothetical cases have been designed to test the models and 
algorithms developed in the study. These datasets were not provided by the FOCs and Network 
Rail directly, but these datasets are consistent with the relevant statistics published by the 
relevant stakeholders as well as my interviews with rail industry representatives. 
 
4.4 Data Set 1 
In this case, a freight service between two stations (station A and B) is considered. There are 
three train itineraries operating on the line every day. The input data for the experiment are: 








   





Demands and revenue information are shown in Table 11. 
 
 Orders 
(Number of freight wagons,  Revenue in Thousand Pounds) 
Day 1 8,15 6,9 6,6 7,6 6,8 7,9 
Day 2 9,10 7,12 4,10 7,8 6,9 8,9 
Day 3 7,8 1,9 2,7 4,9 5,10 5,15 
Table 11 Information of Customer Demand and Revenue 
 
 The IM’s fixed operational cost is £2,000 per freight wagon. 
 The capacity for all the trains is 30 wagons. 
 The IM’s variable cost £ 10 per wagon; 
 The FOC’s variable cost £ 10 per wagon; 
 The distance between A and B is 100 miles. 
 
4.5 Data Set 2 
 
In this case, a subnetwork shown in Figure 17 chosen from the national railway network is 
selected as the freight network to be studied. The network is composed of four stations including 
Mossend, DRIFT (Daventry International Rail Freight terminal), Southampton, and Felixstowe. 
Six itineraries operating in two directions are considered. They are: (1) Mossend-DRIFT-
Southampton; (2) Mossend-DRIFT-Felixstowe; (3) Southampton- DRIFT-Felixstowe; (4) 
Southampton- DRIFT-Mossend; (5) Felixstowe-DRIFT-Mossend; (6) Felixstowe-DRIFT - 
Southampton. For each path, there are three itineraries available for sale. It is assumed that the 
FOC makes decision based on three days’ operation data. All lines include the same node: 
DRIFT. Therefore, the capacity on any individual line will be constrained by the total handling 
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capacity of station DRIFT. The problem is to investigate the IM’s pricing strategy for these 
lines in this subnetwork.  
 
To test the effectiveness and validity of the research outcomes, the following data from the two 
parties, the IM and the FOC is needed:  
 The available freight capacity on the line; 
 The customer demand for the 3 days; 
 The fixed operational cost per unit per train mile of the IM and the FOC; 
 The total variable cost per unit per train mile of the IM and the FOC; 
 The FOC’s revenue for serving different orders using different trains; 
 The allowed maximum number of wagons for all the trains run on the line; 
 The distance between the original station and the destination station. 
 
 
Figure 17 A four-node railway network in the UK 
 
The railway lines in case 2 are mainly used for transporting containers. Therefore, the amount 
of orders and the relevant costs are measured in “containers” (termed Units in UK industrial 
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practice).  In the following, the data used in the case are presented, i.e., the orders received, the 
price the FOC charge shippers, and the other data such as costs and capacity.  
 
(1) Mossend-DRIFT-Southampton 
 The customer demands in 3 days are: 
On day 1, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 10, 4, 10, 8, 5, 9 respectively.  
On day 2, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 11,12,9,7,10,4 respectively.  
On day 3, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 10,6,6,4,12,11 respectively.  
The customer demand vector can be written in the following: 
   {10, 4, 10, 8, 5, 9}, 
   {11,12,9,7,10,4}, 
   {10,6,6,4,12,11}. 
 The IM’s fixed operational cost between Mossend and Southampton is £0.05 per unit 
per train mile. 
 The FOC charges to the shippers for different orders using different trains: 
Train 1:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £583 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £587 per unit for order 2, £572 per unit for order 3, £576 per 
unit for order 4, £577 per unit for order 5 and £586 per unit for order 6.       
Train 2:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £586 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £572 per unit for order 2, £582 per unit for order 3, £583 per 
unit for order 4, £583 per unit for order 5 and £574 per unit for order 6.       
Train 3: The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £583 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £578 per unit for order 2, £585 per unit for order 3, £585 per 
unit for order 4, £588 per unit for order 5 and £591 per unit for order 6.       




 According to physical constraints on the railway lines, the allowed maximum number 
of units for all the trains running between Mossend and Southampton is 32. 
 The total variable cost for the IM on this line per unit per train mile is £0.05; 
 The FOC’s variable cost is £1 per unit per train mile; 
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 The distance between Mossend and Southampton is 470 train miles. 
 
(2) Mossend-DRIFT-Felixstowe; 
 The customer demands in 3 days are: 
On day 1, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 8, 6, 10, 6, 8, 9,12 respectively.  
On day 2, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 12,10,12,9,12,6 respectively.  
On day 3, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 13,9,5,9,15,10 respectively.  
The customer demand can be written in the following vector: 
   {8, 6, 10, 6, 8, 9,12}, 
   {12,10,12,9,12,6}, 
   {13,9,5,9,15,10}. 
 The IM’s fixed operational cost between Mossend and Felixstowe is £0.05 per unit per 
train mile; 
 The FOC’s price for different orders in different trains: 
Train 1:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £590 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £587 per unit for order 2, £582 per unit for order 3, £588 per 
unit for order 4, £588 per unit for order 5 and £584 per unit for order 6.       
Train 2:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £592 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £592 per unit for order 2, £592 per unit for order 3, £591 per 
unit for order 4, £600 per unit for order 5 and £580 per unit for order 6.       
Train 3: The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £590 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £580 per unit for order 2, £597 per unit for order 3, £598 per 
unit for order 4, £591 per unit for order 5 and £600 per unit for order 6.       




 According to physical constraints on the railway lines, the allowed maximum number 
of units for all the trains running between Mossend and Felixstowe is 32; 
 The total variable cost for the IM on this line per unit per train mile is £0.05; 
 The FOC’s variable cost is £1 per unit per train mile; 




(3) Southampton- DRIFT-Felixstowe 
 The customer demands in 3 days are: 
On day 1, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 8, 6, 10, 6, 7, 12 respectively.  
On day 2, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 10,12,8,8,9,6 respectively.  
On day 3, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 10,8,6,6,14,15 respectively.  
The customer demand can be written in the following vector: 
   {8,6,10,6,7,12}, 
   {10,12,8,8,9,6}, 
   {10,8,6,6,14,15}. 
 The IM’s fixed operational cost between Southampton and Southampton is £0.11 per 
unit per train mile; 
 The FOC’s price for different orders in different trains: 
Train 1:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £391 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £386 per unit for order 2, £387 per unit for order 3, £384 per 
unit for order 4, £388 per unit for order 5 and £388 per unit for order 6.       
Train 2:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £386 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £388 per unit for order 2, £386 per unit for order 3, £391 per 
unit for order 4, £385 per unit for order 5 and £385 per unit for order 6.       
Train 3: The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £390 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £385 per unit for order 2, £386 per unit for order 3, £385 per 
unit for order 4, £386 per unit for order 5 and £391 per unit for order 6.       




 According to physical constraints on the railway lines, the allowed maximum number 
of units for all the trains running between Southampton and Felixstowe is 32; 
 The total variable cost for the IM on this line per unit per train mile is £0.05; 
 The FOC’s variable cost is £1 per unit per train mile; 




(4) Southampton- DRIFT-Mossend 
 The customer demands in 3 days are: 
On day 1, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 10,6,8,5,8,7 respectively.  
On day 2, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 12,5,6,5,6,10 respectively.  
On day 3, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 4,8,7,6,15,12 respectively.  
The customer demand can be written in the following vector: 
             {10,6,8,5,8,7}, 
             {12,5,6,5,6,10}, 
             {4,8,7,6,15,12}. 
 The IM’s fixed operational cost between Southampton and Southampton is £0.05 per 
unit per train mile; 
 The FOC’s price for different orders in different trains: 
Train 1:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £580 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £577 per unit for order 2, £582 per unit for order 3, £578 per 
unit for order 4, £578 per unit for order 5 and £584 per unit for order 6.       
Train 2:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £582 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £572 per unit for order 2, £572 per unit for order 3, £591 per 
unit for order 4, £588 per unit for order 5 and £570 per unit for order 6.       
Train 3: The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £581 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £570 per unit for order 2, £587 per unit for order 3, £588 per 
unit for order 4, £581 per unit for order 5 and £589 per unit for order 6.       




 According to physical constraints on the railway lines, the allowed maximum number 
of units for all the trains running between Southampton and Felixstowe is 32; 
 The total variable cost for the IM on this line per unit per train mile is £0.05; 
 The FOC’s variable cost is £1 per unit per train mile; 





 The customer demands in 3 days are: 
On day 1, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 8,6,10,6,8,9 respectively.  
On day 2, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 12,10,12,9,12,6 respectively.  
On day 3, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 13,9,5,9,15,10 respectively.  
The customer demand can be written in the following vector: 
                                                      {8,6,10,6,8,9}, 
{12,10,12,9,12,6}, 
                                                      {13,9,5,9,15,10}. 
 The IM’s fixed operational cost between Southampton and Southampton is £0.05 per 
unit per train mile; 
 The FOC’s price for different orders in different trains: 
Train 1:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £591 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £582 per unit for order 2, £587 per unit for order 3, £585 per 
unit for order 4, £585 per unit for order 5 and £589 per unit for order 6.       
Train 2:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £593 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £594 per unit for order 2, £594 per unit for order 3, £590 per 
unit for order 4, £600 per unit for order 5 and £85 per unit for order 6.       
Train 3: The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £593 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £582 per unit for order 2, £592 per unit for order 3, £591 per 
unit for order 4, £593 per unit for order 5 and £602 per unit for order 6.       




 According to physical constraints on the railway lines, the allowed maximum number 
of units for all the trains running between Southampton and Felixstowe is 32; 
 The total variable cost for the IM on this line per unit per train mile is £0.05; 
 The FOC’s variable cost is £1 per unit per train mile; 
 The distance between Southampton and Felixstowe is 490 train miles. 
 
(6) Felixstowe-DRIFT - Southampton 
 The customer demands in 3 days are: 
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On day 1, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 5, 8, 10, 4, 8, 14 respectively.  
On day 2, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 12,16,6,6,8,6 respectively.  
On day 3, there are six orders and the number of units required by the six order orders 
are 12,8,8,10,10,12 respectively.  
The customer demand can be written in the following vector: 
   {5, 8, 10, 4, 8, 14} 
   {12,16,6,6,8,6} 
   {12,8,8,10,10,12} 
 The IM’s fixed operational cost between Southampton and Southampton is £0.12 per 
unit per train mile; 
 The FOC’s price for different orders in different trains: 
Train 1:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £390 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £388 per unit for order 2, £384 per unit for order 3, £385 per 
unit for order 4, £382 per unit for order 5 and £386 per unit for order 6.       
Train 2:  The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £389 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £384 per unit for order 2, £389 per unit for order 3, £394 per 
unit for order 4, £382 per unit for order 5 and £384 per unit for order 6.       
Train 3: The price the FOC charges to the shipper is £392 per unit for serving order 1. 
Similarly, the FOC charge £395 per unit for order 2, £388 per unit for order 3, £383 per 
unit for order 4, £388 per unit for order 5 and £393 per unit for order 6.       




 According to physical constraints on the railway lines, the allowed maximum number 
of units for all the trains running between Southampton and Felixstowe is 32; 
 The total variable cost for the IM on this line per unit per train mile is £0.05; 
 The FOC’s variabl cost is £1 per unit per train mile; 
 The distance between Southampton and Felixstowe is 300 train miles. 
 
 




Felixstowe to Southampton 
Day 1 8 6 6 7 6 7 
Day 2 9 7 6 7 6 8 
Day 3 7 8 6 9 10 9 
Southampton to Mossend 
Day 1 10 6 8 5 8 7 
Day 2 12 5 6 5 6 10 
Day 3 4 8 7 6 15 12 
Felixstowe to Mossend 
Day 1 8 4 10 7 6 9 
Day 2 12 15 6 7 8 4 
Day 3 6 8 12 4 5 10 
Mossend to Southampton 
Day 1 10 4 10 8 5 9 
Day 2 11 12 9 7 10 4 
Day 3 10 6 6 4 12 11 
Mossend to Felixstowe 
Day 1 8 6 10 6 8 9 
Day 2 12 10 12 9 12 6 
Day 3 13 9 5 9 15 10 
Southampton to Felixstowe 
Day 1 8 6 10 6 7 12 
Day 2 10 12 8 8 9 6 
Day 3 10 8 6 6 14 15 
Table 12 Customer Order (units) 
 
 
Felixstowe to Southampton 
Day 1 390 388 384 385 382 386 
Day 2 389 384 389 394 382 384 
Day 3 392 395 388 383 388 393 
Southampton to Mossend 
Day 1 580 577 582 578 578 584 
Day 2 582 572 572 591 588 570 
Day 3 581 570 587 588 581 589 
Felixstowe to Mossend  
Day 1 591 582 587 585 585 589 
Day 2 593 594 591 594 590 600 
Day 3 593 582 592 591 593 602 
Mossend to Southampton  
Day 1 583 587 572 576 577 586 
Day 2 586 572 582 583 583 574 
Day 3 583 578 585 585 588 591 
Mossend to Felixstowe 
Day 1 590 587 582 588 588 584 
Day 2 592 592 592 591 600 580 
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Day 3 590 580 597 598 591 600 
Southampton to Felixstowe 
Day 1 391 386 387 384 388 388 
Day 2 386 388 386 391 385 385 
Day 3 390 385 386 385 386 391 
Table 13 Unit revenue for each order (£ / unit) 
 
 










The IM’s fixed operational 
cost (£/ unit/mile) 
0.11 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Capacity (Units or Wagons) 34/17 32/16 32/16 32/16 32/16 32/16 
the IM’s variable costs 
(£/unit/mile) 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
The FOC’S variable costs 
(£/unit/mile) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mileage (miles) 300 470 490 470 490 300 
Table 14 The other data 
 
Note: Path 1: Felixstowe to Southampton; Path 2: Southampton to Mossend; Path 3: Felixstowe 
to Mossend; Path 4:  Mossend to Southampton; Path 5: Mossend to Felixstowe; Path 6: 
Southampton to Felixstowe 
 
The above two data sets will be used to verify the models and algorithms together with the 
software tool to be developed in the following chapters.  
 
4.6 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter reviewed the current charging regime of UK freight industry and identified the 
weaknesses of the existing mechanism. Two data sets were prepared for validating the models 
and algorithms to be developed in the following chapters. The data collection process was 










Chapter 5 Stackelberg Equilibrium of the IM-FOC Game 
 
Based on the industrial practice discussed in Chapter 4, this chapter will investigate the scenario 
whereby the IM makes the decision on the design of track access tariff independently to 
maximise its own profits without cooperation with the FOC. This scenario reflects exactly what 
the IM is doing in practice and is modelled as a Stackelberg game. A bilevel optimisation model 
was developed for the scenario and a gradient search method was designed to solve the bilevel 
model. The solution obtained was the optimal track access tariff that can maximise the IM’s 
profit unilaterally.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
To avoid monopolies and increase competition in the rail freight market and to eventually 
improve the efficiency and service quality of the railway network (Nash et al., 2013; Laroche 
& Guihéry, 2013; Alexandersson & Rigas, 2013), vertical separation of railway infrastructure 
ownership from operation was implemented in the UK and some other western countries such 
as Sweden, The Netherlands, Romania and Germany (Nash, J. E. Nilsson and Link, 2013). 
Vertical separation involves two types of independent companies: Infrastructure Manager (IM) 
which provides track, signalling, bridges, tunnels and stations; and Freight Operating Company 
(FOC) which operates freight service using the infrastructure provided by the IM. In the UK, 
Network Rail is the representative of IM, and they charge the FOCs for using the railway 
infrastructure they provide.  
 
Before vertical separation was adopted in the railway industry, the pricing problem did not exist 
as there was only a single company that had all the functions that IMs and the FOCs provide. 
Under the new arrangement, the pricing problem, i.e. setting up the tariff for train itineraries, 
has become a major issue. An IM’s tariff significantly affects not only the IM and FOCs’ 
profitability but also the utilisation rate of the railway system, which should be maximised from 
the perspective of government and society.  
 
It is common in practice that an IM may take advantage of its leader position in designing the 
tariff to unilaterally maximise its’ profit without caring about the FOC’s profit. According to 
my industrial visits to the UK rail freight industry, to prevent an IM from doing this, the UK 
government applies a certain cap on the IM’s profit. As a countermeasure, the IM often chooses 
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to exaggerate its’ costs, and attempts to gain additional profits. In such a battle between the 
government and the IM, the government is often not in a good position since it has great 
difficulty in ascertaining the IM’s genuine costs due to the complexity of railway system 
operations.  Hence, the current pricing mechanism is not as effective as expected. There is a 
need to design a better strategy to improve the pricing process for the rail freight transport 
system adopting a vertical separation governance structure. 
 
In recognition of this issue, this chapter aims to propose novel mathematical models to capture 
the complicated relationships between the IM and the FOC.The best prices that an IM can 
charge to maximise its own profits unilaterally without cooperation with FOCs are determined. 
This is also what an IM is trying to do in practice, but currently they do not have a rigorous 
mathematical tool to determine the prices of their train itineraries. They largely rely on their 
intuitive experience or manually change their prices repeatedly and choose the one that leads to 
maximum profits, which is in nature a trial and error approach.  
 
When developing the model to investigate the above issues, a stylised railway system that 
adopts the vertical separation governance structure is considered as a three-echelon service 
network based supply chain comprising an IM, a FOC, and end customers.  The whole pricing 
process between the IM and the FOC is considered as a dynamic Stackelberg (leader-follower) 
game (Stackelberg, 2011).  As the leader, the IM’s decision is the price tariff for accessing their 
network consisting of all the itineraries; and the follower, the FOC needs to design a service 
network based on the IM’s tariff and the shippers’ orders, which is a typical network design 
problem.  
It is a novel idea in rail freight industry to apply Stackelberg (leader-follower) game to 
investigate the interaction between the IM and the FOC and obtain the optimal solution for the 
IM-FOC game. In previous studies (REFS), the Stackelberg game was seldom used in the 
network revenue management game, and hence the IM’s and the FOC’s sequential decisions 
were not considered in the existing models. By applying this Stackelberg game model, the 
market position of the IM and the FOC is demonstrated appropriately. The IM is treated as the 
leader in the game and always has the priority to make decisions. This complies with the IM’s 
monopolist position in the current practice.   
 
Further, when developing the mathematical models for the IM-FOC game, the network effect 
was considered to reflect the rail freight service property. This has not been considered in the 
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existing studies. In the developed Stackelberg models, itinerary with different properties, e.g. 
original station, destination station, depart time, arrival time, route, etc. were treated as 
heterogeneous products in the freight service supply chain. A Stackelberg game considering 
heterogeneous products is rare in the existing study. More specifically, the study has used binary 
decision variables to model the FOC’s decisions on which itineraries should be purchased. In 
contrast to the common differentiable Stackelberg game, this leads to a new type of Stackelberg 
game, which is more challenging to solve than the existing Stackelberg game in the literature. 
Therefore, the study will have to develop novel solution methods. 
 
A novel game theoretical modelling framework is to be used to answer the following research 
questions: 
 
What are the optimal prices of the IM-FOC game at the Stackelberg Equilibrium? The solution 
at Stackelberg Equilibrium specifies the prices that the IM can charge to maximise its profits 
unilaterally without any cooperation with the FOC.  
 
The unique feature of the problem to be investigated is that the ‘product’ sold across the supply 
chain is a freight service network consisting of multiple itineraries, which makes it different 
from the traditional Stackelberg game that normally does not involve networks and assumes 
homogeneous product and a single price, and consequently the problem investigated here is 
more challenging. Due to the network effect, integer decision variables have to be used in the 
models, which make it very difficult to solve the game and subsequently address the two 
aforementioned research questions. The approach selected in this study to address the research 
question was to develop a bilevel programming model with binary decision variables in the 
lower level.  The existing bilevel solution methods that involve converting the lower level 
problem to its dual problem cannot be used due to these binary variables. Therefore, a 
specialised solution method for the proposed bilevel programming model needed to be 
developed. To this end, a solution method based on stochastic gradient search and local search 
has been developed.  It is worth mentioning that the uncertainty in customer demands in the 
gaming model is also considered. Stochastic programming is applied to handle the uncertain 
demand.   
   
The contributions of this chapter to knowledge are: 
96 
 
1. A novel stochastic pricing problem for a three-tier service network supply chain is 
studied. The products are heterogeneous and have network effects. The problem was 
formulated as a Stackelberg game that included an IM’s model and a FOC’s model.  
2. A bilevel programming model was developed to find the solution of the game at 
equilibrium. Due to the binary integer decision variables in the lower level model, a 
specifically designed gradient search based algorithm enhanced by local search was 
developed to solve the model.  
 
5.2 Problem description 
A stylised railway system considered in this research adopted a vertical separation management 
structure as implemented in many western countries such as the UK, Sweden, Netherlands and 
Germany. For example, in the UK, Network Rail, as the only IM, operates all the track, 
signalling, bridges, tunnels and stations but not the rolling stock. The IM is the monopolist 
infrastructure provider who provides paths for freight and passenger transportation service 
operators. To gain the right to access the paths provided, a FOC needs to pay the IM for using 
paths at certain periods based on a tariff agreed earlier. After gaining the access to tracks, the 
FOC may buy or rent different types of locomotives and wagons, then start to provide freight 
transport service for shippers. Shippers need to pay a certain amount of fees to the FOC for 
using the service according to agreed transportation rates. The IM, the FOC, and shippers form 
a three-tier service supply chain.   
 
As shown in Figure 18, the above process was executed repetitively, and eventually reached an 
equilibrium status.  Once the IM makes a change to the track access tariff, the FOC will make 
a response by changing its itinerary purchasing plan, i.e. designing a new freight service 
network. Based on the new service network, the FOC will need to decide a new plan to fulfil 
customer orders. According to the FOC’s itinerary purchasing plan and customer orders 
fulfilment plan, the IM can calculate its’ profit. Based on the profit generated, the IM may adjust 
its tariff once again aiming at further improving its profit in the next round. However, after 
some rounds, the IM may find the maximum profit and the corresponding tariff and cannot find 
other plans that can lead to higher profit. This situation will be an equilibrium status of the 
Stackelberg game. 
 
In practice, the IM may adopt a trial-and-error method to identify the maximum profit in the 
above game, and thus the solution quality is not guaranteed. In this chapter, a rigorous 










Before formulating the problem, the assumptions to be adopted are as follows: 
 
Assumption 1: The capacity required by passenger services has been pre-determined. 
It should be noted, although the IM normally provides capacity for both freight and passenger 
transportation service, passenger trains normally have priority in capacity/paths acquisition 
t=0, the original freight rate from IM is 
Ct , the IM achieves profit Zt  
The FOC decides which paths he should 
purchase and how to fulfil customer orders 
based on Ct+1 
Plug in FOC’s decisions to the IM model, 




 The IM’s optimal price 𝐶𝑡
∗ and profit 
 The FOC’s profit under 𝐶𝑡
∗ 
 The FOC’s decision on paths purchase 
 The FOC’s plan of allocating the customer orders  
IM sets up a new price Ct+1 (t=0∙∙∙∙∙∙n) to 
maximise its own profit 
N 
Y 
t = t + 1 
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over freight trains as they are much more profitable. As a result, freight trains can only be 
allocated to the remaining itineraries after the allocation of passenger trains. Following the 
industrial practice, it is assumed in the study that all passenger trains’ capacity requirements 
have already been satisfied prior to making the decisions for a freight service. 
 
Assumption 2: The pricing information for end customers is known. 
Rail freight transport is not the only choice available to the shippers, and the shippers may use 
the other transportation modes such as road if a FOC charges high transportation rates which 
they cannot bear.  Due to the competition with other transportation modes, the price the FOC 
can charge the shippers is relatively stable.  Therefore, in this study, it is assumed that the price 
the FOC charges the shippers is known information. 
 
An analysis of the statistical data from the government (see  Figure 19) suggests that within the 
UK, 76% domestic freight was moved by road in 2015 while rail was 9% and water was 15% 
(Department for Transport, 2016). This clearly indicates that road transportation plays a 
dominant position in the freight market. The freight rate is mostly determined by road, the 
freight market leader. In this research, the freight market price is assumed to be stable. In this 
context, the price the FOC offers to their customers can be assumed to be fixed.  
 
Figure 19 Showing Domestic freight in the UK moved by mode in 2015 
Source: (Department for Transport (DfT), 2016a) 
 
Assumption 3: Only direct transportation services are considered 
In many western countries where vertically separated operation mode was adopted, e.g., the 
UK, due to the decline of the rail freight industry before the 1980s, large marshalling or 




classification yards have been closed and dismantled, e.g., Tinsley Marshalling Yard in 
Sheffield (Woodburn, 2001). Nowadays there are no hump facilities, and there are only very 
limited flat-shunting facilities left in the UK. The percentage of wagon transhipments is very 
low. Therefore, in the study wagon transhipments were not considered. 
 
The pricing process is considered as a dynamic Stackelberg (Leader-Follower) game that 
involves an IM and a FOC as the decision makers. The game can be divided into two phases. 
The gaming process details are provided and their formulations are given as follows. 
In the following section, the notations used in the study will be defined first. Based on the 
notations and the text-based problem description in 5.2, mathematical formulation for the 
problem will be given. 
 
5.4 Notations  
Set: 
𝒫 a set of routes each linking a pair of origin and destination stations  
ℐ𝑛 a set of itineraries (or trains) on route n 
𝒟 a set of periods over the planning horizon 
𝒥 a set of jobs (customer orders) 
Ω a set of sample processes of customer demands 
ℒ a set of sections on the rail network 
𝒦 
 
a set of train stations 
Index: 
𝑗 a transportation task from customers 
𝑛 a route between a pair of origin and destination train stations 
𝑖 an itinerary (a train); an itinerary is equivalent to a train; 
𝑑 a day (or a period) 
𝜉 a sample process of customer demands in the planning horizon 
𝑘 a station on the network 
𝑙 a section between two consecutive stations 
 
Parameters: 




𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 the revenue a FOC can obtain for transporting one wagon for fulfilling task 
j on day d on route n 
𝐶𝑛𝑖 the maximum number of wagons that train i can carry on route n 
O(⋅ ) an indicator function which indicates the origin of a job or a train 
D(⋅ ) an indicator function which indicates the destination of a job or a train 
𝑎𝑛𝑖 fixed operational cost of train i on route n 
𝑉𝑛 IM’s variable cost per tain mile per wagon on route n 
Sn travel distance between the pair of origin and destination station in route n 
𝑄𝑙 The maximum number of trains that can be accommodated at section l per 
day 
𝑄𝑘 the handling capacity in wagons at station k 
𝑉𝑛
′ FOC’s variable operational cost on route n per train mile per wagon  
𝛿𝑛𝑖
𝑙  binary input data. 1 indicates that section l is used by train i on route n; 
otherwise, 0 
𝛾𝑛𝑖
𝑘  binary input data. 1 indicates that station k is visited by train i on route n; 
otherwise, 0 
𝑁 the number of samples in Ω 
 
Decision variables:  
𝑓𝑛𝑖 binary variable. 1 if train i on route n is purchased; otherwise, 0; 
𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) binary variable dependent of a sample process of demand ξ. 1 if a job j is 
served by train i on day d on route n; otherwise, 0 
𝑝𝑛𝑖 the price charged by the IM for running train i on route n 
 
5.5 Mathematical Models  
From discussions on current structure of rail freight rates in section 4.2, together with the 
information collected from the UK freight industry practice, the mathematical models for the 
stakeholders of the rail freight system will be developed in this section, taking into account the 
application of fixed costs to freight transport.  
 
In this research, the IM and the FOC are all deemed to be typical commercial organisations 




5.5.1 Phase 1: Leader (the IM)’s decision 
In phase 1, as the Leader, the IM first designs a tariff in which the price for using each itinerary 
at each time period is specified. As the IM is a monopolist who owns almost all the railway 
infrastructure, theoretically the IM can charge any price it wishes. However, there are some 
practical constraints.  If the IM charges low prices, its profit may be low or they may even incur 
a loss from selling the railway itineraries; if the prices are too high, the number of itineraries 
they can sell to the FOC may be low, and the revenue they can gain may be low as well.  
 
The IM’s objective function is to maximise its expected profit, which can be formulated as 
follows, 
 
Max 𝑍(𝑝, 𝑓, 𝑥) = ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 − ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 −
1
𝑁




The first term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of Eq (1) represents the revenue generated by 
selling itineraries to the FOC. The second term represents the total fixed cost of the sold 
itineraries. The third term is the IM’s total expected variable costs, which reflect the track wear 
arising from transporting shippers’ cargoes.  This cost is proportional to the amount of customer 
demands served, the average variable cost per wagon per train-mile V, and the mileage in the 
network between the O-D pair in route n, Sn.  
 
The price tariff is the IM’s decision. However, the maximisation of the IM’s profit depends on 
𝑓𝑛𝑖 , i.e, the FOC’s itinerary purchasing plan, and the order fulfilment plan 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉), which are 
decisions made by the FOC at the second phase. 
 
5.5.2 Phase 2: Follower (the FOC)’s decision 
The FOC needs to design a service network as well as a customer order fulfilment plan to 
maximise its profit. More specifically, given the IM’s tariff, the operating cost for each itinerary, 
and the unit revenue generated for fulling demands, the FOC needs to make decisions on which 
itineraries it should purchase; how to fulfil customer demands, i.e., which customer orders 




The Phase 2 gaming process is considered as a two-stage stochastic programming model. The 
first stage is to purchase itineraries from the IM; and the second stage is to fulfil stochastic 
customer demands using purchased itineraries. The stochastic factor considered in the model is 
customer demand.  Sample Average Approximation method (Kleywegt, Shapiro and Homem-
de-Mello, 2002) is applied to handle the uncertain factor. The objective function of Phase 2 
decision making is to maximise the expected profits of the FOC as formulated in Eq. (2) 
 
 Max 𝑌(𝑓,  𝑥) = − ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 +
1
𝑁
𝐹(𝑥, 𝜉) (2)  
 
The first term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of Eq. (2) represents the acquisition cost of 
itineraries from the IM, which is also the fees the FOC needs to pay the IM for track access. 
The first term corresponds to the costs incurred in the first stage decision making. The second 
term represents the expected revenue from freight service operation, which is associated with 
the second stage decision making.  
 
The details of the FOC’s activities at the aforementioned two stages are described as follows. 
Stage 1: Itinerary Purchasing 
In the first stage, the FOC needs to decide which itinerary they should purchase.  Binary 
variables are used to denote the decision. A binary variable takes 1 when the FOC chooses to 
buy an itinerary; otherwise 0.  When providing train itineraries to the FOC, the IM is constrained 
by the capacity at a section and the handling capacity at a station. Hence, we have 
     ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝛿𝑛𝑖
𝑙
𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ≤ 𝑄
𝑙     ∀ 𝑙 ∈ ℒ (3) 
 ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝛾𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖∈ℐ𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛𝑖𝑛∈𝒫 ≤ 𝑄
𝑘    ∀ 𝑘 ∈  𝒦 (4) 
 
Stage 2: Operations of Freight Service 
At the second stage, the FOC makes decisions on the operational activities according to the 
purchasing plan or the designed service network decided in the first stage. The FOC’s objective 
is to maximise its profits that is equal to the income minus the costs.  
 
The FOC’s income is generated from providing freight service to the shippers. It is directly 
determined by the number of orders (wagons) / customer demand served on the railway 




After analysing the existing charging structure and the potential changes to the cost calculation 
methodology, the FOC’s cost components are considered:  
1) The fee that the FOC pays for access to the railway track, which is also the IM’s charge;   
2) The variable operational costs, which is related to the number of wagons used and the 
distance that the wagons travel on the network;  
 
At present, two pieces of software are used in UK freight practice in measuring the variable 
costs. One is called Vampire which is used to simulate the track damage caused by providing 
the freight service. The software can build the train’s dynamic model and study the response 
and reaction between the vehicles and the tracks. RFCpro is another piece of software used to 
calculate the Suspension Factors which are used in determining the variable track usage charge 
of freight trains (Rhodes and Ling, 2012) (DfT, 2017). 
 
For the other related costs, information from interviews with people from Network Rail’s 
Freight Department suggest that the freight transportation costs structure is extremely complex 
consisting of thousands of factors. Collection of detailed data of every part of the costs is not 
realistic. This makes it impossible to obtain the exact costs. Under such an industrial fact, it is 
reasonable to set up the freight rate to be a lump sum as per line for one commodity. 
 
As to the operators’ model, it is assumed that the freight customers’ demand in the rail network 
is uncertain which is treated as a stochastic factor in the model. To cope with this stochastic 
factor, Sample Average Approximation (SAA) approach is applied.  
 
Following the above considerations, the profit obtained from running the freight service can be 
formulated in the following equation. 
   𝐹(𝑥, 𝜉) = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) ∙ 𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗 −𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) ∙ 𝑉′ ∙ 𝑆𝑛 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛 𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫      
(5) 
The first item in Eq. (5) is the revenue generated from order fulfilment; and the second item is 
the FOC’s operational costs including fuel or energy consumption cost, crew cost and all the 
other costs related to travel distance and loading statues (the number of laden wagons).   
 
By plugging Eq. (5) into Eq. (2), the complete objective function of the FOC can be obtained. 
Max 𝑌(𝑓, 𝑥) = − ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 +
1
𝑁
[∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) ∙ 𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫




In the second stage, the FOC needs to consider how to satisfy customer demands subject to the 
purchased service network. The FOC’s constraints are formulated as follows. 
Constraint 1: 
𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑓𝑛𝑖  ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑘 (7) 
The transportation task j on day d on route n can only be allocated to train i when train i has 
been purchased.  
Constraint 2: 
 ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑛∈𝑃 ≤ 1 ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑗 (8) 
No more than 1 train will be needed to serve job j.  
Constraint 3:  
∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ⋅ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥 ≤ 𝐶𝑛𝑖 ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖 (9) 
This is the capacity constraint. The total amount of wagons required by all tasks allocated to 
train i cannot exceed the capacity of train i on route n.  
Constraint 4: 
𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 0  ∀ {i, j | O(j) ≠ O(i), D(j)≠ D(i)}, ∀𝑛, 𝑑 (10) 
Order j cannot be allocated to train i when j cannot be covered by train i geographically. 
Constraint 5: 
  𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1}, 𝑓𝑛𝑖 ∈ {0,1}   ∀ n, i 
 
5.6 Equilibrium solution of the IM – FOC game  
 
The dynamic gaming process between the IM and the FOC as discussed above can be 
formulated as a bilevel optimisation model. However, solving the bilevel optimisation model is 
not straightforward due to the integer variables in the lower level. In this section, the explicit 
form of the bilevel optimisation model is given and then a special solution method is developed 
for it. 
5.6.1 Bi-level optimisation model for the IM – FOC game 
Based on the Eq. (1) – (10), the complete bi-level model below can be obtained: 
Upper Level:       
Max 𝑍(𝑝, 𝑓, 𝑥) = ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 − ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 −
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(ξ) ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛ξ∈Ω  
Subject to:             𝑝𝑛𝑖 ≥ 0  ∀ n, i 
                             For a given 𝑝𝑛𝑖, solves  




 Max Y(f, x) = − ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 +
1
𝑁
(∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) ∙𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω
                              𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗 − ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) ∙ 𝑉′ ∙ 𝑆𝑛 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫 )    
                Subject to:      
𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑓𝑛𝑖                       ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗  
∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑛∈𝑃 ≤ 1        ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑗         
∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ⋅ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥 ≤ 𝐶𝑛𝑑𝑖   ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0                             ∀ {i, j | O(j) ≠ O(i), D(j)≠ D(i)}       
 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1}                     ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗  
𝑓𝑛𝑖 ∈ {0,1}                          ∀ n, i                                                           
 
The upper level of this bilevel model denotes the decision making of the IM. The objective is 
to maximise its total profit. As to any given price, the IM will have a different profit. The 
decision variable of the IM is the price which can lead to a maximal profit. 
The lower level of the bi-level model presents the FOC’s profit optimisation process. For any 
price given by the IM, based on its own costs and demand from the customer, the FOC will 
determine how to maximise its profit by making decisions on path purchasing and the customer 
orders allocating to the purchased trains. 
All the variables in the lower level of the above bilevel model are binary integer variables, 
therefore the lower level model has no dual form and cannot be solved easily.  An Approximate 
Gradient Search based method is developed to solve the model.  
 
5.6.2 Approximate gradient search based algorithm 
As the binary integer variables are contained within the FOC’s model and there is complex 
interaction between the upper and lower level models, the gradient of the IM’s profit function 
can only be approximately estimated. Let 𝑪𝒌 =  (𝑐1
𝑘, 𝑐2
𝑘, ⋯ , 𝑐𝑖
𝑘, ⋯ 𝑐|𝒫|
𝑘 )  denote the price vector, 




𝑘 the change of the IM’s profit with regard to a small change of 𝑐𝑖
k ,  at 
the kth iteration. The gradient of the IM’s function at 𝑪𝒌,  𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑪𝒌),  at the k
th iteration can be 




















𝑘 ) (12) 
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𝑘, which is an element in the 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑪
𝒌). 
Let 𝑍𝑛
𝑘′denote the IM’s profit when the price vector is set as 𝑪𝒌
𝒊′ = (𝑐1, 𝑐2, ⋯ , 𝑐𝑖 + ∆, ⋯ 𝑐𝑛) , 












𝑘′can be obtained by solving the lower level model in Eq. (11) for the given price 
vectors 𝑪𝒌
𝒊  and 𝑪𝒌
𝒊′, respectively. The detailed steps for calculating 𝑍𝑛
𝑘 or 𝑍𝑛
𝑘′ are described 
below. 
Algorithm 5.1: Computing the IM’s profits for a given price vector 
Step 1: substitute the given price vector into the lower level model in Eq. (11) - the 
FOC’s model; 
Step 2: solve the FOC’s model using standard integer programming method, and 
obtain the optimal decisions the FOC will make, 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜉) and 𝑓𝑛𝑖
∗ ; 
Step 3: substitute 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜉) , 𝑓𝑛𝑖
∗  , and the price vector into the objective function of 
the upper level model, and the profit of IM, 𝑍(𝑝, 𝑓, 𝑥),  can be obtained.  
 
 
At some point, the IM’s profit under a new price vector may be no better than the previous 
optimal profit. Before stopping the algorithm, a local search procedure will be performed. A 
positive amount will be added on the price vector to generate a new one, i.e., 𝐶𝑘+1 = 𝐶𝑘 + 𝑆 , 
where S is the length of search step. If there is no improvement after searching a certain number 
of times, the algorithm will stop. The local search method is helpful to avoid the calculation 
stopping at a local optimal price (profit). 
 
The algorithm that combines Gradient Search and Local Search is described as follows. 
Algorithm 5.2:  A Gradient Search based Algorithm for Solving Integer Bi-level 
Optimisation Model 
Step1: Initialisation.   
  Set a counter M to record the times of local search attempts,   𝑀 = 0; 
  a counter k to record the number of steps the algorithm runs, k = 0 
  the initial price vector 0, i.e., 𝑪𝟎 =  𝟎; 
  the Optimal_ Profit_So_Far = −𝑍   (Z is a very big nonnegative number), 
  the Optimal_Price = 𝑪𝟎; 
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  step length = L, (L is a pre-defined nonnegative number) 
  the maximum number of local search attempts = A (A is pre-defined 
number) 
Step 2: if M < A continue; otherwise, stop.  
Step 3: Computing 𝑍𝑘 with 𝑪𝒌  using Algorithm 5.1. 
Step 3.1  if 𝑍𝑘 > Optimal_Profit_So_Far; continue; otherwise, go to Step 3.2  
               Optimal_Price  = 𝑪𝒌 ; Optimal_Profit_So_Far = 𝑍𝑘; k = k + 1 
               Calculate gradient of 𝑪𝒌  using Eq. (13) and Algorithm 1,  
               𝑪𝒌+𝟏 = 𝑪𝒌 + 𝐿 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑪𝒌)  
Step 3.2: Local Search 
      𝑪𝒌+𝟏 = 𝑪𝒌 + 𝑆;  (S is a predefined step); M = M + 1;   
Step 4: Go to Step 2. 
 
In the first step of the algorithm, some data is initialised: counter M which records the times of 
local search attempts, counter k recording the number of steps of calculation are set to be 0, 
initial optimal price vector C0 is set to be 0. Current optimal profit of the IM is assumed to be 
a very big negative number -Z. Step length for the local search in the algorithm is defined as a 
nonnegative number and the allowed local search attempts is given as integer A. 
Step 2: Check the current local search attempts M, if it is less than the predefined allowed 
attempts A, go to Step 3. Otherwise, calculation stop.  
Step 3: Calculate the IM’s profit Zk when price vector is Ck. 
If Zk  is larger than the current optimal profit of IM, substitute the current optimal profit with 
𝑍𝑘, substitute the current optimal price with Ck.  Increase the value of counter k to k+1. 
Calculate gradient of 𝑪𝒌  using Eq. (13) and Algorithm 5.1. Generate new price vector with 
formulation                𝑪𝒌+𝟏 = 𝑪𝒌 + 𝐿 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑪𝒌) . Go to step 2. 
If 𝑍𝑘  is less than the current optimal profit of IM, implement local search, generate new price 
vector using:  𝑪𝒌+𝟏 = 𝑪𝒌 + 𝑆;  (S is a predefined step); M = M + 1; and go to step 2. 
The output of the algorithm is the optimal price which can lead a maximal profit of the IM. 
 
5.7 Numerical Examples 
In this section two case studies are provided. The first case is hypothetical, which has one 
service route with three trains (itineraries). The second case considers a network with four 
freight rail stations, multiple service routes and multiple itineraries in the UK. The purpose is 




5.7.1  Solutions to the IM-FOC game at Stackelberg Equilibrium in case 1 
Firstly, feed the first data set provided in Chapter 4 into the developed bilevel programming 
programme in Eq (11) to calculate the non-cooperative price which enables the IM to maximise 
its price unilaterally. The calculation results are shown in Table 15. 
 








(55,55,55) (245,245,245) 162 0.33 162.33 
Table 15 The IM’s and The FOC’s Profits at Equilibrium  (Thousand Pounds) 
 
The initial price is set to be (55,55,55), the programme stops when it shows the optimal price is 
(245,245,245), the IM’s profit is 162 and the FOC’s profit is 0.33. The calculation result 
indicates that the IM’s profit is relatively high whereas the FOC’s profit is close to zero. Further 
increasing the optimal price, the FOC will choose to not to operate any line, and the IM’s profit 
will go down. Therefore, the current price (245,245,245) is the best price the IM can charge the 
FOC in the sense that the IM’s profit is maximised unilaterally. It also indicates that, under the 
price (245,245,245), the game will be at Stackelberg equilibrium.  
 
5.7.2 Solutions to the IM-FOC game at Stackelberg Equilibrium in case 2 
By plugging the second data set in Chapter 4 into the developed models and applying the 
designed algorithms to solve the models, the solutions for equilibrium are obtained as shown in 
Table 16. It can be observed the best profits that the IM can achieve without collaboration is 

























3766, 3206, 3206 
9272.33 6264 3008.33 
MOSSEND to 
Felixstowe 















3766, 3206, 3206 
MOSSEND to 
Felixstowe 
2425, 2425, 2425 
Table 16 Stackelberg Equilibrium Scenario 
 
5.8 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter investigates the scenario when the IM sets up the freight tariff aiming to maximise 
its own profit without any consideration of the FOC’s profit. The prices the IM should charge 
the FOC to achieve the optimal profit were determined. The profit of the FOC and the entire 
freight system under this optimal price set were also provided by the designed algorithm. It is 
clearly identified that the IM’s profit was maximised under the optimal price, but it is not clear 












Chapter 6 Global Optimisation of the IM-FOC Game 
 
This chapter firstly focused on a scenario where the IM and the FOC have perfect cooperation 
under centralised decision making, which is different from the non-collaboration scenario 
discussed in Chapter 5. The solution to the IM-FOC game under perfect collaboration will lead 
to the global optimal system profit. Afterwards, the scenario in practice under decentralised 
decision making was investigated. An Inverse Mixed Integer Linear Programming (InvMILP) 
model and a Fenchel Cutting Plane solution algorithm were proposed to identify the optimal 
prices that enable the scenario under which decentralised decision-making had the same 
performance as the centralised decision-making mode. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, a stylised freight railway system under vertical separation governance structure 
was considered. The scenario where the IM made decisions on the track access prices 
unilaterally without cooperation with the FOC was discussed. The interaction between the FOC 
and the IM was analysed through a proposed bilevel linear programming model. The outputs 
of the algorithm included: the highest profits the IM can achieve unilaterally and the optimal 
non-operative price, the FOC’s profit under the price. The research question answered in 
Chapter 5 was “What are the optimal prices of the IM-FOC game at the Stackelberg 
equilibrium?” The solution at Stackelberg equilibrium specified the prices that the IM can 
charge to maximise its profits unilaterally without any cooperation with the FOC. 
 
In this Chapter, the research question to be answered is: - 
What are the optimal prices that can maximise the overall profits of the whole rail freight system 
(supply chain) and lead to global optimality under vertical separation?  
 
The global optimal solution of the game will be compared with the solution at Stackelberg 
equilibrium obtained in the current industrial practice as discussed in Chapter 5. The 
comparison of the results from the two different scenarios will demonstrate the importance of 
the collaboration between the stakeholders and inspire the stakeholders to follow a better 
alternative, cooperative and innovative pricing strategy. The new strategy will help to build up 




In fact, in the UK, many practitioners from the rail freight industry have realised the necessity 
of changing the relationship among the stakeholders. People working in the rail industry noticed 
that the relationship between Network Rail and the ORR as well as Network Rail and the FOC 
still have room for improvement. For example, Network Rail’s Chairman Sir Peter Hendy 
thought the relationship between Network Rail and the ORR needed to be “reset”.  HS1 chief 
executive Dame Colette Bowe believes that a close examination of the ORR’s role and 
responsibilities is needed in reviewing the planning of multi-billion pound enhancement 
schemes. Importantly, interviews with people from Network Rail indicate that insufficient 
cooperation between Network Rail and the FOCs has led to a large amount of unnecessary costs 
and generated negative impacts on the performance of the rail freight system.  
 
In this chapter, whether cooperation between stakeholders generates more profits than non-
cooperation will be investigated. If cooperation outperforms non-cooperation, then what are the 
optimal cooperative prices that the IM should charge the FOC? To achieve the target, an ideal 
full collaboration case where the IM and the FOC are treated as a single company will be 
investigated. The ideal collaboration case is actually a centralised decision-making system with 
a virtual central planner. This case can identify the highest level of profits that the IM-FOC 
game can obtain.  Then, an inverse programming method is applied to identify the optimal 
prices under a decentralised decision-making system that is being adopted in industrial practice. 
The prices determined by the inverse programming model can lead to the same performance as 
the ideal cooperation scenario. Due to the integer variables involved in the inverse programming 
model, a Fenchel cutting plane method (Boyd, 1994) is used to solve the inverse integer 
programming model. It is worth mentioning that the uncertainty in customer demands in the 
gaming model is also considered. Stochastic programming is applied to handle the uncertain 
demand.   
 
The contributions of the chapter to knowledge are: 
1) A new pricing strategy that can achieve the global optimality is identified.  
2) A Fenchel cutting plane based solution method is developed to solve an inverse integer 
linear programming model. 
 
In the remainder of the Chapter, the following definitions will be used frequently.  
Definition 1: System profit is defined as the sum of the IM’s and the FOC’s profits 
For the IM-FOC game, the system profits with regard to a given track access tariff needs to be 
calculated in two phases. In the first phase, the given track access tariff needs to be fed into the 
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FOC’s model in Chapter 5. By solving the FOC’s model using standard MILP solver such as 
CPLEX, the FOC’s profit as well as its optimal itinerary purchasing plan and order fulfil plan 
can be obtained. By plugging the optimal purchasing plan, order fulfil plan and the given track 
access tariff into the IM’s model, the IM’s profit can be obtained. By totalling the IM’s profit 
and the FOC’s profit, the corresponding system profit can be obtained.  The calculation process 










Figure 20 Chart showing the method of calculating the system profit 
 
In this section, a full cooperation scenario where the IM and the FOC are treated as a virtual 
single company or there exists a virtual central planner for the whole supply chain will be 
investigated. In this case, a single MILP model will be developed for the two stakeholders, and 
the objective function of the MILP model is the system profit. Therefore, by solving the MILP 
model, the optimal system profit can be obtained for the full cooperation scenario. 
 
Definition 2: Global optimality is defined as the situation where the system profit is maximised.  
In Chapter 5, the system profits at Stackelberg equilibrium without cooperation has been 
obtained. However, it remains unclear whether the profits are globally optimal. In this chapter, 
efforts will be made to identify the optimal system profit under cooperation and non-
cooperation. 
 
Definition 3: Centralised decision-making is a decision-making mode in which a virtual central 
planner makes decision for all the relevant stakeholders aiming at the maximisation of system 
profits.  
 
In game theory, centralised decision making also leads to full cooperation between different 
stakeholders  (Drew Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). 
The FOC’s Model 
The IM’s Model 
A Given Tariff The FOC’s Itinerary Purchasing Plan, Order Fulfil Plan 
The FOC’s Profit 
The IM’s Profit 




Definition 4: Decentralised decision-making is a decision-making mode whereby each 
stakeholder makes the decision independently to maximise their own profits.  
 
Decentralised decision-making is very common in the real world applications. A decentralised 
decision-making system may or may not have cooperation between stakeholders. Normally 
many applications involving game theory aim to design cooperation mechanisms for 
decentralised decision-making systems. The designed cooperation mechanisms should have the 
same performance as the corresponding centralised decision-making systems (Drew Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1991). 
 
In what follows, the scenario with perfect collaboration under centralised decision-making 
mode will be discussed first; then Inverse MILP will be employed to determine the optimal 
prices for decentralised decision-making mode and the determined prices will have the same 
performance as the centralised decision-making mode, i.e. achieve global optimality.  
 
6.2 Perfect Collaboration Under Centralised Decision Making 
In Chapter 5, an algorithm was designed to obtain the optimal non-cooperative price as well as 
the maximum profits the IM can obtain unilaterally.  However, the price that is optimal for the 
IM may not be optimal for the entire freight service supply chain. In this section, the way to 
achieve global optimality is explored, i.e., maximise the system profit of the whole supply chain. 
This section considers an ideal situation where the IM and the FOC is deemed as a single virtual 
organisation, i.e., having perfect collaboration.   
 
Proposition:  A freight system will achieve global optimality when the IM and the FOC have 
perfect cooperation under centralised decision-making mode. 
Proof:  
Under the decentralised decision-making situation where the IM and the FOC are two 
independent commercial organisations.  The IM tends to make profits for providing itineraries 
to the FOC, hence the prices that the IM charge the FOC include both costs and profits. The 
prices will be higher than that under global optimality scenario where the two players belong 
to one single organisation. The reason for this is that when the IM and the FOC are two different 
departments in the same company, the IM does not aim to make profits by providing the freight 
capacity to the FOC. Hence, the IM can accept a zero-profit situation, i.e., charge the FOC the 
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price that only recovers the IM’s cost. In doing so, the FOC’s costs for purchasing the itineraries 
is minimised.  
 
From the perspective of the FOC, the price they can offer to the shipper / freight customers is 
largely dependent on the cost for providing the freight service. The cost comprises the fee they 
pay for the IM, the target profit and the operational costs associated with customer demand 
fulfilment. As the operational costs result from serving customer orders and the profit is 
substantially fixed, the shippers’ price is largely determined by the fee the FOC pays to the IM. 
Under the perfect collaboration scenario, the fee the FOC pays to the IM is lowest, which will 
lead to the minimum prices they can offer to end customers. The minimum shippers’ price can 
further attract maximum customer demand which can subsequently lead to the maximum profit 
of the total system. Therefore, it can be concluded that under perfect collaboration (global 
optimality) scenario, the freight system can achieve the maximum profit. 
 
For the non-ideal situation, e.g. the current practice when the IM and the FOC are operating as 
two separate organisations who make decisions independently, the system profit under perfect 
collaboration scenario is the maximum profit the system can obtain. Setting up the appropriate 
prices to achieve this maximum sum profit and sharing the profits between the IM and the FOC 
will lead to better profits for the two stakeholders. 
 
  
The perfect collaboration will lead to the following standard Integer Programming model. 
Max Z =  − ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛 +
1
𝑁
(∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) ∙ 𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(ξ) ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛ξ∈Ω −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) ∙ 𝑉′ ∙ 𝑆𝑛 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω )    
𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑓𝑛𝑖                       ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗  
∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑛∈𝑃 ≤ 1        ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑗       
∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝛿𝑛𝑖
𝑙
𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ≤ 𝑄
𝑙     ∀ 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 
∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝛾𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖∈ℐ𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛𝑖𝑛∈𝒫 ≤ 𝑄
𝑘    ∀ 𝑘 ∈  𝒦 
∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ⋅ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥 ≤ 𝐶𝑛𝑖   ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0                             ∀ {i, j | O(j) ≠ O(i), D(j)≠ D(i)}       
 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1}                     ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗  





The above model for perfect cooperation is a combination of the IM’s and the FOC’s model 
discussed in Chapter 5.  The objective function is the system profit of the IM-FOC game. It 
should be pointed out that, in the objective function, there are no charges between the IM and 
the FOC as the two companies are treated as the same virtual company. Therefore, the item  
∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫  , which appeared in the IM’s and the FOC’s model has been removed. The 
constrains in the perfect cooperation model are exactly the same as those in the FOC’s model.  
 
The optimal value of the objective function of the above perfect cooperation model will be the 
optimal system profit. However, the system optimal profit is obtained under a centralised 
decision-making mode, which does not exist in practice in the UK rail freight industry. In what 
follows, the optimal price under the decentralised decision-making model will be identified, 
which can also lead to system optimality.  
 
6.3 The Optimal Prices Under Decentralised Decision Making 
The perfect collaboration case described above does not exist in a vertically separated railway 
management system.  This section considers how a vertically separated railway system should 
set prices which can make the system profits the same as in the ideal case.    
 
In practice, the IM needs to charge the FOC to recover its costs as well as generate profit. In 
what follows, the optimal price the IM should charge the FOC to achieve system optimisation 
under decentralised decision making will be identified. The technique to be adopted is Inverse 
Linear Programming (ILP) (Toint 2013; Tayyebi & Aman 2016; You, Chow & Ritchie, 2016).  
The idea of ILP is to make a known feasible solution be the optimal one by changing the 
coefficients of objective function appropriately.  The classical solution method (Ahuja & Orlin, 
2001) that uses the dual form of the lower model cannot be applied into our problem. This is 
because the proposed problem has binary variables in the lower level model and has no duals. 
In what follows, the formulation of inverse programming model  is  introduced and then Fenchel 
cutting plane algorithm (Boyd, 1994)  is developed to solve the game. 
 
By solving the perfect collaboration model in Eq. (14) discussed in section 6.2, the FOC’s 
purchasing plan 𝑓𝑛𝑖
∗ (∀𝑛, 𝑖)  and the optimal order fulfilment plan 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (∀ 𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗)  were 
obtained. The problem of inverse programming is, for a given set of 𝑓𝑛𝑖




∗ (∀ 𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗) obtained in Eq (14), how to determine the prices 𝑝𝑛𝑖(∀𝑛, 𝑖)  which can ensure 
that the FOC will make the same decision under the governance structure of vertical separation.  
 
To simplify the narrative, let  Pk  denote the FOC’s model at the k
th iteration, Inv_Pk denotes a 
specific inverse form of the model at the kth iteration. There might be many different sets of 
𝑝𝑛𝑖(∀𝑛, 𝑖) which can make the given set of 𝑓𝑛𝑖
∗ (∀𝑛, 𝑖) and 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (∀ 𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗) obtained in the 
model described in Eq. (14) the optimal solution for the FOC’s model. The L1 norm is used to 
limit the choices. By complying with the L1 norm, only a single set 𝑝𝑛𝑖(∀𝑛, 𝑖) will be selected. 
Let 𝒄 = {𝑐𝑛𝑖|∀𝑛, 𝑖} denote an known initial price vector;  𝒅 = {𝑑𝑛𝑖|∀𝑛, 𝑖} the price vector that 
can make a feasible set of price, 𝒙𝟎, to be optimal as discussed above; 𝒙(𝒌) another feasible 
solution of prices at the kth iteration. The problem Inv_Pk can be formulated as, 
(Inv_Pk)                       Z(𝒅) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛|𝐜 − 𝐝| 
                                     𝑑𝑇𝑥0 ≤ 𝑑𝑇𝑥(𝑘)   
(15) 
 
In Eq. (15), the L1 norm can be linearized by introducing a positive auxiliary vector 𝜽 = {𝜃𝑛𝑖 ≥
0|∀𝑛, 𝑖} .  By substituting 𝑥0  with 𝑓𝑛𝑖
∗ (∀𝑛, 𝑖)  and 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (∀ 𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗)  obtained in the model 
described in Eq. (1), Eq.(2) can be re-formulated as, 
(Inv_Pk)                  Z(𝒅
(𝒌)) = min ∑ ∑ θ𝑛𝑖
(𝑘)
𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫  
  Subject to              
                                 𝑐𝑛𝑖 − d𝑛i
(𝑘) ≤ θ𝑛𝑖
(𝑘)
            ∀𝑛, 𝑖 
                                d𝑛i
(𝑘) − c𝑛i ≤ θ𝑛𝑖
(𝑘)







(∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜉) ∙ 𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω
𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗 − ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗







(∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
(𝑘) ∙ 𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω
𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗 − ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
(𝑘) (𝜉) ∙ 𝑉′ ∙ 𝑆𝑛 ⋅ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω ) 
(16) 
Note in the above formulation, the variables associated with the superscript (k) will be updated 
at each iteration.  
 
Based on the formulation of inverse linear programming, an algorithm is developed to obtain 
the optimal price which can lead to the global optimality.  
 
Algorithm 6.1:  A cutting plane algorithm for inverse MILP 
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Step 1: Initialisation.  Set a counter of steps, k, and let 𝑘 ←  0 ; and 𝒅(𝑘) ← 𝒄, 
Step 2: Substitute the price vector 𝒅(𝑘) into PK, solve the FOC’s model PK, and obtain 
its optimal solution 𝑓𝑛𝑖
(𝑘)(∀𝑛, 𝑖) and 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
(𝑘) (𝜉)(∀ 𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜉).  






(∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜉) ∙ 𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗






(∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
(𝑘) ∙ 𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
(𝑘) (𝜉) ∙ 𝑉′ ∙ 𝑆𝑛 ⋅ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω ) 
Solve inv_PK, and obtain the optimal solution 𝒅∗,  𝒅𝑘 ← 𝒅∗; 
𝑘 ← 𝑘 + 1; 






(∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜉) ∙ 𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω
𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗 − ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗






(∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
(𝑘) ∙ 𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
(𝑘) (𝜉) ∙ 𝑉′ ∙ 𝑆𝑛 ⋅ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω ) ,  go to Step 2; otherwise, Stop. 
 
In the above algorithm, c theoretically can be set as any value. However, in our experiment a 
zero vector for c was set. This means we seek a price vector that is close to 0 rather than any 
other possible vectors. This complies with the idea of providing the minimal price to the end 
customer to ensure the competitiveness of rail freight in the freight market. 
 
6.4 Numerical Example 
In this section, numerical experiments were carried out for: 1) the perfect cooperation model 
under centralised decision-making; 2) the Inverse Linear Programming model for decentralised 
decision-making. The two datasets provided in Chapter 4 are used to conduct these experiments. 
The perfect cooperation model was solved using the Branch and Bound algorithm built in IBM 
CPLEX. The Fenchel cutting plane method was solved using C++ and CPLEX.  
 


























N/A N/A N/A 221.3 1,1,0 
Global 
optimality 
58,58,130 7 214.3 221.3 1,1,0 
Table 17 Stakeholders’ Profit Level Under Different Price 
*Note that the prices and profits in the table are measured in thousand pounds. 
 
In Table 17, it can be observed, when the price is set as £58 thousand, £58 thousand, £130 
thousand for each train respectively, the corresponding system profit is the same as that under 
perfect collaboration. However, when global optimality is achieved, the profit that the IM can 
obtain is only £7 thousand, which is much lower than £162 thousand obtained in the equilibrium 
status of the game where the IM makes decisions unilaterally to maximise its profits. 
Interestingly, it can also be found that the system profit at equilibrium, £162.33 thousand, is 
lower than £221.3 thousand which is the maximum profit the entire supply chain can obtain 
under global optimisation scenario. The difference between the two system profits is £221.3 
thousand - £162.3 thousand = £58.97 thousand. This indicates that, if global optimality is 
achieved, there is the chance that both the IM and the FOC can be better off and a win-win 
situation can be achieved.  
 
In this experiment the convergence of Fenchel cutting plane based algorithm is also observed. 
It has been found, that there is only a need to generate two cuts as shown in Table 18 to reach 














Cut 1 120,130,130 37 152.3 189.3 1,0,0 
Cut 2 120,58,130 -25 214.3 189.3 0,1,0 
Table 18 Convergence of Fenchel Cut Based Solution Algorithm for 




By applying Algorithm 3 (discussed in section 6.3), Cut 1 is generated first.  Compared to the 
scenario under perfect collaboration, it is easy to find that system profit is less than the targeted 
perfect collaboration case. This indicates that the algorithm has not converged yet. Cut 2 then 
needs to be generated. However, it also cannot make the system profit equal to that under perfect 
collaboration.  After adding Cut 2 into the model described by Eq. (4) in Chapter 5, the 
algorithm converged, and the optimal solution in the second row in Table 17 is obtained. 
 
Case 2: 
By plugging data into the developed models and applying our algorithms to solve the models, 
the solutions for global optimality are obtained as shown in Table 19. It can be observed that if 
the IM chooses to implement global optimality, the best profit that it can achieve drops from 
£6264 to £1368, which corresponds to a system profit increase from £9272.33 to £10878. This 
indicates that if the IM collaborates with the FOC, they can generate more profits, which will 
provide a chance for both of them to be better off than Stackelberg equilibrium.  
 











10878 1368 9510 
MOSSEND to 
Felixstowe 
2050, 2200, 2200 
Southampton to 
Felixstowe 

















2050, 2200, 2200 
Table 19  Global optimisation scenario 
 
6.5 Managerial Insights and Policy Recommendation 
Vertical separation has been adopted in western countries such as the UK, Sweden and 
Germany as a way to eliminate the monopolist position of the railway infrastructure owner. The 
vertical separation has been practiced for a couple of decades, and it has been found useful in 
not disadvantage the FOC. However, the infrastructure manager may take advantage of its 
leader position in designing the track access price tariff. As indicated by the solutions at 
equilibrium discussed above, the infrastructure manager can maximise its own profits, and the 
FOC can only obtain very minor profits which sometimes may be close to 0. According to our 
interviews with the railway industry in the UK, the government has a review procedure 
regarding the IM’s income and cost before providing national grant. They try to impose a cap 
for the profits the IM can obtain. However, as a counter measure, the IM often chooses to 
exaggerate their costs and thus to disguise their real profits. As the IM’s costs may be built in 
many business activities, it is a very challenging task for the government to verify whether the 
IM’s claimed costs are genuine or not.  
 
This study has demonstrated that there exists global optimality for the game. Achieving global 
optimality will be beneficial for both the IM and the FOC as the profits the whole transport 
service supply chain can obtain under global optimality is higher than in cases where the IM 
makes decisions independently and selfishly. However, to achieve global optimality, the IM 
needs to shift its goal of decision making from unilaterally maximising its profits to maximising 
the profits of the entire supply chain.  
 
In summary, the managerial insights we can obtain from the cases are: under the governance 
structure of vertical separation, the IM and the FOC need to expand the profit pie, and then 
share the pie appropriately, which will create a win-win situation for both parties.  
 
6.6 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter investigated the scenario where the IM and the FOC have perfect cooperation 
under centralised decision-making and proved the solution to the IM-FOC game under perfect 
collaboration will lead to the global optimal system profit. To also achieve global optimality in 
practice under decentralised decision-making, an Inverse Mixed Integer Linear Programming 
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(InvMILP) model and a Fenchel Cutting Plane algorithm were proposed.  The proposed method 
can identify the optimal prices that enable the scenario under which decentralised decision 
making also has the same system performance as the centralised decision-making mode. Two 
numerical examples validated the developed algorithm, and revealed that the IM needs to shift 
its goal of decision making from unilaterally maximising its profits to maximising the profits 






Chapter 7 Subsidy Contract Design to Coordinate the Freight System 
 
Under the Stackelberg equilibrium of the IM-FOC game investigated in Chapter 5, the IM 
makes decisions on the freight tariff only considering its’ own benefits without caring about the 
other stakeholder’s benefits. By taking the advantage of its leadership position in the game, the 
IM can obtain its maximum non-cooperative profits unilaterally. In Chapter 6, an ideal scenario 
where the IM and the FOC have full cooperation was explored. With reference to the ideal 
scenario, the track access price tariff which can lead the freight system under decentralised 
decision making mode to achieve global optimality was determined. The research methods 
adopted were the Inverse Mixed Integer Linear Programming model and the Fenchel cutting 
plane method. The comparison of the results obtained in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 indicates that 
the cooperation between the IM and the FOC can lead to a better result for both players in the 
game compared to the non-cooperation case. 
 
In this chapter, the alternative mechanisms, e.g., supply chain contracts, which may lead to 
system optimality of the game will be explored.  In particular, the discussion will focus on how 
to utilise the government subsidy to achieve system optimality.  
 
7.1 Introduction to Mechanism Design 
The IM, the FOC and the end customers form a three-echelon supply chain. To serve the end 
customers’ transport demands, the IM sells freight transport capacity on the railway network as 
a supplier; the FOC provides the transport service to the end customers using purchased train 
itineraries as a retailer. The products on the three-echelon supply chain are the freight service 
network.  
 
As the independent commercial bodies in the freight transport market, the operational goals of 
the IM and the FOC are not to maximise the profits of the entire supply chain but their own 
individual profits (Pfeiffer, 2016). The IM tries to charge a higher price to the FOC while the 
FOC always hopes to pay less for accessing the freight capacity. Therefore, they have 
conflicting interests. When no cooperation mechanisms are applied, which is also what happens 
in practice, both the players make their decisions independently. In this situation, as the leader 
of the business, the IM tries to set up the price for any itinerary as high as possible to maximise 
its’ profits, which will have the effect of increasing the FOC’s total cost for providing freight 
services to the shippers. This will reduce the number of profitable orders that the FOC can serve 
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and consequently the total revenue of the whole system. The non-cooperative decision making 
process will lead to a suboptimal solution for the supply chain system (Lawrence v. Snyder, 
2011a). To avoid this suboptimal situation and achieve a global optimal solution, a contract 
mechanism should be applied to coordinate the supplier (the IM) and the retailer (the FOC) in 
the rail freight system. 
 
In this Chapter, a number of mechanism (contracts) that may lead to system optimality will be 
explored. These mechanisms have intensively investigated supply chain coordination and 
proved to be an efficient process to achieve global optimality of the supply chain. Due to the 
network effect of a railway freight service, it remains unclear how these commonly used 
contracts in supply chain management perform in a network revenue management game.  
Therefore, the research question in this Chapter was defined as: 
 
What is the best supply chain contract that can lead to system optimality of the IM-FOC 
game? 
 
The contribution of the Chapter to knowledge is that the performance of traditional supply chain 
contracts will be evaluated in the context of a network revenue management game. The research 
in the chapter will ascertain how well traditional supply chain contracts perform in network 
revenue game and provide alternative ways to achieve global optimality of the IM-FOC game.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, an overview of the contracts commonly used in the supply 
chain management will be provided first; and then a subsidy contract will be selected and 
formulated; a Double-Layer-Gradient-Search Algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal 
subsidy. Numerical experimentation is provided at the end of the chapter to validate the 
designed models and algorithms. 
 
7.2 An Overview of Supply Chain Contracts  
In the SCM context, the decisions made by each of the involved parties affects all stakeholders’ 
as well as the entire supply chain’s profit (Chakraborty et al., 2018). Conflicting interests of the 
parties always leads to a suboptimal supply chain (SC) as the partners make decisions in 
isolation. It has been proven that cooperation and coordination between the players can improve 
the efficiencies of entire supply chain (Chakraborty, Chauhan and Vidyarthi, 2015). Supply 
chain coordination can be achieved by the application of a contract mechanism between the 
supplier and retailer (Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M., & Campbell, 2005). A supply chain contract 
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is an important element in supply chain management because it can significantly improve the 
profits of the whole chain (Hou et al., 2017). In order to coordinate a supply chain, choosing a 
proper form of supply contract is one of the crucial steps. There have been many studies 
focusing on contract design in the supply chain since the mid-1990s (Zhuo, Shao and Yang, 
2018; Cachon and Lariviere, 2002; Katok and Wu, 2009; Wang and Liu, 2014; Wang et al., 
2018). 
 
In the literature, the main contract models that were studied intensively include: wholesale price 
contract, buyback contract, revenue-sharing contract, quantity flexibility contract and subsidy 
contract. Detailed properties of the existing contracts in supply chain context are available in 
the textbook “Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory” (Lawrence v. Snyder, 2011). These 
contracts also are widely discussed in the academic literature. For example,  Cai et al., (2017) 
summarised supply chain contract when they designed subsidy contracts for Vendor Managed 
Inventory system on supply chain. Katok and Wu (2009) analysed the performance of the 
wholesale contract, buyback contract and revenue-sharing contract mechanisms in a laboratory 
investigation. In the following, a brief introduction to each contract will be provided.  
 
7.2.1 Wholesale Price Contract  
The wholesale price contract has a very simple structure. Under such a contract, the retailer 
pays a wholesale price per unit to the supplier and sells the products to end customers. The 
profit of the supplier 𝑃𝑆 , the profit of the retailer 𝑃𝑟 and the profit of the entire supply chain 
𝑃𝑎  are all the function of the wholesale price w and the order quantity Q.  
𝑃𝑆 = 𝐹(𝑤, 𝑄𝑠), 𝑃𝑟 = 𝐹(𝑤, 𝑄𝑟), 𝑃𝑎 = 𝐹(𝑤, 𝑄𝑎) 
If there exists a wholesale price w, and an identical order quantity for each stake holder, i.e., 
𝑄∗ = 𝑄𝑆 = 𝑄𝑟 = 𝑄𝑎  , which can maximise the profits for the supplier, the retailer and the 
supply chain system, 𝑃𝑆
∗, 𝑃𝑟
∗ , 𝑃𝑎
∗ , respectively, then the supply chain is coordinated by the 
wholesale price. However, in such a situation, it has been proven that the profit of the supplier 
is non-positive (Lawrence v. Snyder, 2011). As there is not a wholesale price w which can make 
𝑄𝑆 = 𝑄𝑟 = 𝑄𝑎 and ensure that the supplier and the retailer earn positive profits, the wholesale 
price contract is known as non-coordination contract (Lawrence v. Snyder, 2011). The other 
reason for the wholesale price contract being unable to coordinate a supply chain is that there 




7.2.2 Buyback Contract 
In a buyback contract, the retailer pays a unit price w to the supplier for obtaining a certain 
amount of credit. At the end of the contract period, the supplier pays a fee of q per unit to the 
retailer for unsold products. The retailer does not need to return the product to the supplier 
physically but obtains a credit instead. The buyback contract can avoid the product being sold 
for a very low price by the retailer. Under a buyback contract, the retailer’s risk on overage is 
reduced and shared by the supplier. This mechanism also makes the retailer avoid losing profit 
for being out of stock. The supply chain can therefore arrive at a higher profit and may lead to 
the coordination of a supply chain. The unit purchasing price w is a function of buyback price 
q，𝑤(𝑞). It is proven that by applying a buyback contract, the players’ profit can be improved 
or at least remain unchanged by setting up the proper contract parameters, q and  𝑤(𝑞)  
(Lawrence v. Snyder, 2011). In practice, the buyback price is affected by the players’ positions 
in the respective market, i.e., who is the leader in the market. The supplier oriented market or 
the retailer oriented market may have different contract parameters. Generally, the buyback 
price is determined through negotiation between the two players. In literature, Zhao et al., (2014) 
explored buy back contract application in a supplier retailer supply chain where the price-
dependent demand is stochastic. 
 
7.2.3 Revenue Sharing Contract 
Revenue Sharing (RS) Contract/ Mechanism is another type of supply chain contract used as a 
method to coordinate the decentralised supply chain system. The revenue-sharing contract is an 
extension of the wholesale price contract. In general, under the revenue-sharing contract, the 
retailer needs to pay the wholesale price for every unit of product plus an agreed reward to the 
supplier where the reward here can be a certain percentage of revenue or net profit of the retailer 
as negotiated by the two partners. Revenue Sharing (RS) is normally applied to the supply 
chains with uncertain demands (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005; Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo, 
2004). Applying revenue sharing mechanism with optimised contract parameters can improve 
the profit of each involved stakeholder in the chain and achieve a win-win situation.  
 
RS mechanism can be applied in a broader context, e.g., a company’s employees, companies in 
alliance (Sarah Miller, 2015). This mechanism can even be applied in different departments of 
the government, for example, the government of the United States has applied this revenue 
sharing mechanism in their taxation system between 1972 and 1986 (James M. Cannon, 1986).  
The RS mechanism has also been applied in railway operation in the UK. In the Periodic Review 
2013 (PR13), ORR published the Route-level Efficiency Benefit Sharing (REBS) mechanism 
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baselines which was introduced by Network Rail (Network Rail, 2014). Under this mechanism, 
participating operators can share a certain percentage of surplus from Network Rail if any; and 
have to contribute to covering a percentage of Network Rail’s loss conversely for each route. 
This method can be understood as FOC sharing the profit/loss of IMs based on an agreed rate 
basis.  
 
In the academic community, the RS contract has been intensively studied. Avinadav, 
Chernonog and Perlman (2015) provided an extensive review of the application of the revenue 
sharing contract using mobile Apps. Chakraborty, Chauhan and Vidyarthi (2015) compared 
wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts in product selling process. (Saraswati and 
Hanaoka, 2014) employed multi-airport multi-airline non-cooperative games within a network 
model to analyse the cooperation between the airport-airline in a revenue sharing context. 
(Wang and Liu, 2014) integrated the fairness preference theory with the traditional principal–
agent model to discuss the revenue sharing ratio in public private partnership (PPP) projects. 
Xie et al. (2018) designed a contract that combined a revenue-sharing contract with a cost-
sharing contract for a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain and then applied Stackelberg game 
theory to investigate this coordination mechanism. Li, Zhu and Huang (2009) considered a 
consignment contract with a revenue sharing contract for a supply chain with one manufacturer 
and one retailer. A Nash bargaining game theoretical model was developed to realise profit 
sharing and achieve the cooperation between the two players. 
 
7.2.4 Quantity Flexibility Contract  
A quantity flexibility contract can be viewed as a special format of a buy back contract. The 
difference between the two contracts is that the quantity flexibility contract requires the supplier 
to “recycle” the unsold units from the retailer; whereas, in the buyback contract, the supplier 
will only pay a percentage of the original purchasing price to buy-back the unsold products. Li 
et al. (2016) discussed the application of a quantity flexibility contract between a cosmetic 
manufacture and retailer. In the study, the cosmetic retailer is allowed to adjust the purchasing 
quantity of a new type of cosmetic product based on the actual customer demand and inventory 
level. The impact of applying flexible contracts on the performance of both retailer and supplier 
was investigated by Cai et al.(2015).  
 
7.2.5 Subsidy Contract  
A subsidy contract was first proposed by Cai et al. (2017) to study the coordination of a vendor-
managed inventory (VMI) supply chain with service level sensitive customers. In the study, the 
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retailer provides a subsidy to the supplier. There were three variations of the subsidy contract 
considered in the study in terms of the subsidy scope and level. Numerical examples showed 
that the proposed contracts can improve the supply chain collaboration and performance. In 
some other cases, the subsidy contract has been adopted to promote the implementation of a 
project or the cooperation between partners. For example,  Yi and Li (2018) investigated the 
cooperation of the supplier and the retailer in a supply chain for energy saving and emission 
reduction using a Stackelberg game model. A subsidy contract was proposed in the research as 
the government provides subsidies to the energy saving product and imposes tax on the carbon 
emitted. The results show that the subsidy can promote the cooperation between the upstream 
and downstream companies in the supply chain.  
 
7.3 Rationales for the Adoption of the Subsidy Contract 
Freight capacity, which is also the product of the freight service supply chain in this research, 
is perishable, which means that the freight capacity is no longer available after a certain point 
in time. However, in quantity flexibility contracts and buyback contracts, an essential 
requirement is that the supplier needs to “recycle” the unused products in some way. This makes 
the two contracts too impractical to be implemented for the IM-FOC game. As the intention of 
applying any mechanism is to coordinate the IM and the FOC, the possibility of applying the 
wholesale contract is also excluded because it is a non-coordinating contract. The revenue 
sharing contract has been applied in rail freight operation in the UK (Network Rail, 2014) as 
introduced in section 7.2.3. However, in the existing revenue sharing contract, there is no 
consideration of the government subsidy which is one of the sources of income for Network 
Rail. According to (Office of Rail and Road, 2019a), the UK government’s net subsidy was 
£3.8 billion in 2017-18, which accounts for 30.6% of total income of the railway industry. This 
research will try to introduce a novel mechanism to coordinate the stakeholders in rail freight 
system using the government subsidy as a lever.  
 
As the rail freight transportation system in this research is composed of the IM and the FOC, 
all the income generated for the system will be from end customers. Generally, the system profit 
is determined by how many profitable customers’ demands the system can serve. From the 
prospective of the FOC, a particular shipping order is profitable only when the revenue 
generated by serving this order is more than the costs incurred in the operation process. If the 
FOC’s costs for serving the order are reduced, the number of profitable orders will be increased. 
As a consequence, the FOC can then serve more orders and generate higher benefits. This 
means that the system’s profits could be improved if the FOC’s cost for serving an order is 
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reduced.  It is clear that reducing the FOC’s cost for accessing the rail freight network will have 
such an effect.  
 
The FOC’s costs can be reduced if the IM reduces its charges, i.e., setting up a track assessing 
tariffs lower than the optimal price at Stackelberg equilibrium. In doing so, the FOC may choose 
to purchase more train itineraries, service more customer orders and consequently increase the 
system profits. However, the IM’s profit under the reduced price tariff will be lower than that 
at Stackelberg equilibrium. Hence, the IM will have no motivation to choose the lower track 
assessing tariff. In order to encourage the IM to choose the lower traffic accessing tariff, reduce 
the freight charges to the FOC and subsequently increase the system profit, the Government 
could consider providing a subsidy (allowance) to the IM.  The subsidy can be paid back later 
from the increased profit of the freight transport system. This will avoid the Government 
incurring extra financial burden.  
 
In light of the above discussion, the subsidy mechanism is designed as follows: the government 
provides a certain amount of subsidy to the IM. The IM follows the bilevel model presented in 
Chapter 5 to determine the optimal prices to charge the FOC.  At the end of the contract period, 
the IM and the FOC needs to pay the subsidy back to the government. 
 
If the initial amount of subsidy is set appropriately, the above subsidy contract policy will lead 
to system optimality of the game. In the IM-FOC game, different amounts of government 
subsidy may lead the IM to design different optimal track access price tariffs, which may result 
in the FOC’s options for optimal purchasing plans and consequently different system profits. 
The target of the subsidy mechanism is to identify the optimal subsidy that can lead to the 
maximum system profit.  
 
In the following, the subsidy contract will be mathematically formulated. A solution algorithm 
to identify the optimal subsidy will be designed. Detailed discussion will be provided in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
 
7.4 Formulation of Subsidy Contract 
In the section, the IM’s and the FOC’s decision making models under the subsidy contract will 





w The subsidy per wagon provided by the government to the IM 
∆ A non-negative small number 
T A counter indicating the times of local search attempts 
Z A very big non-negative number 
𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑤𝑘) The gradient of the subsidy w at iteration k 
𝑆𝑘  The system profit when subsidy is 𝑤𝑘  
𝑆𝑘
′
 The system profit when subsidy is 𝑤𝑘
′
 
A A predefined integer, indicate the allowed maximum local search times 
L A predefined nonnegative number, which is the step length of inner gradient 
search 
r r is a predefined number denoting the value of adjustment for each local search 
iteration 
AE The total subsidy provided by the government                   
 
7.4.2 Problem Description and formulation 
As shown in Figure 21 , under the subsidy contract, the first step of the gaming process is that 
the government decides a subsidy rate, w, for each customer order to be served; the second step 
is that the IM makes decisions on the track access tariff based on the subsidy rate w; the third 
step is that the FOC uses its model to decide the itinerary purchasing plan and customer order 
fulfilment plan. The FOC’s decision including the itinerary purchasing plan and the customer 
order fulfilment plan will be fed into the IM’s model as input data, and then the IM can compute 
its profits. The IM may adjust its tariff in the next round decision making in the hope its profits 
can be improved. The gaming process is very similar to that identified previously in Figure 18 





Figure 21 The Optimization Process When The IM Making Decisions Independently 
 
In the aforementioned gaming process, the IM’s and the FOC’s models need to run 
repetitively.  A bilevel model was developed to model the interaction between the IM 
and the FOC 
Upper Level:        
Max 𝑍(𝑝, 𝑓, 𝑥) = ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 − ∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 −
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(ξ) ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛ξ∈Ω +
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(ξ) ∙ 𝑤ξ∈Ω  
Subject to:             𝑝𝑛𝑖 ≥ 0  ∀ n, i 
(17) 
 
The government provides a subsidy rate 
w per wagon to the IM 
The FOCs decide which paths they should 
purchase and how to fulfil customer orders 
based on Ct+1 
Plug in FOC’s decisions to the IM model, 




 The IM’s optimal price 𝐶𝑡
∗ and profit 
 The FOC’s profit under 𝐶𝑡
∗ 
 The FOC’s decision on paths purchase 
 The FOC’s plan of allocating the customer orders  
IM sets up a tariff Ct+1 to maximise its’ 
own profit based on w 
N 
Y 
t = t + 1 
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                             For a given 𝑝𝑛𝑖, solves  
Lower Level:  
 Max Y(f, x) = − ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 +
1
𝑁
(∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) ∙  𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫𝜉∈Ω −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝜉) ∙ 𝑉′ ∙ 𝑆𝑛 ∙ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑑∈𝒟𝑛∈𝒫 )    
                Subject to:      
𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑓𝑛𝑖                       ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗  
∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑛∈𝑃 ≤ 1        ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑗       
∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝛿𝑛𝑖
𝑙
𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ≤ 𝑄
𝑙     ∀ 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 
∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑖 ⋅ 𝛾𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖∈ℐ𝑛 ⋅ 𝐶𝑛𝑖𝑛∈𝒫 ≤ 𝑄
𝑘    ∀ 𝑘 ∈  𝒦 
∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ⋅ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥 ≤ 𝐶𝑛𝑖   ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0                             ∀ {i, j | O(j) ≠ O(i), D(j)≠ 
D(i)}       
 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1}                     ∀𝑛, 𝑑, 𝑖, 𝑗  




The above formulation is similar to the bilevel model in Chapter 5, and the difference only 
lies in the IM’s objective function. The first term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of Eq (17) 
represents the revenue generated by selling the train itineraries in the railway network to 
the operator. The second term represents the total fixed operational cost of the sold 
itineraries. The third term is of the IM’s total variable cost. The fourth item is the subsidy 
provided by the government per number of wagons delivered on the sold train itineraries 
during the given time period. 
 
Proposition 1: The IM will not set up a price tariff that can lead to the global optimality if the 





∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ)′ξ∈Ω
 










∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ) ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛ξ∈Ω − ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖
∗ ′ ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖
∗ ′𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 +




∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ)′ ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛ξ∈Ω  
 
Proof: 














∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ) ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛ξ∈Ω  
 
 
Where  𝑝∗, 𝑓∗, 𝑥∗ are the optimal solution at the Stakelberge Equilibrium. 
 
If the proposed contract is accepted, the IM’s profit would be: 
 
 𝑍′(𝑝∗′, 𝑓∗′, 𝑥∗′) = ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖
∗ ′ ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖




∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ)′ ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛ξ∈Ω +
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ)′ ∙ wξ∈Ω  
 
                
And 𝑝∗′, 𝑓∗′, 𝑥∗′    are the optimal solution of the IM-FOC game with applying the 
subsidy contract.                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                            
To stimulate the IM to accept this contract, their profit after applying this mechanism must 
be guaranteed better than or at least no less than the profit in the scenario without any 
contract. That is: 
𝑍′(𝑝∗′, 𝑓∗′, 𝑥∗′) ≥ 𝑍(𝑝∗, 𝑓∗, 𝑥∗) 
 
∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖
∗ ′ ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖




∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ξ∈Ω
𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ)′ ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛 +
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗











∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ξ∈Ω
𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗








∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ)′ξ∈Ω
 










∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ) ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛ξ∈Ω − ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑖
∗ ′ ⋅ 𝑓𝑛𝑖
∗ ′𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 +




∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗




Therefore, in the designed contract, the subsidy rate, w, is equal to or bigger than the above 
inequation RHS value is the primary requirement. 
 
Proposition 2: The system profit cannot exceed an upper bound no matter how the government 
increases the subsidy rate for the IM.  
 
Proof: For any given railway line, the total number of wagons that can be served by the FOC 
is constrained by the available section and station capacity and the allowed maximum number 
of wagons for each train. The maximum profit of the freight system is the total profit earned by 
serving orders subject to all available capacities. Therefore, this maximum system profit is also 
bounded. The charging rate which can attract most profitable customer orders is the best price 
for the system; and the subsidy rate that leads to the IM setting up the price as the 
aforementioned charging rate is the optimal subsidy. A higher subsidy may lead to lower price 
from the IM, but if no more orders can be accommodated in the freight network, no extra profit 
can be generated for the system. Therefore, the optimal subsidy is also bounded. 
 
The key step in the subsidy contract design is to find the optimal subsidy that can maximise the 
system profit. Under the subsidy contract, the system profit is calculated by adding the profit 
of the IM and the profit of the FOC but taking away the total subsidy provided by the 
government.  
 
7.4.3 A Double-Layer-Gradient-Search Solution Algorithm 
As previously discussed, the subsidy contract is designed to use the government financial 
support to encourage the IM to reduce their charges to the FOC. In doing so, the FOC can secure 
more customer orders and achieve the system optimality of the game. In this section, an 
algorithm that can identify the optimal subsidy leading to the system optimality of the game 
was developed.  
 
In the proposed algorithm, the gradient search method will be applied twice. The outer level 
gradient search method is used to identify the government’s optimal subsidy per wagon. The 
identified optimal subsidy can lead to the freight transport system achieving global optimality.  
The inner level gradient search is used to calculate the bilevel model for a given subsidy. The 
inner level gradient search is very similar to the gradient search method developed to solve the 
bilevel model in Chapter 5. Similar to the discussion in 5.2, to avoid the local optimisation, the 
135 
 
local search method is combined with the gradient search method in the double-layer-gradient 
search algorithm. 
 
Let 𝑤𝑘  denote the subsidy per wagon the IM receives from the government; 𝑆𝑘  the freight 
system profit at the Stackelberg equilibrium corresponding to the subsidy per wagon 𝑤𝑘 from 
the government;  
𝑑𝑆𝑘
𝑑𝑤𝑘
 the change of the system profit with regard to a small change of 𝑤𝑘 ,  at 
the kth iteration. The gradient of the system profit at 𝑤𝑘,  𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑤𝑘),  at the k
th iteration can be 





To compute  𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑤𝑘), let 𝑆𝑘
′
denote the system profit corresponding to another given 
subsidy per wagon 𝑤𝑘
′
= 𝑤𝑘 + Δ from the government, where ∆ is a non-negative small 








   (19) 
For the given subsidy  𝑤𝑘 and 𝑤𝑘
′
, the optimal profit 𝑆𝑘  and 𝑆𝑘
′
can be obtained by the 
following algorithm. 
 
Algorithm 7.1 Computing the freight system profits for a given subsidy. 
 
Step 1: for a given w, apply gradient search algorithm (as stated in 5.2) to calculate 
𝑝𝑛𝑖
∗ , 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜉) and 𝑓𝑛𝑖
∗ ,   the profit of the FOC, 𝑌∗(𝑓, 𝑥)  
Step 2: substitute 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝜉) , 𝑓𝑛𝑖
∗  , the subsidy w , and the price vector into the objective 
function of the upper level model, and the profit of IM, 𝑍∗(𝑝, 𝑓, 𝑥),  can be obtained;  
Step 3: the total profit of the freight system S equals to the profit of the FOC, 𝑌∗(𝑓, 𝑥) plus 
the profit of IM, 𝑍∗(𝑝, 𝑓, 𝑥) minus the total subsidy provided by the government AE = 
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑗∈𝒥𝑑∈𝒟𝑖∈ℐ𝑛𝑛∈𝒫 ∙ 𝑥𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ (ξ) ∙ 𝑤ξ∈Ω . 
 
To identify the optimal subsidy w*, the following double-layer gradient search based 








Algorithm 7.2 Double-layer Gradient Search Algorithm to Find the Optimal Subsidy  
Step1: Initialization  
Set a counter T to record the times of local search attempts,   𝑇 = 0; 
a counter k to record the number of steps the algorithm runs, k = 0 
the initial subsidy 0, i.e., 𝒘𝟎 =  𝟎; 
the Optimal_System-Profit_So_Far = −𝑍   (Z is a very big nonnegative number), 
the Optimal_Subsidy = 𝒘𝟎; 
step length = L, (L is a pre-defined nonnegative number) 
the maximum number of local search attempts = A (A is pre-defined number) 
Step 2: if T < A continue; otherwise, stop.  
Step 3: Computing 𝑆𝑘 with 𝒘𝒌  using Algorithm 7.1. 
Step 4.1  if 𝑆𝑘 > Optimal_System-Profit_So_Far; continue; otherwise, go to Step 4.2  
               Optimal_Subsidy  = 𝒘𝒌 ; Optimal_System-Profit_So_Far = 𝑆𝑘; k = k + 1; 
gradient of 𝒘𝒌 ,  𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝒘𝒌), using  Eq. (19) and Algorithm 7.1; 
               𝒘𝒌+𝟏 = 𝒘𝒌 + 𝐿 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝒘𝒌) ; T = 0 
Step 4.2: Local Search 
      𝒘𝒌+𝟏 = 𝒘𝒌 + 𝑟;  (r is a predefined step); T = T + 1;   
Step 5: Go to Step 2. 
 
In Algorithm 7.2, Step 1 is to initialise the calculation, the counter T is used to record the times 
of local search attempts, counter k the number of steps the algorithm has run so far. Both T and 
k are initialized to be 0, the subsidy w is set to be 0. The current optimal system profit is set to 
be a very big negative number to ensure the calculation start. The current optimal subsidy is set 
to be 0; the step length is set to be L, (L is a pre-defined nonnegative number) and the maximum 
number of local search attempts is set to be A (A is pre-defined number).  
 
Step 2 is to check if the times of local search attempts is more than the pre-defined allowed 
maximum number.  If it does, the algorithm stops; otherwise, go to step 3.  
 
Step 3 is to apply Algorithm 7.1 to calculate system profit 𝑆𝑘when subsidy is set to be 𝑤𝑘. 
 
At Step 4.1, if 𝑆𝑘 is more than the current optimal system profit, the current subsidy 𝑤𝑘is set 
to be the current optimal subsidy and the current system profit is set to be the current optimal 
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system profit; update k with k+1; calculate 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝒘𝒌). To calculate 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝒘𝒌), inner level 
gradient search algorithm is applied to calculate the IM’s optimal profit when subsidy 𝒘𝒌 per 
wagon is applied. Update 𝒘𝒌+𝟏 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝒘𝒌 + 𝐿 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝒘𝒌) , and reset T = 0. 
 
At Step 4.2, local search will be applied. The subsidy will be updated as 𝒘𝒌+𝟏 = 𝒘𝒌 + 𝑆  (S is 
a predefined step). After each local search is completed, the counter will be updated, T = T + 1.   
 
At Step 4, the algorithm will go back to Step 2 to check if the algorithm should be terminated. 
 
The outputs of the double-layer gradient search algorithm include the optimal value of subsidy 
per wagon and the freight system profit, the IM’s profit and the FOC’s profit under this subsidy. 
 
7.5 Numerical Example 
A software tool using C++ and CPLEX is developed to compute the optimal solution for the 
problem. Feeding the data sets in Chapter 4 into the developed models and algorithms, the 
results for case 1 and 2 were obtained and shown in Table 20 and Table 21. 
 
7.5.1 Case 1 
In this case, when the government provides a £ 22 subsidy per wagon to the IM,  
 The freight system profit can arrive at £221.33 thousand which is the same as its 
maximal profit under global optimisation scenario and better than equilibrium scenario 
(£162.33 thousand); 
 The IM’s profit is £162 thousand which is the same as its maximal profit under 
equilibrium scenario; 
 The FOC’s profit is £59.33 thousand. It is significantly higher than the equilibrium 

















Subsidy Contract 22 58,58,130 221.33 162 59.33 




7.5.2 Case 2 
After plugging the data into the developed programme, the calculation results are shown in 
Table 21. When the IM receives a £4 subsidy per wagon from the government, 
 The system profit will be £10612, which is close to the profits under perfect cooperation 
scenario (£11147.67) and higher than that under equilibrium scenario (£9272.33); 
 The IM’s maximum profit is £6264 which is the same as its maximum profit under 
equilibrium scenario; 
 The FOC’s profit is £4348. It is significantly higher than the equilibrium scenario 
when the IM and the FOC are non-cooperative (£3008.33).  
 
Path Subsidy  System 
Profit 
The IM’s Profit The FOC’s 
profit 
MOSSEND to Southampton 4 
10612 6264 4348 
MOSSEND to Felixstowe 4 
Southampton to Felixstowe 4 
Southampton to MOSSEND 4 
Felixstowe to MOSSEND 4 
Felixstowe to Southampton 4 
Table 21 Optimal Profit of Each Stakeholder under the Subsidy Contract 
 
In the experiment, the freight system under the subsidy contract did not obtain the exactly same 
profit as that in the full cooperation scenario. This is because the proposed gradient search 
combined local search method is an approximate solution approach due to the integer variables 
involved. The calculation accuracy may also be constrained by the searching step length.  It is 
possible to reduce the profit differences under the two scenarios by reducing the searching step 
length, however, this may result in long computational time. 
 
7.6 Summary of the Chapter 
A subsidy contract has been proposed as the mechanism to coordinate the relationship between 
the IM and the FOC. In contrast to the existing subsidy contract in the literature, the subsidy in 
this proposed mechanism provided by the government will be used as a motivating factor and 





The profits of the IM, the FOC and the entire freight system obtained under subsidy contract 
was compared with that at Stackelberg game in Chapter 5 as well as that in perfect collaboration 
scenario discussed in Chapter 6.  The comparison result indicates that subsidy provided by the 
government can stimulate the IM to set up a lower rate in comparison to the non-cooperative 
scenario discussed in Chapter 5. As the lower rate can attract more customer demands and lead 
to an increased number of lines purchased by the FOC, it will consequentially increase the 
profits of the IM, the FOC and the freight system. The numerical test proves and demonstrates 
















Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents an overview of this research and summarises how the research questions 
have been addressed and what research findings have been obtained. Contributions to 
knowledge and recommendations for future work are also given in this chapter. 
 
8.1 Conclusions  
This thesis started with an introduction to the unique characteristics of rail freight in terms of 
cost-efficiency, environmental impact, reliability and effect on road congestion. Afterwards, 
the role of rail in the multimodal freight transportation system and the state of art in the UK rail 
freight industry were analysed. Following these discussions, the weaknesses existing in current 
charging process that motivate this research were identified. Three research questions were 
formulated: - 
 
1)  What are the optimal prices of the IM-FOC game at the Stackelberg equilibrium? The 
solution at Stackelberg equilibrium specifies the prices that the IM can charge to 
maximise its profits unilaterally without any cooperation with the FOC.  
2) What are the optimal prices that can maximise the overall profits of the whole rail 
system (supply chain) and lead to system optimality under vertical separation operation 
structure?  
3) What is the best contract that should be adopted to coordinate the whole rail freight 
system? 
 
Based on the analysis of the research questions, the scope of literature review was identified 
and conducted in Chapter 2. The intensive literature review revealed a number of research gaps.  
   
1) There is very limited study on the network revenue management game in the rail freight 
industry. The most relevant research treated the FOC’s decision making for itinerary 
purchasing as continuous variables which is not consistent with practice in reality.  
2) To solve the IM-FOC game at the Stackelberg Equilibrium and find the optimal 
solutions, the existing method in literature cannot be applied directly due to the need for 
the binary variables. A novel solution algorithm is needed to solve this problem.  
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3) In literature there is no research foci on the global optimal solution for the Stackelberg 
game for network revenue management in the rail freight industry.  
4) Although mechanism design for supply chain revenue management where demands are 
independent in the leader-follower game and also for the competitions in network 
revenue game in the Nash game can be found in literature, the coordination mechanism 
for Stackelberg game in network revenue management is missing.  
5) Importantly, the industry interview indicated that there is a requirement for improving 
the charging regime in the UK freight transport practice. 
 
Before addressing the aforementioned research questions and filling the identified research gaps, 
the following research methods to be applied into the study were reviewed in Chapter 3:  
 Linear Programming: to be applied to develop the IM’s model; 
 Stochastic Programming: to be applied in developing the FOC’s model where the 
customer demand was the stochastic factor; 
 Game Theory: to be applied to demonstrate the interaction between the IM and the FOC; 
 Inverse Optimisation: This optimisation technique was used to determine the optimal 
price which can make the decentralised freight system achieve the same profit as that 
under the scenario where the IM and the FOC have full cooperation; 
 Gradient Search: This method was used to find the optimal subsidy rate which can lead 




In Chapter 4, the pricing charging regime of the UK rail freight system has been reviewed. This 
review provided a basis for the model development.  Also, two datasets have been collected, 
which have been used for testing the various models and solution algorithms.   
 
In Chapter 5, the first research question reflecting the current industrial practice where the IM 
and the FOC make decisions independently without cooperation was investigated.  In this 
dissertation, this question has been approached rigorously using a Stackelberg game theoretical 
method. To determine the optimal track access tariff at Stackelberg equilibrium, a bilevel linear 
programming model and a gradient search based solution algorithm was proposed. The outputs 
of the developed model and the solution algorithm include important information at Stackelberg 
equilibrium: the IM’s optimal non-cooperative price tariff for track access, the corresponding 
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profits of the IM, the FOC and the freight system under this price, the FOC’s train itinerary 
purchasing plan, and the FOC’s plan for fulfilling customer demand. 
 
The second research question aims to reveal whether it is worthwhile to introduce cooperation 
between the IM and the FOC. To answer this question, an ideal scenario with full cooperation 
under a centralised decision making system was investigated in Chapter 6 and formulated as a 
Mixed Integer Linear Programming model. By solving the model using standard commercial 
software such as IBM CPLEX, the maximum system profit can be obtained.  Further, an Inverse 
Mixed Integer Linear Programming model and a Fenchel Cutting Plane based algorithm were 
developed to determine the optimal track access prices under a decentralised decision making 
process, which can also lead to the same system profit as that obtained in the ideal full 
cooperation case. The experimental results indicate that the optimal track access prices under a 
decentralised decision making process outperforms the prices at Stackelberg equilibrium.  In 
other words, the numerical experiment results support that cooperation between the IM and the 
FOC can improve the total profit of the freight system.  
 
The third research question aims to design a mechanism to promote the cooperation between 
the IM and the FOC, and guide the IM to set up a track access tariff that can lead to the system 
optimisation. In Chapter 7, after reviewing the existing mechanisms used in supply chain 
coordination, a subsidy contract was selected. This contract is particularly useful for the 
scenario where the freight industries in many countries are operating at a loss and are highly 
reliant on the government subsidy. A double layer gradient search algorithm has been developed 
to identify the optimal subsidy rate that leads system optimisation. The numerical experiment 
indicates that the subsidy contract and the double layer gradient search algorithm are useful to 
achieve global optimality and the profits obtained under the optimised subsidy contract is on a 
par with that under a full collaboration case.  
 
In this study, managerial insights in relation to the profits for the IM, the FOC, and the system, 
have been obtained through numerical experiments.  
 
System Profit 
If the IM tries to set up the track access tariff to maximise its profit independently without 
cooperation with the FOC, the system profit of the freight system will be very low. As a contrast, 
under full collaboration scenario, the freight system profit is maximised and much higher than 
that in the non-cooperation case. It has been found that, by applying an optimised subsidy 
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contract, the obtained freight system profit is very close to the maximised profit in the full 
collaboration case, and significantly higher than the profit under the Stackelberg equilibrium 
scenario.  
 
The IM’s profit 
When the IM makes decisions independently without cooperation with the FOC, the IM can 
maximise its profit when the game reaches Stackelberg equilibrium. Under the full cooperation 
scenario, the IM’s profit is lower than the maximum profit at Stachelberg equilibrium. By 
applying the proposed subsidy contract, the IM still has the same maximal profit as that under 
the Stackelberg equilibrium scenario since its loss from reducing track accessing tariff can be 
compensated by the government subsidy.  
 
The FOC’s profit 
In the Stackelberg Equilibrium scenario, when the IM makes decisions on freight tariff 
independently without cooperation with the FOC, the FOC will normally have a very low profit. 
When the IM and the FOC have full cooperation, the FOC’s profit is significantly increased 
and much higher than that under Stackelberg equilibrium scenario. By providing government 
subsidy to the IM according to the wagons delivered in the freight network, the FOC’s profit is 
improved as well compared with that under Stackelberg Equilibrium scenario.         
 
Based on the discussion and calculation in this thesis it can be concluded that the price set up 
by the IM is the most important factor that can influence the profit of the IM, the FOCs as well 
as the freight system. Although being the monopolist of the freight system, the IM should not 
make decisions independently without cooperation with the FOC as this will lead to low profits 
for both the stakeholders.  By applying the appropriate contract mechanism, the IM’s, the 
FOC’s, and the system profit can be improved, and the freight system can be coordinated. 
 








Chapter 6 Proposition:  A freight system will achieve global optimality when 
the IM and the FOC have perfect cooperation under centralised 
decision-making mode. 
Chapter 7 Proposition 1: The IM will not set up a price tariff that can lead to the 
global optimality if the subsidy rate of the contract is smaller than a 
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∗ (ξ)′ ∙ 𝑉 ∙ 𝑆𝑛ξ∈Ω  
 
 Proposition 2: The system profit cannot exceed an upper bound no 
matter how the government increases the subsidy rate for the IM.  
 
 




The thesis has contributed to the knowledge in the following aspects: 
1. A novel stochastic pricing problem for a three-echelon service network supply chain is 
studied. The ‘products’ considered in the supply chain are heterogeneous and have 
network effects.  The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game that includes an IM’s 
model and a FOC’s model. The IM’s decision is to determine track accessing prices, 
and the FOC’s decision is to design a freight service network and customer fulfilment 
plan.  
 
In the existing literature, the pricing problem on supply chain normally considers homogeneous 
products with a single price, and there are no correlations between these homogenous products. 
As a contrast, in this study, each train itinerary needs to be considered as a unique product since 
each train itinerary is associated with a unique combination of Origin and Destination stations 
and departure and arrival times; also train itineraries are correlated as they are all constrained 




The existing literature relating to network revenue game mainly consider competitions between 
different competitors, which leads to Nash equilibrium. As a contrast, in the study, as an IM 
and a FOC makes decisions sequentially, Stackelberg game theory needs to be applied to model 
their interactions.  
 
There are only two previous studies, (Harker and Hong,1994) and (Crevier et al., 2012) where 
Stackelberg equilibrium was considered in the network revenue game. However, the two studies 
only considered selling a percentage of capacity on a given rail line, modelled as continuous 
variables, and hence the follower’s decision is not a typical network design issue. Further, the 
two studies also have not modelled individual customer orders, and thus the decisions as to 
whether to accept or reject a customer order and which train an individual customer order 
should be allocated to are not included in their models.  The FOC’s model developed in this 
thesis has overcome the aforementioned drawbacks, and thus is a more accurate representation 
of industrial practice.  
 
2. A bilevel programming model with the binary integer decision variables in the lower 
level is developed to find the solution of the game at Stackelberg equilibrium. As the 
existing method cannot solve the problem, a unique specifically designed gradient 
search based algorithm enhanced by local search is developed to solve the model. This 
method contributes to the literature to solve the special bilevel programming model that 
contains binary integer decision variables in the lower level. 
 
As the FOC’s decisions include network work design and an order fulfilment plan as discussed 
above, binary integer decision variables have been widely used in the lower level of the bilevel 
programming model. There have previously been no solution algorithms proposed to solve 
bilevel programming model with integer decision variables in the lower level. This study 
uniquely proposed the gradient search based algorithm enhanced by a local search to fill this 
gap in the literature.  
 
3. This study is the first use of the applied inverse linear programming and Fenchel cutting 
plane method to identify the exact global optimal solution of Stackelberg game in 
network revenue management. A new pricing strategy that can achieve the global 
optimality of the game is identified. The solution approach is to combine inverse integer 
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linear programming model and a Fenchel cutting plane method to solve the Stackelberg 
game, which has not been reported in the previous literature.  
 
The global optimality for the Stackelberg game of network revenue management has not been 
discussed in the literature. The only two published papers ( Harker and Hong, 1994; Crevier et 
al., 2012) dealing with Stackelberg game of network revenue management only consider the 
determination of equilibria, and there was no discussion about the global optimality of the game 
even considering the game formulated in a simplified format without considering many 
operational details.  
 
4. An efficient subsidy mechanism (contract) that can coordinate the IM-FOC game has 
been proposed for the first time in this study. An algorithm has also been developed to 
determine the parameters in the mechanism. 
 
As described above, the previous studies relating to the Stackelberg game of network revenue 
management only considered the equilibria of the game, and there was no discussion about how 
to design the mechanism for the game.  
 
In this study, a subsidy contract has been designed for the game. The subsidy contract is in line 
with rail freight industrial practice in the UK because 30.6% of total income of the railway 
industry comes from the government subsidy. This research is the first study aiming to help the 
government to decide the optimal amount of subsidy that can lead to global optimisation of the 
rail freight system.  
 
5. Managerial insights have been obtained from the provided analysis and case study. It 
has been found that: (i) an IM’s selfish pursuit to profit maximisation without 
cooperation with the FOC would lead to a poor system performance; (ii) there exists a 
pricing strategy that can lead to global optimality. Thus, the best strategy for an IM is 
to charge the prices leading to global optimality first and then share the profits with the 
FOC afterwards. In short, it is recommended that an IM should expand the profit pie, 
and then share part of the pie with the FOC. Under this new strategy, both parties can 
be better off. (iii) a subsidy contract can lead to system optimality if the amount of 




For example, in the case 2, under Stackelberg Equilibrium scenario, the IM’s profit is £6264, 
the FOC’s profit is £3008.33, the freight system profit is £9272.33; under full cooperation 
scenario, the IM’s profit is £1368, the FOC’s profit is £9510, the profit of the freight system is 
£10878; by applying subsidy mechanism, the IM’s profit is £6264, the FOC’s profit is £4348, 
the profit of the freight system is £10612.  
 
Compared with Stackelberg Equilibrium scenario, which represents the current freight practice, 
under the full cooperation scenario, although the IM’s profit decreases from £6264 to £1368, 
the system profit increases from £9272.33 to £10878, which is an increase of 17.3% and the 
FOC’s profit increases from £3008.33 to £9510 which is an increase of 216%. As the IM’s 
profit under full operation is lower than that under Stackelberg equilibrium, the IM may have 
no incentive to implement full operation. However, since the FOC’s profit is increased, if the 
FOC agreed to share part of its profit with the IM, this will give the IM motivation to follow 
the prices leading to global optimisation. By applying subsidy mechanism and setting up the 
subsidy rate as £4 per delivered wagon to the IM, the IM’s profit is £6264, the FOC’s profit is 
£4348 and the system profit is £10612. The IM obtains the same profit as under Stackelberg 
Equilibrium scenario, and the system profit increases from £9272.33 to £10612, which is an 
increase of 14.4% and the FOC’s profit increases from £3008.33 to £4348 which is an increase 
of 44.5%.  Under the subsidy contract, both the IM and the FOC will be better off than 
Stackelberg equilibria. Also the subsidy contract in the decentralised freight system can 
generate the profits similar to that in the centralised freight system, hence it can coordinate the 
freight system. 
 
To apply the designed mechanism into industry practice, it is necessary that the three 
stakeholders, the IM, the FOC and the government gain benefits or at least will not lose profit 
from it. The calculated results of the two numerical experiments indicate that the proposed 
government subsidy based mechanism can maximise the IM’s profit and the entire freight 
system profit at the same time. This means the IM will not incur any profit loss when applying 
the mechanism. In the meantime, the FOC’s profit level is higher than that under Stackelberg 
Equilibrium scenario which represents the current operation practice. In other words, the FOC 
will have a better profit after applying the mechanism, hence a FOC may be willing to adopt 
such a mechanism in practice. As the mechanism is uniquely designed to pay back the total 
subsidy to the government, this can avoid the extra financial burden to the government for 
introducing the mechanism to the industry. Moreover, the social facility in terms of entire 




Although the dissertation considered the UK railway industry as the context of the numerical 
examples, the proposed mechanism has the potential to be applied in the vertically separated 
railway industry in the other countries. The reason for this is that in designing the mechanism, 
the IM and the FOC were only considered as independent commercial organisations in the game 
who follow the pure market rules. The government, the subsidy provider, is not required to 
invest in the industry as the total subsidy will be paid back at the end. Therefore, theoretically, 
any vertically separated operating railway industry can adopt the proposed government subsidy 
mechanism. 
 
The study considered the vertically separated railway freight industry as a three-tier service 
supply chain which is a novel position from which to investigate the relationship between the 
IM, the FOC and the end customers. The conflicting interests were taken into account when 
designing the pricing strategy of the itineraries by applying game theory. The developed bilevel 
models considered the uncertainty of customer demand and involve integer variables in the 
lower level. By applying the novel solution algorithms provided in this study to solve the 
proposed models, the key parameters for the stakeholders, e.g. the optimal pricing strategy for 
the IM, best network design and customer demand fulfil plan for the FOC, the best subsidy rate 
the government should apply to the IM, can be determined.   
      
 
8.3 Recommendations for Further Study 
In this research, one FOC has been considered. In the UK rail industry practice, there exists 
more than one freight operating company, for example, DB Cargo, Freight Liner, DRS etc. For 
a future study, two or more FOCs could be considered in the game. With different FOCs 
operating on the same freight network, there will be competition between the companies for 
accessing the freight capacity as well as serving customer demand. In this situation, the 
interaction between the IM and each FOC will be considered as Stackelberg game and the 
interaction between each pair of FOCs will be a Nash game. The whole system is the 
combination of a set of Stackelberg games and Nash game. It will be a very challenging task to 




This study assumed that the freight charges applied to shippers are known information, which 
are not decision variables. In practice, truck transport and rail freight transport always compete 
with each other. Price may be an important weapon for the two transport modes to win the 
competition. Evaluating the impact of the competition between the two freight transportation 
modes in the IM-FOC game can be another further study. To develop models for this scenario 
when considering the freight price offered to the shippers as a variable which changes with 
freight market competition, the customer demand of the FOC that is very sensitive to the price 
needs to be interpreted as a function of the price.   
 
In this study, only the subsidy contract has been evaluated. However, there might be other 
contract mechanisms that may also be able to coordinate the freight service supply chain. 
Potentially, these unidentified contracts may have a simpler format or better performance than 
the subsidy contract proposed in this study. Therefore, designing and analysing more contracts 
may be a future research direction where the existing contract formats can be the basis of the 
mechanism.  
 
Further research can also be the empirical analysis of the application of the optimal pricing 
strategy obtained from the inverse programming model or the subsidy contract in practice. This 
type of research may be the collection of the attitudes of different stakeholders towards the 
implementation of these research outcomes; or the evaluation of financial performance of the 













We would like to collect the following information and data as a part of PhD project entitled 
“Network Revenue Management Game in the Rail Freight Industry”. This research is sponsored 
by EPSRC and Network Rail. It will focus on the design of an optimal pricing mechanism 
between the IM (Infrastructure Manager) and the FOCs (Freight Operating Companies) in the 
rail freight industry.  
An early consultation with rail freight industry experts and literature on the rail freight service 
price is set, suggests that there are weaknesses and ambiguity in the current pricing process. At 
present, the price is set by the Infrastructure Manager then applied, following approval by 
Office of Rail and Road (ORR). FOCs are just consulted in setting the price. This current 
approach was the impetus to set up this novel research which aims to provide a method for 
involving the IM and the FOCs actively in the pricing process, in order to maximize profits for 
both. 
To achieve this, the research adopts an innovative methodology to design a new pricing 
mechanism for IMs/FOCs which centres on the coordination of the two parties in pricing design 
and improve the relationship management between them. The mechanism (contract) can design 
the optimal price which will create a higher volume of freight service and profit level, as well 
as share profit equitably between the partners.  
Two mathematical models will be developed, to be used by the IM and the FOCs respectively, 
in the decision-making process. Also the interaction between the two models will be studied, 
using leader/follower gaming theory.  Two numerical cases will demonstrate the process and 
software will be developed to complete the calculation. The study will attempt to prove that the 
suggested mechanism can lead to improved profitability for all players.  
To enable this research, we are seeking your help to provide the following information and data. 










Information and data needed  
 
1. How do you decide if you should buy the route according to the prices set by the IM? 
What are the factors you would consider in this process? Do you use any formula to 





2. In a typical 3 days’ period, what volume / number of wagons do you receive from the 
customers (i.e. shippers/ consignees)? Please provide details of the number of customers 
and the respective volumes/ wagons for each of the 3 days.   If necessary, please attach 
detailed information.  Alternatively, can you please provide the daily average customers’ 






3. What is the average cost per wagon per train mile for laden wagons and empty wagons? 
If there is no direct information for this, can you please provide information for average 














5. What is the estimated profit that you can earn from meeting the demands mentioned in 
Q2?  (if it is difficult to provide this information, can you please identify the average 




































To enable statistical analysis, please answer the following questions about yourself.  
Name  
 
Name of your company 
 
Which of the following categories best describes your role? 
o CEO 
o Senior Management 
o Middle Management 
o Operational 
o Administration 
o Other (please specify) 
 
Which of the following best describes your business? 
o Freight operator 
o Infrastructure manager 
o Logistics service provider 
o Passenger operator 
o rail freight customer 
o Consultant  




Length of service in the rail sector 
o 0-5 years 
o 5-10 years 
o 10+ years 
 


























We would like to collect the following information and data as a part of PhD project entitled 
“Network Revenue Management Game in the Rail Freight Industry”. This research is sponsored 
by EPSRC and Network Rail. It will focus on the design of an optimal pricing mechanism 
between the IM (Infrastructure Manager) and the FOCs (Freight Operating Companies) in the 
rail freight industry.  
An early consultation with rail freight industry experts and literature on the rail freight service 
price is set, suggests that there are weaknesses and ambiguity in the current pricing process. At 
present, the price is set by the Infrastructure Manager then applied, following approval by 
Office of Rail and Road (ORR). FOCs are just consulted in setting the price. This current 
approach was the impetus to set up this novel research which aims to provide a method for 
involving the IM and the FOCs actively in the pricing process, in order to maximize profits for 
both. 
To achieve this, the research adopts an innovative methodology to design a new pricing 
mechanism for IMs/FOCs which centres on the coordination of the two parties in pricing design 
and improve the relationship management between them. The mechanism (contract) can design 
the optimal price which will create a higher volume of freight service and profit level, as well 
as share profit equitably between the partners.  
Two mathematical models will be developed, to be used by the IM and the FOCs respectively, 
in the decision-making process. Also the interaction between the two models will be studied, 
using leader/follower gaming theory.  Two numerical cases will demonstrate the process and 
software will be developed to complete the calculation. The study will attempt to prove that the 
suggested mechanism can lead to improved profitability for all players.  
To enable this research, we are seeking your help to provide the following information and data. 










Information and data needed: 
 
1. Can you please briefly introduce the current pricing process? For NR, what is the 
principle when set up the rate? 
 
 
2. I can find some charging information related with freight trains from NR website, there 
are some different categories: 1) Freight Variable Usage Charge default rates or Freight 
variable usage charge rates (is calculated by VTISM); 2) Freight Electrification Asset 
Usage Charge rates 3) Charter Slot Charge rates 4) Freight Traction Electricity 
Modelled Consumption Rates 5) capacity charge rates  
 I understand that all above charges are the price should be applied to the FOCs in terms 
of different cases, to determine the integrated price for FOCs, is it just the sum of 
different charging categories? (Are they the price structure?)  
 Do you take into account the FSOs’ benefit? Are the prices being not only cover cost 
itself? If the price structure for a specific train (e.g. electric traction trains in combined 
used line) is:  1+2+4+5+6, How to classify the cost among the price? How about the 
cost structure? 
 
3. Is there any bidding procedure to acquire freight capacity? 
o Yes 
o No  
 If yes, can you please briefly illustrate this process? How long before they will bid for 
the capacity? How long is the fixed term for this price（is that 5 years which is the 
same as control period）?  
 
4. For the purpose of consulting a case study in detail, is it possible to get such cost and 
price information for small part of the railway network? If yes, please select a railway 
segment in the UK freight network for which you can provide the most information. 





5. On the selected line, from Original station to Destination, a) how many freight trains 
can be allocated (i.e. maximum capacity of rail freight trains on the line), b) what is 
the number of trains on average currently being operated and c) what is the distance 
between Original station and Destination? d) What is the maximum number of 
wagons permitted per train on this line?  
 
6.  Can you please give an example for a particular train which carry one single 
commodity, what is the cost (other than charge rates published on NR website) per 











Name of your company 
 
 
Which of the following categories best describes your role? 
o CEO 
o Senior Management 
o Middle Management 
o Operational 
o Administration 




Length of service in the rail sector 
o 0-5 years 
o 5-10 years 
o 10+ years 
 




















 using std::vector; 
static void 
 usage (const char *progname), 
 populatebyrow     (IloModel model, IloNumVarArray var, IloRangeArray con), 
 populatebycolumn  (IloModel model, IloNumVarArray var, IloRangeArray con), 
 populatebynonzero (IloModel model, IloNumVarArray var, IloRangeArray con); 
int 
 main (int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 IloEnv   env; 
 try { 
  IloModel model(env); 
  IloObjective FSOobj,FSOobj1,FSOobj2; 
  IloInt d,i,j,t;  
  IloInt Ndays=3; 
  IloInt Ntrains=3; 
  IloInt Norders=6; 
  double a=27;//fixed operational cost  
  IloNum p[3]={ 2050, 2200, 2000 };//initial price per train 
 
  IloNum r[3][6]=           //profit per railcar 
  { 
   { 101,92,97,95,95,99 }, 
   { 103,104,101,104,100,110 }, 
   { 103,92,102,101,103,112 } 
  }; 
  IloNum V=0.05; //variable cost per railcar per mile 
  IloNum S=490; //distance between teo stations 
  double grad[3]; 
  double stepL=1; 
  double optimalprice[3]   
  IloBoolVarArray  f(env,Ntrains); 
  IloArray<IloArray<IloBoolVarArray> >   xdij(env); 
  IloInt T[3][6] = 
  { 
      { 8,6,10,6,8,9}, 
      {12,10,12,9,12,6}, 
      {13,9,5,9,15,10} 
  }; 
  IloInt C[3][3] = 
  { 
   { 32,32,32 }, 
   { 32,32,32 }, 
   { 32,32,32 } 
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  }; 
  double optimalprofit = -1000000; 
  double ST = 0; 
  while (ST < 5) 
  { 
   //calculate IM profit at initial price 
  //solve FSO model  
   IloModel model1(env); 
   IloBoolVarArray  k(env, Ntrains); 
   IloArray<IloArray<IloBoolVarArray> >   ydij(env); 
   IloCplex cplex(env); 
   //creat ydij 
   for (d = 0; d < Ntrains; d++) 
   { 
    IloArray<IloBoolVarArray> tempmatrix(env); 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IloBoolVarArray tempbool(env, Norders); 
     for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
     { 
      std::ostringstream ossX; 
      ossX << "ydij" << "(" << d << ")" << "(" << i << 
")" << "(" << j << ")"; 
      tempbool[j].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
     } 
     tempmatrix.add(tempbool); 
    } 
    ydij.add(tempmatrix); 
   } 
   //creat k   
   for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    std::ostringstream ossX; 
    ossX << "k" << "(" << i << ")"; 
    k[i].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
   } 
   //generate objective function 
   //revenue  
   IloExpr obj(env); 
   for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
   { 
    for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
    { 
     IloExpr temExp(env); 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      temExp = temExp + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
     } 
     obj += temExp*r[d][j]; 
    } 
   } 
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   obj = obj / Ndays; 
   // train purchasing costs 
   IloExpr E(env); 
   for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    E += p[i] * k[i]; 
   } 
   obj = obj - E; 
   IloConstraintArray cc(env); 
   //generate constraints:ydij<=k 
   for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
     { 
      cc.add(ydij[d][i][j] <= k[i]); 
     } 
    } 
   } 
   //generate constraints: 2 
   for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
   { 
    for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
    { 
     IloExpr objf(env); 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
 
      objf = objf + ydij[d][i][j]; 
     } 
     cc.add(objf <= 1); 
    } 
   } 
   //generate constraints 3 
   for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
   { 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IloExpr objf1(env); 
     for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
     { 
      objf1 = objf1 + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
     } 
     cc.add(objf1 <= C[d][i]); 
    } 
   } 
   //add constraints to model1 
   model1.add(cc); 
   //add objilt1 to model1 
   model1.add(FSOobj = IloMaximize(env, obj)); 
   //objilt.end(); 
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   cplex.extract(model1); 
   cplex.exportModel("ilt1.lp"); 
   cplex.solve();F 
   env.out() << "   Profit of FSO when price is "<<   p[0] <<endl <<p[1] 
<<endl <<p[2]<<endl << "     =    " << cplex.getObjValue() << endl; 
   cplex.writeSolution("FSO_Initial.sos"); 
   vector<vector<vector<bool>>> Fvec; //SOLUTION for FSO model-
ydij; 
   for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
   { 
    vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     vector<bool> Ftvec; 
     for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
     { 
      Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
     } 
     Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
    } 
    Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
   } 
   vector<bool> Fvecf; //solution for FSO model-ki; 
   for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
   } 
   for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    cout << Fvecf[i] << endl; 
   } 
   model1.remove(FSOobj); 
   obj.clear(); 
   //IM profit 
   double IMformer=0; 
   double IMr=0; 
   double IMfixedc=0; 
   double IMvar = 0; 
   // double IMvarc; 
   for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    IMr += p[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
   } 
   for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    IMfixedc += a*Fvecf[i]; 
   } 
   for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
   { 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
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     double temp = 0; 
     for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      temp = temp + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j] 
     } 
     IMvar = IMvar + temp*V*S; 
    } 
   } 
   IMformer = IMr - IMfixedc-IMvar; 
   env.out() << "IM profit is     " << IMformer << endl; 
   Fvec.clear(); 
   Fvecf.clear(); 
    re: 
   if (IMformer > optimalprofit) 
   { 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     optimalprice[i] = p[i]; 
 
     cout << "optimal price is :   "<< optimalprice[i]<<endl; 
    } 
 
    optimalprofit = IMformer; 
    cout << "optimal profit of IM is " << optimalprofit << endl; 
    // calculate gradient of initial price 
    double s = 0.5; 
    //calculate grad[0] 
    p[0] = p[0] + s; 
    IloExpr obj1(env); 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
     { 
      IloExpr temExp(env); 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       temExp = temExp + ydij[d][i][j] * 
T[d][j]; 
      } 
      obj1 += temExp*r[d][j]; 
     } 
    } 
    obj1 = obj1 / Ndays; 
    // train purchasing costs 
    IloExpr EE(env); 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     EE = p[i] * k[i] + EE; 
    } 
    obj1 = obj1 - EE; 
    model1.add(cc); 
    model1.add(FSOobj = IloMaximize(env, obj1)); 
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    //objilt.end(); 
    cplex.extract(model1); 
    cplex.exportModel("ilt2.lp"); 
    cplex.solve(); 
    cplex.writeSolution("FSO_0.sos"); 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
     vector<bool> Ftvec; 
      for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
      { 
      
 Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
      } 
      Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
     } 
     Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     cout << Fvecf[i] << endl; 
    } 
    double IMr01=0; 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IMr01 += p[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
 
    } 
    //cout << "IMr01=" << IMr01<<endl; 
    double IMfixedc01=0; 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IMfixedc01 += a*Fvecf[i]; 
    } 
    // cout << "IMfixedc01=" << IMfixedc01<<endl; 
    double IMvar01 = 0; 
    for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     //cout << "j=" << j << endl; 
     //cout << "Norders" << Norders<<endl; 
     for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
     { 
      double temp = 0; 
      for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
      // cout << Fvec[d][i][j] << endl; 
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      // cout << T[d][j] << endl; 
       temp = temp + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
      } 
      IMvar01 = IMvar01 + temp*V*S; 
     } 
    } 
    double IMcurrent01=0; 
    IMcurrent01 = IMr01 - IMfixedc01-IMvar01; 
   cout << "current IM profit when p[0]=p[0]+s is" << IMcurrent01<< 
endl; 
    double Prodiff=0; 
    Prodiff = IMcurrent01 - IMformer; 
    cout << " profit difference when p[0]=p[0]+s   is:" << Prodiff 
<< endl; 
 
    grad[0] = Prodiff / s; 
    Fvec.clear(); 
    Fvecf.clear(); 
    model1.remove(FSOobj); 
    obj1.clear(); 
    cout << "grad[0]=" << grad[0] << endl; 
    //calculate grad[1] 
    double IMr02=0; 
    double IMfixedc02=0; 
    double IMvar02 = 0; 
    p[0] = p[0] - s; 
    p[1] = p[1] + s; 
    cout << "p[0]=" << p[0] << endl; 
    cout << "p[1]=" << p[1] << endl; 
    cout << "IM former when p[1]=p[1]+s is" << IMformer << 
endl; 
    IloExpr obj2(env); 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
     { 
      IloExpr temExp(env); 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       temExp = temExp + ydij[d][i][j] * 
T[d][j]; 
      } 
      obj2 += temExp*r[d][j]; 
     } 
    } 
    obj2 = obj2 / Ndays; 
    // train purchasing costs 
    IloExpr EE1(env); 
 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     EE1 = p[i] * k[i] + EE1; 
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    } 
    obj2 = obj2 - EE1; 
    model1.add(cc); 
    model1.add(FSOobj = IloMaximize(env, obj2)); 
    //objilt.end(); 
    cplex.extract(model1); 
    cplex.exportModel("ilt2.lp"); 
    cplex.solve(); 
 env.out() << "   Profit of FSO when p[1]=p[1]+s   = " << cplex.getObjValue() << 
endl; 
    cplex.writeSolution("FSO_1.sos"); 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      vector<bool> Ftvec; 
      for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
      { 
      Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
      } 
      Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
     } 
     Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
     cout << "purchasing plan is " << Fvecf[i] << endl; 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IMr02 += p[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IMfixedc02 += a*Fvecf[i]; 
    } 
     for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
     { 
      double temp = 0; 
      for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       temp = temp + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
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      } 
      IMvar02 = IMvar02 + temp*V*S; 
     } 
    } 
    double IMcurrent02=0; 
    IMcurrent02 = IMr02 - IMfixedc02-IMvar02; 
    Prodiff = IMcurrent02 - IMformer; 
    cout << " profit difference when p[1]=p[1]+s   is:" << Prodiff 
<< endl; 
    grad[1] = Prodiff / s; 
    Fvec.clear(); 
    Fvecf.clear(); 
    model1.remove(FSOobj); 
    obj1.clear(); 
    cout << "grad[1]=" << grad[1] << endl; 
    //calculte grad[2] 
    double IMr03=0; 
    double IMfixedc03=0; 
    double IMvar03 = 0; 
    double IMcurrent03=0; 
    p[1] = p[1] - s; 
    p[2] = p[2] + s; 
    cout << "p[0]=" << p[0] << endl; 
    cout << "p[1]=" << p[1] << endl; 
    cout << "p[2]=" << p[2] << endl; 
    IloExpr obj3(env); 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
     { 
      IloExpr temExp(env); 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       temExp = temExp + ydij[d][i][j] * 
T[d][j]; 
      } 
      obj3 += temExp*r[d][j]; 
     } 
    } 
    obj3 = obj3 / Ndays; 
    // train purchasing costs 
    IloExpr EE2(env); 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     EE2 = p[i] * k[i] + EE2; 
    } 
    obj3 = obj3 - EE2; 
    model1.add(cc); 
    model1.add(FSOobj = IloMaximize(env, obj3)); 
    //objilt.end(); 
    cplex.extract(model1); 
    cplex.exportModel("ilt3.lp"); 
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    cplex.solve(); 
  env.out() << "   Profit of FSO when p[2]=p[2]+s   = " << cplex.getObjValue() 
<< endl; 
    cplex.writeSolution("FSO_2.sos"); 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      vector<bool> Ftvec; 
      for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
      { 
      Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
      } 
      Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
     } 
     Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
     cout << "purchasing plan is " << Fvecf[i] << endl; 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IMr03 += p[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IMfixedc03 += a*Fvecf[i]; 
    } 
    for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
     { 
      double temp = 0; 
      for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
      temp = temp + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
      } 
      IMvar03 = IMvar03 + temp*V*S; 
     } 
    } 
    IMcurrent03 = IMr03 - IMfixedc03-IMvar03; 
    cout << "IM profit when p[2]=p[2]+s is" << IMcurrent03 << 
endl; 
    Prodiff = IMcurrent03 - IMformer; 
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    cout << " profit difference when p[2]=p[2]+s   is:" << Prodiff 
<< endl; 
    grad[2] = Prodiff / s; 
    Fvec.clear(); 
    Fvecf.clear(); 
    model1.remove(FSOobj); 
    obj3.clear(); 
 
    p[2] = p[2] - s; 
    cout << "gradient at this point:" << endl; 
    cout << "grad[0]=" << grad[0] << endl; 
    cout << "grad[1]=" << grad[1] << endl; 
    cout << "grad[2]=" << grad[2] << endl; 
    //new price 
    for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) 
    { 
     p[i] = p[i] + grad[i] * stepL; 
     cout << "p" << i << "=" << p[i] << endl; 
    } 
    //IM profit at new price 
    double IMlformer=0, IMlcurrent=0; 
    double IMrl=0; 
    double IMfixedcl=0; 
    double IMvarc1 = 0; 
    //solve FSO modle to get purchaing plan 
    //revenue  
    IloExpr objL(env); 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
     { 
      IloExpr temExp(env); 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
      temExp = temExp + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
      } 
      objL += temExp*r[d][j]; 
     } 
    } 
    objL = objL / Ndays; 
 
    // train purchasing costs 
    IloExpr EL(env); 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     EL += p[i] * k[i]; 
    } 
    objL = objL - EL; 
    IloConstraintArray cL(env); 
    //generate constraints:ydij<=k 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
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    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
     { 
      for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
      { 
       cL.add(ydij[d][i][j] <= k[i]); 
      } 
     } 
    } 
    //generate constraints: 2 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
     { IloExpr objf(env); 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       objf = objf + ydij[d][i][j]; 
      } 
      cL.add(objf <= 1); 
     } 
    } 
    //generate constraints 3 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      IloExpr objf1(env); 
      for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
      { 
       objf1 = objf1 + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
      } 
      cL.add(objf1 <= C[d][i]); 
     } 
    } 
    //add constraints to model1 
    model1.add(cL); 
    //add objilt1 to model1 
    model1.add(FSOobj1 = IloMaximize(env, objL)); 
    //objilt.end(); 
    cplex.extract(model1); 
    cplex.exportModel("ilt.lp"); 
    cplex.solve(); 
env.out() << "   Profit of FSO when price = " << "(" << p[0] << "," << p[1] << "," << p[2] << 
")" << "  is" << cplex.getObjValue() << endl; 
    cplex.writeSolution("FSO.sos"); 
    for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      vector<bool> Ftvec; 
      for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
      { 
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 Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
      } 
      Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
     } 
     Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
     cout << "purchasing plan is " << Fvecf[i] << endl; 
    } 
    model1.remove(FSOobj1); 
    objL.clear(); 
    //IM profit  
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IMrl += p[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
    } 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     IMfixedcl += a*Fvecf[i]; 
    } 
    for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
    { 
     for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
     { 
      double temp = 0; 
      for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
 
 
       temp = temp + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
      } 
      IMvarc1 = IMvarc1 + temp*V*S; 
     } 
    } 
    IMlcurrent = IMrl - IMfixedcl-IMvarc1; 
    env.out() << "current IM profit  is   " << IMlcurrent << endl; 
    Fvec.clear(); 
    Fvecf.clear(); 
      
   // cout << "optimalprofit=  " << optimalprofit << endl; 
    IMformer = IMlcurrent; 
    cout << "IMformer=" << IMformer << endl; 
    ST = 0; 
    goto re; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    double D = 1; 
    for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) 
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    { 
     p[i] = p[i]-grad[i] * stepL + D; 
     cout << "p" << i << "=" << p[i] << endl; 
    } 
    ST++; 
   } 
   cout << "optimal profit of IM is    " << optimalprofit; 
  } 
   
  env.out() <<"press any key to continue..."<<endl; 
  getchar(); 
  throw 20; 
 } //end of try 
 catch(int e) 
 { 






 return 0; 
} 
 


































usage(const char *progname), 
populatebyrow(IloModel model, IloNumVarArray var, IloRangeArray con), 
populatebycolumn(IloModel model, IloNumVarArray var, IloRangeArray con), 
populatebynonzero(IloModel model, IloNumVarArray var, IloRangeArray con); 
 
int 
main(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 IloEnv   env; 
 try { 
  IloModel model(env); 
  IloObjective FSOobj; 
  IloInt d, i, j, t; 
  IloInt Ndays = 3; 
  IloInt Ntrains = 3; 
               IloInt Norders = 6; 
  double a = 27;//fixed operational cost  
  IloNum p[3] = { 2050, 2200, 2000 };//price per train 
 
  IloNum r[3][6] =           //profit per railcar 
  { 
   { 101,92,97,95,95,99 }, 
   { 103,104,101,104,100,110 }, 
   { 103,92,102,101,103,112 } 
 
  }; 
 
  IloNum V = 0.05; //variable cost per railcar per mile 
  IloNum S = 490; //distance between two stations 
  IloBoolVarArray  f(env, Ntrains); 
  IloArray<IloArray<IloBoolVarArray> >   xdij(env); 
  IloInt T[3][6] = 
  { 
  { 8,6,10,6,8,9 }, 
  { 12,10,12,9,12,6 }, 
  { 13,9,5,9,15,10 } 
 
  }; 
  IloInt C[3][3] = 
  { 
   { 32,32,32 }, 
   { 32,32,32 }, 








  for (d = 0; d<Ntrains; d++) 
  { 
   IloArray<IloBoolVarArray> tempmatrix(env); 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    IloBoolVarArray tempbool(env, Norders); 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
    std::ostringstream ossX; 
    ossX << "x" << "(" << d << ")" << "(" << i << ")" << "(" << j 
<< ")"; 
    tempbool[j].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
    } 
 
    tempmatrix.add(tempbool); 
   } 
   xdij.add(tempmatrix); 
  } 
 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
   std::ostringstream ossX; 
   ossX << "f" << "(" << i << ")"; 
   f[i].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
  } 
 
  //solve model for system profit and calculate x0 
 
  //generate objective function 
 
  IloExpr obj(env); 
 
  //revenue  
 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
   for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
   { 
    IloExpr tempExp(env); 
    for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
 
     tempExp += xdij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
    } 
    obj += tempExp*r[d][j]; 
   } 
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  } 
  obj = obj * 1 / Ndays; 
  // fixed operational costs 
  IloExpr A(env); 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
   A += a*f[i]; 
  } 
  obj = A - obj; 
  // add in variable cost related with distance  
  IloExpr B(env); 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
   for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
   { 
    IloExpr tempexpr(env); 
    for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
 
     tempexpr += xdij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
    } 
    obj += tempexpr*V*S; 
   } 
  } 
 
  //generate constraints:xdij<=fi 
 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
 
  { 
   for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
   { 
 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     model.add(xdij[d][i][j] <= f[i]); 
 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  //generate constraints: 2 
 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
 
   for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
   { 
    IloExpr obj2(env); 
    for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 




     obj2 = obj2 + xdij[d][i][j]; 
 
    } 
    model.add(obj2 <= 1); 
   } 
  } 
 
  //generate constraints 3 
 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    IloExpr obj3(env); 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     obj3 = obj3 + xdij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
    } 
    model.add(obj3 <= C[d][i]); 
   } 
  } 
  //add obj to model 
  model.add(IloMinimize(env, obj)); 
  obj.end(); 
  IloCplex cplex(env); 
  cplex.extract(model); 
  cplex.exportModel("sumprofit.lp"); 
  cplex.solve(); 
  double Maxsysprofit = 0; 
  Maxsysprofit = cplex.getObjValue(); 
 
  //env.out() <<cplex.getValue(xdij[0][0][0])<<endl; 
  env.out() << "Maxsysprofit = " << cplex.getObjValue(); 
 
  cplex.writeSolution("SystemOptimal.sos"); 
 
  vector<vector<vector<bool>>> vec; 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
   vector<vector<bool>> ivec; 
 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    vector<bool> tvec; 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     tvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(xdij[d][i][j])); 
 
    } 
    ivec.push_back(tvec); 
   } 




  } 
 
  vector<int> vecf; 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
   vecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(f[i])); 
 
  } 
 
 
  //solve original problem (FSO model )and calculate x1 
  IloModel model1(env); 
  IloBoolVarArray  k(env, Ntrains); 
  IloArray<IloArray<IloBoolVarArray> >   ydij(env); 
  //creat ydij 
  for (d = 0; d<Ntrains; d++) 
  { 
   IloArray<IloBoolVarArray> tempmatrix(env); 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    IloBoolVarArray tempbool(env, Norders); 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     std::ostringstream ossX; 
     ossX << "ydij" << "(" << d << ")" << "(" << i << ")" << 
"(" << j << ")"; 
     tempbool[j].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
    } 
 
    tempmatrix.add(tempbool); 
   } 
   ydij.add(tempmatrix); 
  } 
 
  //creat k   
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
   std::ostringstream ossX; 
   ossX << "k" << "(" << i << ")"; 
   k[i].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
  } 
 
  //generate objective function 
 
  //revenue  
  IloExpr objilt(env); 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
   for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
   { 
    IloExpr temExp(env); 
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    for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
 
     temExp = temExp + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
    } 
    objilt += temExp*r[d][j]; 
   } 
  } 
  objilt = objilt / Ndays; 
 
  // train purchasing costs 
  IloExpr E(env); 
 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
   E += p[i] * k[i]; 
  } 
 
  objilt = E - objilt; 
 
  //generate constraints:ydij<=k 
 
 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
 
  { 
   for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
   { 
 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     model1.add(ydij[d][i][j] <= k[i]); 
 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  //generate constraints: 2 
 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
 
   for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
   { 
    IloExpr objf(env); 
 
    for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
 
     objf = objf + ydij[d][i][j]; 
 
    } 
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    model1.add(objf <= 1); 
   } 
  } 
 
  //generate constraints 3 
 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    IloExpr objf1(env); 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     objf1 = objf1 + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
    } 
 
    model1.add(objf1 <= C[d][i]); 
   } 
  } 
 
  //add objilt1 to model1 
  model1.add(FSOobj = IloMinimize(env, objilt)); 
  //objilt.end(); 
  cplex.extract(model1); 
  cplex.exportModel("ilt1.lp"); 
  cplex.solve(); 
  env.out() << "   Profit of FSO at ilt1(dx1)= " << cplex.getObjValue() << endl; 
  cplex.writeSolution("FSO_Initial.sos"); 
  double F1; 
  F1 = cplex.getObjValue(); 
  vector<vector<vector<bool>>> Fvec; //SOLUTION for FSO model-ydij; 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
   vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    vector<bool> Ftvec; 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
    } 
    Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
   } 
   Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
 
  } 
 
  vector<bool> Fvecf; //solution for FSO model-ki; 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 




  } 
 
  //calculate d1*x0 
  IloNum FSOprofit; 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
   for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
   { 
    double temExpre = 0; 
    for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     temExpre = temExpre + vec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
    } 
    FSOprofit += temExpre*r[d][j]; 
   } 
  } 
  FSOprofit = FSOprofit / Ndays; 
  IloNum FSOprofit1; 
 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
 
   FSOprofit1 += p[i] * vecf[i]; 
  } 
 
  FSOprofit = FSOprofit1 - FSOprofit; 
  env.out() << "   FSOprofit(dx0)= " << FSOprofit << endl; 
 
  IloNum W; 
  W = FSOprofit - F1; 
  env.out() << "   W= " << W << endl; 
  int X = 0; 
  IloConstraintArray cc(env); 
  //solve inverse problem 
  IloModel modelinv(env); 
  IloExpr objinv(env); 
  IloExpr objinv1(env); 
  IloNumVarArray newprice(env, Ntrains, 0.0, IloInfinity, ILOFLOAT); 
  IloNumVarArray Q(env, Ntrains, 0.0, IloInfinity, ILOFLOAT); 
  vector<double> optpricevec; 
  double FSOFinalpro = 0; 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
   std::ostringstream ossX; 
   ossX << "Q" << "(" << i << ")"; 
   Q[i].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
  } 
 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
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   std::ostringstream ossX; 
   ossX << "d" << "(" << i << ")"; 
   newprice[i].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
  } 
 
  //add objective function   
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
 
   objinv += Q[i]; 
  } 
 
  modelinv.add(IloMinimize(env, objinv)); 
 
  //add constraint(newprice[i]-p<=Q[i]) 
 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
   cc.add((newprice[i] - p[i]) <= Q[i]); 
  } 
 
  //add constraint(p-newprice[i]<=Q[i]) 
 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
   cc.add((p[i] - newprice[i]) <= Q[i]); 
  } 
 
  while (W>0)// 
  { 
   optpricevec.clear(); 
 
   //calculate newprice*x0 
 
   double targetprofit1 = 0; 
 
   for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
   { 
 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     double pro = 0; 
 
     for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      pro = pro + vec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
     } 
     targetprofit1 += pro*r[d][j]; 
    } 
   } 
   targetprofit1 = targetprofit1 / Ndays; 
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   //cout<<"targetprofit1=     "<<targetprofit1<<endl; 
 
   IloExpr targetprofit(env); 
 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
 
    targetprofit += newprice[i] * vecf[i]; 
   } 
 
   targetprofit = targetprofit - targetprofit1; 
   //cout<<"targetprofit=     "<<targetprofit<<endl; 
 
   //calculate newprice*x1 
 
   double newprofit1 = 0; 
   for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
   { 
 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     double pro = 0; 
 
     for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      //cout<<"ydij=    "<<Fvec[d][i][j]<<endl; 
      pro = pro + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
     } 
     newprofit1 += pro*r[d][j]; 
    } 
   } 
   newprofit1 = newprofit1 / Ndays; 
 
   //cout << "newprofit1=    "<<newprofit1; 
   IloExpr newprofit(env); 
 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    // cout<<"k=    "<<Fvecf[i]<<endl; 
    newprofit += newprice[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
   } 
 
   newprofit = newprofit - newprofit1; 
   cout << "newprofit=     " << newprofit << endl; 
   //add constraint(dx0<dx1) 
 
   cc.add(targetprofit <= newprofit); 
 
   modelinv.add(cc); 




   cplex.extract(modelinv); 
 
   std::ostringstream INVname; 
   INVname << "INV" << X << ".lp"; 
 
   cplex.exportModel(INVname.str().c_str()); 
 
   cplex.solve(); 
 
   env.out() << "  inverse problem objective function " << 
cplex.getObjValue() << endl; 
 
   vector<double> newpricevec; 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    newpricevec.push_back(cplex.getValue(newprice[i])); 
   } 
 
 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    optpricevec.push_back(cplex.getValue(newprice[i])); 
   } 
 
   model1.remove(FSOobj); 
   objilt.clear(); 
 
   //solve original problem (FSO model) with price=newprice; 
 
   //generate new objective function for fso model 
 
   //revenue  
 
   for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
   { 
 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     IloExpr pro(env); 
 
     for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      pro = pro + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
     } 
     objilt += pro*r[d][j]; 
    } 
   } 
   objilt = 1.0*objilt / Ndays; 
 
 
   // train purchasing costs 
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   E.clear(); 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
  cout << "newpice     " << i << "               =" << cplex.getValue(newprice[i]) << 
endl; 
 
    E += cplex.getValue(newprice[i])*k[i]; 
   } 
 
   objilt = E - objilt; 
 
   //add objilt1 to model1 
   model1.add(FSOobj = IloMinimize(env, objilt)); 
   objilt.clear(); 
   //IloCplex cplex1(env); 
 
   cplex.extract(model1); 
 
   std::ostringstream FSOname; 
   FSOname << "FSO" << X << ".lp"; 
   cplex.exportModel(FSOname.str().c_str()); 
   cplex.solve(); 
   //SOLUTION for new FSO model-ydij; 
   Fvec.clear(); 
   for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
   { 
    vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
 
    for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
     vector<bool> Ftvec; 
     for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
     { 
      Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
     } 
     Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
    } 
    Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
 
   } 
 
     //solution for new FSO model-ki; 
   Fvecf.clear(); 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
 
   } 
 
   env.out() << "   Profit of FSO at ilt2 (dx1)" << "= " << 
cplex.getObjValue() << endl; 
   std::ostringstream FSOSoluion; 
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   FSOSoluion << "FSO" << X << ".sos"; 
   cplex.writeSolution(FSOSoluion.str().c_str()); 
 
   //calculate new W 
 
   //dx0 
   double NFSOprofit = 0; 
   for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
   { 
 
    for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
    { 
     double temp = 0; 
     for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      //cout<<"vec ========            
"<<vec[d][i][j]<<endl; 
 
      temp = temp + vec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
      //cout<<" temp"<<temp<<endl; 
 
     } 
     NFSOprofit = NFSOprofit + temp*r[d][j]; 
    } 
   } 
 
   //cout<<Ndays<<endl; 
   NFSOprofit = NFSOprofit / Ndays; 
 
   
   double n = 0; 
 
   for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
   { 
    n = n + newpricevec[i] * vecf[i]; 
   } 
   //env.out() <<"n====="<<n<<endl; 
   NFSOprofit = n - NFSOprofit; 
   //     env.out() << "dx0 under new price is :"<<NFSOprofit<<endl; 
 
 
   // cout<<"F1="<<F1<<endl; 
   cout << cplex.getObjValue() << endl; 
 
   FSOFinalpro = cplex.getObjValue(); 
 
   W = NFSOprofit - cplex.getObjValue(); 
 
 
   env.out() << "w==========" << W << endl; 
 
   model1.remove(objilt); 
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   objilt.clear(); 
   X++; 
   env.out() << "X========" << X << endl; 
 
  }//endwhile 
 
  double IMprofit1 = 0; 
 
  for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
  { 
 
   for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
   { 
    double temp = 0; 
    for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
 
 
     temp = temp + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
 
    } 
    IMprofit1 = IMprofit1 + temp*V*S; 
   } 
  } 
 
  double IMprofit2 = 0; 
  for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
  { 
 
   IMprofit2 = IMprofit2 - a*Fvecf[i] + optpricevec[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
 
  } 
 
  double IMprofit = 0; 
  IMprofit = -IMprofit1 + IMprofit2; 
 
  cout << "IM profit under optimal price is :   " << IMprofit << endl; 
 
  double Systemprofit = 0; 
  Systemprofit = IMprofit - FSOFinalpro; 
  cout << "System profit under optimal price is :   " << Systemprofit << endl; 
 
  env.out() << "  Maximum system Profit = " << -Maxsysprofit << endl; 
 
  double difference = 0; 
 
  difference = Systemprofit + Maxsysprofit; 
 
  cout << "difference between Maxmum system profit and system profit under 




  env.out() << "press any key to continue..." << endl; 
  getchar(); 
 
 } //end of try 
 
 catch (IloException&e) { 
  cerr << "Concert exception caught: " << e << endl; 
 } 
 catch (...) { 






 return 0; 
} 
 
























 using std::vector; 
 
static void 
 usage (const char *progname), 
 populatebyrow     (IloModel model, IloNumVarArray var, IloRangeArray con), 
 populatebycolumn  (IloModel model, IloNumVarArray var, IloRangeArray con), 
 populatebynonzero (IloModel model, IloNumVarArray var, IloRangeArray con); 
 
double Sysoptimalpro(double RS, double Price[]); 
 
   
  IloObjective FSOobj,FSOobj1,FSOobj2; 
  IloInt d,i,j,t;  
  IloInt Ndays=3; 
  IloInt Ntrains=3; 
  IloInt Norders=6; 
  double a=27; 
   
 
  IloNum r[3][6]=         
  { 
   { 101,92,97,95,95,99 }, 
   { 103,104,101,104,100,110 }, 
   { 103,92,102,101,103,112 } 
  }; 
 
  double V=0.05;  
  double S=490;  
  double grad[3]; 
  double stepL=1; 
   
  IloInt T[3][6]= 
  { 
   { 8,6,10,6,8,9 }, 
   { 12,10,12,9,12,6 }, 
   { 13,9,5,9,15,10 } 
  }; 
 
  IloInt C[3] = { 32,32,32 }; 
   ofstream myfile; 
 
  int main() 
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  { 
   myfile.open("rev.csv"); 
    
   double p[3] = { 1600,1600,2100 };//initial price per train 
 
   try { 
    double RS = 0; 
    double OPRS = 0; 
    double systemoptimalprofit = 0; 
    double systemoptimalprofit1 = 0; 
    systemoptimalprofit = Sysoptimalpro(RS, p); 
    cout << "systemoptimalprofit=" << systemoptimalprofit<<endl; 
    double q =1; 
    RS = RS + q; 
    double pp[3] = { 1600,1600,2100 }; 
    systemoptimalprofit1 = Sysoptimalpro(RS, pp); 
    cout << "systemoptimalprofit1=" << systemoptimalprofit1 << 
endl; 
    double D = 0; 
    D = systemoptimalprofit1 - systemoptimalprofit;   
    cout << "D=  " << D<< endl; 
    double gradR = 0; 
    gradR = D / q; 
 
    cout << "gradR=    " <<gradR << endl; 
    int N = 0; 
    int T = 0; 
     
   // vector<double >  
 myfile << "N=" << N << "," << "allowrance=" << RS << "," << "gradR=" << 
gradR<<"," << endl; 
    while (N < 50) 
 
    { 
     if (gradR > 0.01) 
     { 
      RS = RS + gradR*stepL; 
      N = 0; 
      OPRS = RS; 
      T++; 
      cout << "RS=" << RS << endl; 
     } 
 
     else if (gradR<0.01 && T<=0) 
     { 
      RS = RS + 2; 
 
    cout << "RS " << RS << endl; 
    cout << " The optimal system profit is :" << 
systemoptimalprofit; 
 
      N++; 
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     } 
     else if (gradR < 0.01 &&T>0) 
     { 
      cout << "The optimal RS=  " << OPRS << endl; 
      break; 
     } 
     cout << "N=" << N << endl; 
     cout << "T=" << T << endl; 
     
     
      double Nsystemoptimalprofit = 0; 
      double Nsystemoptimalprofit1 = 0; 
      double np[3] = { 1600,1600,2100 }; 
     Nsystemoptimalprofit = Sysoptimalpro(RS, np); 
     RS = RS + q; 
     cout << "RS= " << RS << endl; 
     double npp[3] = { 1600,1600,2100 }; 
     Nsystemoptimalprofit1 = Sysoptimalpro(RS, npp); 
     D = Nsystemoptimalprofit1 - Nsystemoptimalprofit; 
     gradR = D / q; 
   
     myfile << "N=" << N << "," << "Ratio=" << RS << "," 
<< "gradR=" << gradR << "systemoptimalprofit="<< Nsystemoptimalprofit<<endl; 
 
    } 
    myfile.close(); 
     
   } 
 
  catch (int e) 
  { 
   cout << "An exception occurred. Exception Nr. " << e << '\n'; 
  } 
 
  getchar(); 
   
 
  return 0; 
} 
 
 double Sysoptimalpro(double RS, double p[3]) 
 
  { 
 
  IloEnv   env; 
    
    double optimalshiftR = 0; 
    double systemprofit = 0; 
     
    double optimalprice[3] = { 0,0,0 }; 
    double optimalprofit = -100000; 
    double OPFOCprofit = 0; 
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    double FOCprofit = 0; 
    double ST = 0; 
    vector<bool>OPf; 
 
    while (ST < 20) 
    { 
     IloModel model1(env); 
     IloBoolVarArray  k(env, Ntrains); 
     IloArray<IloArray<IloBoolVarArray> >   ydij(env); 
     IloCplex cplex(env); 
     for (d = 0; d < Ntrains; d++) 
     { 
      IloArray<IloBoolVarArray> tempmatrix(env); 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
 
       IloBoolVarArray tempbool(env, 
Norders); 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
      std::ostringstream ossX; 
 ossX << "ydij" << "(" << d << ")" << "(" << i << ")" << "(" << j << ")"; 
       
 tempbool[j].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
       } 
 
       tempmatrix.add(tempbool); 
      } 
      ydij.add(tempmatrix); 
     } 
 
     //creat k   
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      std::ostringstream ossX; 
      ossX << "k" << "(" << i << ")"; 
      k[i].setName(ossX.str().c_str()); 
     } 
 
     //generate objective function 
 
     //revenue  
     IloExpr obj(env); 
     for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
     { 
      for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
      { 
       IloExpr temExp(env); 
       for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
       { 
 




       } 
       obj += temExp*r[d][j]; 
      } 
     } 
     obj = obj / Ndays; 
 
     // train purchasing costs 
     IloExpr E(env); 
 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      E += p[i] * k[i]; 
     } 
 
     obj = obj - E; 
 
     IloConstraintArray cc(env); 
 
     //generate constraints:ydij<=k 
 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
 
     { 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
        cc.add(ydij[d][i][j] <= k[i]); 
 
       } 
      } 
     } 
     //generate constraints: 2 
 
     for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
     { 
 
      for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
      { 
       IloExpr objf(env); 
 
       for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
       { 
 
        objf = objf + ydij[d][i][j]; 
 
       } 
       cc.add(objf <= 1); 
      } 




     //generate constraints 3 
 
     for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
     { 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       IloExpr objf1(env); 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
        objf1 = objf1 + ydij[d][i][j] * 
T[d][j]; 
       } 
 
       cc.add(objf1 <= C[i]); 
      } 
     } 
 
 
      
     model1.add(cc); 
     model1.add(FSOobj = IloMaximize(env, obj)); 
     
     cplex.extract(model1); 
     cplex.exportModel("ilt1.lp"); 
 
     cplex.solve(); 
     FOCprofit = cplex.getObjValue(); 
 
env.out() << "   Profit of FSO when price is " << p[0] << endl << p[1] << endl << p[2] << 
endl << "     =    " << FOCprofit << endl; 
 
     cplex.writeSolution("FSO_Initial.sos"); 
 
         
 vector<vector<vector<bool> > > Fvec; //SOLUTION for FSO model-ydij; 
 
     for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
     { 
      vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       vector<bool> Ftvec; 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
       
 Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
       } 
       Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
      } 





     } 
 
 
     for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
     { 
 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
        cout << "ydij (" << d << i << j << 
" )  =   " << Fvec[d][i][j] << endl; 
       } 
 




     } 
 
     vector<bool>FvecfL; 
      vector<bool> Fvecf; //solution for FSO model-ki; 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
 
      Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
 
     } 
 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
 
      cout << Fvecf[i] << endl; 
 
     } 
 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
 
      FvecfL.push_back(Fvecf[i]); 
 
     } 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
 





     } 
 
     double shiftrevenue = 0; 
 
     for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
     { 
      for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
      { 
 
       for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
       { 
 
        shiftrevenue += Fvec[d][i][j] * 
T[d][j]; 
 
       } 
 
      } 
     } 
     shiftrevenue = RS*shiftrevenue / Ndays; 
     model1.remove(FSOobj); 





     //IM profit 
 
     double IMformer = 0; 
     double IMr = 0; 
     double IMfixedc = 0; 
     double IMvarc = 0; 
     // double IMvarc; 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      IMr += p[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
     } 
 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
     { 
      IMfixedc += a*Fvecf[i]; 
     } 
 
     for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
     { 
 
      for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
      { 
 
       for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 





      IMvarc = IMvarc + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
 
       } 
 
      } 
     } 
 
     IMvarc = IMvarc*V*S; 
 
     IMformer = IMr - IMfixedc - IMvarc + shiftrevenue; 
 
     env.out() << "IM profit is     " << IMformer << endl; 
 
     Fvec.clear(); 
     Fvecf.clear(); 
 
     double allowrance = 0; 
 
    re: 
     if (IMformer > optimalprofit) 
     { 
      OPf.clear(); 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
 
       OPf.push_back(FvecfL[i]); 
       cout << OPf[i] << endl; 
 
      } 
 
      OPFOCprofit = FOCprofit; 
 
      allowrance = shiftrevenue; 
 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       optimalprice[i] = p[i]; 
 
       cout << "optimal price is :   " << 
optimalprice[i] << endl; 




     optimalprofit = IMformer; 
    cout << "optimal profit of IM is " << optimalprofit << endl; 
 




    systemprofit = OPFOCprofit + optimalprofit - allowrance; 
    cout << "systemprofit is " << systemprofit << endl; 
 
    optimalshiftR = shiftrevenue; 
    cout << "optimal shift revenue is  " << optimalshiftR << endl; 
    // calculate gradient of initial price 
 
     double s = 2; 
      //calculate grad[0] 
      p[0] = p[0] + s; 
 
      IloExpr obj1(env); 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
        IloExpr temExp(env); 
        for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
         temExp = temExp + 
ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
        obj1 += temExp*r[d][j]; 
       } 
      } 
      obj1 = obj1 / Ndays; 
 
      // train purchasing costs 
      IloExpr EE(env); 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       EE = p[i] * k[i] + EE; 
      } 
 
      obj1 = obj1 - EE; 
 
      model1.add(cc); 
      model1.add(FSOobj = IloMaximize(env, obj1)); 
      //objilt.end(); 
 
      cplex.extract(model1); 
      cplex.exportModel("ilt2.lp"); 
 
      cplex.solve(); 
 
     cplex.writeSolution("FSO_0.sos"); 
 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
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       vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
 
       for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
       { 
        vector<bool> Ftvec; 
        for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
        { 
        
 Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
        } 
        Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
       } 
       Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
 
      } 
 
     for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
 
      } 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
 
       cout << Fvecf[i] << endl; 
 
      } 
 
 
      double shiftrevenue01 = 0; 
 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
 
        for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      shiftrevenue01 += Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
 
       } 
      } 
      shiftrevenue01 = RS*shiftrevenue01 / Ndays; 
 
      double IMr01 = 0; 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 




      } 
 
      //cout << "IMr01=" << IMr01<<endl; 
 
      double IMfixedc01 = 0; 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       IMfixedc01 += a*Fvecf[i]; 
      } 
      // cout << "IMfixedc01=" << 
IMfixedc01<<endl; 
      double IMvarc01 = 0; 
 
      for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
      { 
 
       for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
       { 
 
        for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
 
        { 
 
       IMvarc01 += Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
 
       } 
      } 
 
      IMvarc01 = IMvarc01*V*S; 
 
      double IMcurrent01 = 0; 
   IMcurrent01 = IMr01 - IMfixedc01 - IMvarc01 + shiftrevenue01; 
 
   cout << "current IM profit when p[0]=p[0]+s is" << IMcurrent01 << 
endl; 
 
      double Prodiff = 0; 
      Prodiff = IMcurrent01 - IMformer; 
   cout << " profit difference when p[0]=p[0]+s   is:" << Prodiff << endl; 
 
      grad[0] = Prodiff / s; 
      Fvec.clear(); 
      Fvecf.clear(); 
      model1.remove(FSOobj); 
      obj1.clear(); 
 
 




      //calculate grad[1] 
      double IMr02 = 0; 
      double IMfixedc02 = 0; 
      double IMvarc02 = 0; 
 
      p[0] = p[0] - s; 
      p[1] = p[1] + s; 
 
      cout << "p[0]=" << p[0] << endl; 
      cout << "p[1]=" << p[1] << endl; 
    cout << "IM former when p[1]=p[1]+s is" << IMformer << 
endl; 
      IloExpr obj2(env); 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
        IloExpr temExp(env); 
        for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      temExp = temExp + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
        obj2 += temExp*r[d][j]; 
       } 
      } 
      obj2 = obj2 / Ndays; 
 
      // train purchasing costs 
      IloExpr EE1(env); 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       EE1 = p[i] * k[i] + EE1; 
      } 
 
      obj2 = obj2 - EE1; 
 
      model1.add(cc); 
      model1.add(FSOobj = IloMaximize(env, obj2)); 
      //objilt.end(); 
       cplex.extract(model1); 
      cplex.exportModel("ilt2.lp"); 
 
      cplex.solve(); 
 
  env.out() << "   Profit of FSO when p[1]=p[1]+s   = " << cplex.getObjValue() 
<< endl; 
 




      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
 
       for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
       { 
        vector<bool> Ftvec; 
        for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
        { 
        
 Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
        } 
        Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
       } 
       Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
 
      } 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
 
      } 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i]));
    cout << "purchasing plan is " << Fvecf[i] << endl; 
      } 
 
      double shiftrevenue02 = 0; 
 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
 
        for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      shiftrevenue02 += Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
 
       } 
      } 
      shiftrevenue02 = RS*shiftrevenue02 / Ndays; 
 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       IMr02 += p[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
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      } 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       IMfixedc02 += a*Fvecf[i]; 
      } 
 
      for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
      { 
 
       for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
       { 
 
        for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      IMvarc02 = IMvarc02 + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
 
       } 
      } 
      IMvarc02 = IMvarc02*V*S; 
 
      double IMcurrent02 = 0; 
      double Prodiff02 = 0; 
   IMcurrent02 = IMr02 - IMfixedc02 - IMvarc02 + shiftrevenue02; 
      Prodiff02 = IMcurrent02 - IMformer; 
   cout << " profit difference when p[1]=p[1]+s   is:" << Prodiff02 << 
endl; 
 
      grad[1] = Prodiff02 / s; 
      Fvec.clear(); 
      Fvecf.clear(); 
      model1.remove(FSOobj); 
      obj1.clear(); 
      cout << "grad[1]=" << grad[1] << endl; 
      //calculate grad[2] 
 
      double IMr03 = 0; 
      double IMfixedc03 = 0; 
      double IMvarc03 = 0; 
      double IMcurrent03 = 0; 
      double Prodiff03 = 0; 
      p[1] = p[1] - s; 
      p[2] = p[2] + s; 
 
      cout << "p[0]=" << p[0] << endl; 
      cout << "p[1]=" << p[1] << endl; 
      cout << "p[2]=" << p[2] << endl; 
 




      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
        IloExpr temExp(env); 
        for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      temExp = temExp + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
        obj3 += temExp*r[d][j]; 
       } 
      } 
      obj3 = obj3 / Ndays; 
 
      // train purchasing costs 
      IloExpr EE2(env); 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       EE2 = p[i] * k[i] + EE2; 
      } 
 
      obj3 = obj3 - EE2; 
 
 
    
      model1.add(cc); 
      model1.add(FSOobj = IloMaximize(env, obj3)); 
      //objilt.end(); 
 
 
      cplex.extract(model1); 
      cplex.exportModel("ilt3.lp"); 
 
      cplex.solve();    
env.out() << "   Profit of FSO when p[2]=p[2]+s   = " << cplex.getObjValue() << endl; 
 
      cplex.writeSolution("FSO_2.sos"); 
 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
 
       for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
       { 
        vector<bool> Ftvec; 
        for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
        { 
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 Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
        } 
        Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
       } 
       Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
 
      } 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
 
      } 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
      cout << "purchasing plan is " << Fvecf[i] << 
endl; 
      } 
 
      double shiftrevenue03 = 0; 
 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
 
        for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      shiftrevenue03 += Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
 
       } 
      } 
      shiftrevenue03 = RS*shiftrevenue03 / Ndays; 
 
      cout << "shiftrevenue is " << shiftrevenue; 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       IMr03 += p[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
      } 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       IMfixedc03 += a*Fvecf[i]; 




      for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
      { 
 
       for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
       { 
 
        for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      IMvarc03 = IMvarc03 + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
 
       } 
      } 
 
      IMvarc03 = IMvarc03*V*S; 
   IMcurrent03 = IMr03 - IMfixedc03 - IMvarc03 + shiftrevenue03; 
 
   cout << "IM profit when p[2]=p[2]+s is" << IMcurrent03 << endl; 
 
      Prodiff03 = IMcurrent03 - IMformer; 
 
   cout << " profit difference when p[2]=p[2]+s   is:" << Prodiff03 << 
endl; 
 
      grad[2] = Prodiff03 / s; 
      Fvec.clear(); 
      Fvecf.clear(); 
      model1.remove(FSOobj); 
      obj3.clear(); 
 
      p[2] = p[2] - s; 
      cout << "gradient at this point:" << endl; 
 
      cout << "grad[0]=" << grad[0] << endl; 
      cout << "grad[1]=" << grad[1] << endl; 
      cout << "grad[2]=" << grad[2] << endl; 
 
      //new price 
 
      for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) 
      { 
       p[i] = p[i] + grad[i] * stepL; 
 
       cout << "p" << i << "=" << p[i] << endl; 
 
      } 
 





      double IMlformer = 0, IMlcurrent = 0; 
      double IMrl = 0; 
      double IMfixedcl = 0; 
      double IMvarcl = 0; 
 
      
      IloExpr objL(env); 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
        IloExpr temExp(env); 
        for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      temExp = temExp + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
        objL += temExp*r[d][j]; 
       } 
      } 
      objL = objL / Ndays; 
 
      // train purchasing costs 
      IloExpr EL(env); 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       EL += p[i] * k[i]; 
      } 
 
      objL = objL - EL; 
 
      IloConstraintArray cL(env); 
 
      //generate constraints:ydij<=k 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
 
      { 
       for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
       { 
 
        for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
        { 
         cL.add(ydij[d][i][j] <= 
k[i]); 
 
        } 
       } 
      } 




      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
        IloExpr objf(env); 
 
        for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
         objf = objf + ydij[d][i][j]; 
 
        } 
        cL.add(objf <= 1); 
       } 
      } 
 
 
      //generate constraints 3 
 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
       { 
        IloExpr objf1(env); 
        for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
        { 
       objf1 = objf1 + ydij[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
      } 
 
        cL.add(objf1 <= C[i]); 
       } 
      } 
 
 
      //add constraints to model1 
      model1.add(cL); 
 
 
      //add objilt1 to model1 
 
      model1.add(FSOobj1 = IloMaximize(env, 
objL)); 
      //objilt.end(); 
 
      cplex.extract(model1); 
      cplex.exportModel("ilt.lp"); 
 
      cplex.solve(); 
      env.out() << "   Profit of FSO when price = " << 
"(" << p[0] << "," << p[1] << "," << p[2] << ")" << "  is" << cplex.getObjValue() << endl; 
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      FOCprofit = cplex.getObjValue(); 
      // cout << " FOC PROFIT =" << 
FOCprofit; 
      cplex.writeSolution("FSO.sos"); 
 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       vector<vector<bool>> Fivec; 
 
       for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
       { 
        vector<bool> Ftvec; 
        for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
        { 
        
 Ftvec.push_back(cplex.getValue(ydij[d][i][j])); 
        } 
        Fivec.push_back(Ftvec); 
       } 
       Fvec.push_back(Fivec); 
 




      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       Fvecf.push_back(cplex.getValue(k[i])); 
     //cout << "purchasing plan is " << Fvecf[i] << endl; 
      } 
 
 
      double shiftrevenueL = 0; 
 
      for (d = 0; d < Ndays; d++) 
      { 
       for (j = 0; j < Norders; j++) 
       { 
 
        for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      shiftrevenueL += Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
       } 
 
       } 
      } 
      shiftrevenueL = RS* shiftrevenueL / Ndays; 
 
      //shiftrevenue = shiftrevenueL; 
 
      model1.remove(FSOobj1); 
211 
 
      objL.clear(); 
 
      //IM profit  
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       IMrl += p[i] * Fvecf[i]; 
      } 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
       IMfixedcl += a*Fvecf[i]; 
      } 
 
      for (d = 0; d<Ndays; d++) 
      { 
 
       for (j = 0; j<Norders; j++) 
       { 
 
        for (i = 0; i<Ntrains; i++) 
        { 
 
      IMvarcl = IMvarcl + Fvec[d][i][j] * T[d][j]; 
 
        } 
 
       } 
      } 
 
      IMvarcl = IMvarcl*V*S; 
 
     IMlcurrent = IMrl - IMfixedcl - IMvarcl + 
shiftrevenueL; 
     env.out() << "current IM profit  is   " << IMlcurrent << 
endl; 
 
      for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
      { 
      FvecfL.push_back(Fvecf[i]); 
     } 
      Fvec.clear(); 
      Fvecf.clear(); 
 
      IMformer = IMlcurrent; 
      shiftrevenue = shiftrevenueL; 
 
      cout << "IMformer=" << IMformer << endl; 
      ST = 0; 
      goto re; 
     } 
     else 
     { 
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      double D = 1; 
 
      for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) 
      { 
       p[i] = p[i] + D; 
 
      cout << "p" << i << "=" << p[i] << endl; 
 
      } 
      ST++; 
     } 
 
    } 
    // 
 
    cout << "optimal profit of IM is    " << optimalprofit << endl; 
 
    for (i = 0; i < Ntrains; i++) 
    { 
 
     cout << "purchasing plan is " << OPf[i] << endl; 
 
     cout << "optimal price is :   " << optimalprice[i] << 
endl; 
    } 
    cout << "FOC profit:" << OPFOCprofit << endl; 
    cout << "optimal shift revenue is  " << optimalshiftR << endl; 
 
 
    cout << "the total system profit ==  " << systemprofit << endl; 
    cout << "ST=" << ST << endl; 
 
    //env.out() ; 
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